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As both a philosopher and a Christian, John Macmurray (1891-1976), spent
his life attempting to show that we are truly called to a life of unity with one
another. He makes a strong philosophical case that to be properly human is
to seek and to intend communion with others, and in his analysis of the
nature of the human person he offers uS a way of understanding that the call
to Christian unity is not simply a matter of pastoral effectiveness but one
that expresses the deepest truth of our human being, that we are most fully
ourselves when we are in communion with one another.
The call to unity among the Christian Churches is one that has largely
shaped pastoral and theological concerns over the last hundred years or
more. The efforts of the World Council of Churches and the writings of
many eminent theologians have pushed the question of ecumenism to the
forefront of Christian consciousness. It is now generally recognised among
Christians of all traditions that the failure of the Churches to give practical
expression of the unity for which Christ prayed is itself a major obstacle to
the proclamation of the Good News, and one that inhibits the message of
Jesus from being properly heard and accepted by many who are seeking
meaning in their lives.
In terms of how best to achieve the unity that so many desire, there has long
been a divide between those who argue that unity should come about
through doctrinal agreement and those who say that, while doctrine tends to
divide Christians, unity can be best achieved through a shared commitment
to practical efforts to make the world a more peaceful, just and loving place.
Something, however, that has been largely overlooked in the whole
ecumenical question is the need to find an appropriate philosophical basis
for unity among peoples and among the Churches. Without such a
philosophical underpinning, the call to unity can easily be seen as simply a
practical pastoral tool for the effective proclamation of the Gospel or as
nothing other than emotive rhetoric. In the writings ofJohn Macmurray we·
are able to find an approach to the question of ecumenism that provides us
with just such a philosophical basis for unity.
This dissertation engages in a close reading of both Macmurray's
philosophical and religious views, and suggests that, despite some
inconsistencies in his own approach, Macmurray offers the whole
ecumenical project a significant philosophical basis for the notion that in
seeking unity among the Christian Churches we are being faithful to our
nature as human beings. While not denying the sincerity of the countless
numbers of those who have committed themselves to the call for unity
among Christians, the desire for unity needs to be fortified by an
appropriate understanding of human nature. It is. argued that the
ecumenical movement can be greatly enhanced by the kind of perspective
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On his very first day of school, a five-year-old boy was asked by his teacher
what he wanted to be when he grew up. The answer he gave was that he
wanted to be "a man of knowledge".l The young boy in question, John
Macmurray, certainly achieved his desire. Born in Scotland in 1891, he lived
to the age of 85 and spent his whole life becoming, in his terms, a man of
knowledge. He spent most of his adult years in the great halls of learning,
first as student and then as lecturer and professor. Despite a wide range of
interests, ranging from science to art and from politics to international
relations, his main focus was on philosophy, and a mark of the knowledge
that he attained in that field is that he was at various times in his academic
career a lecturer in philosophy at Manchester University, and at the
University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, before moving on to
become a don at Bailiol College in Oxford. From there he moved to
London to become Grote Professor in Mind and Logic at University
College, London and completed his academic wanderings at Edinburgh,
where he was Professor of Moral Philosophy from 1944 until his retirement
in 1958.
Along with such an impressive list of academic appointments, the wide
range of Macmurray's publications also bear testimony that we are indeed
dealing with a man of knowledge. He wrote fifteen books, covering such
issues as democracy, Communism, the mearung of history, science, the
relationship between philosophy and religion, and the meaning of
1 John E. Costello,John Macmurrqy: A Biograp!?J, Flons Books, Edinburgh, 2002, p.19.
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Christianity. He also contributed a great number of articles for a variety of
publications, and was largely responsible for the BBC's influential series on
philosophy and society of the 1930s'. What emerges from even a brief
glance at the range of his publications is that Macmurray was no stereotype
philosopher, hidden in his ivory tower. He was a person who believed that
if philosophy was to be of any real value then it must engage with the social
problems of its times. His own experience of serving, first as a medic and
then as a soldier, in the First World War, convinced him that the failure of
philosophy and also of Christianity to create the conditions where people
could live in peace and friendship, called for a fresh approach to the
philosophical and religious questions of what it means to be a human
person. The courage with which he intellectually addressed the social and
political difficulties of his time reveals that being a man of knowledge was
not, for Macmurray, an invitation to solitariness, but that learning and
knowledge should be used as a contribution to the well-being of the world.
There is a passion to his writing that shows his efforts were not simply
about understanding the world, but about changing it? Such a view of the
role of learning, and of philosophy in particular, set Macmurray apart from
most of his contemporary colleagues, to such an extent that, despite the
highly impressive academic positions he held, he can be said to have never
really felt at home in the British philosophical culture of his day.
2 It was Kad Marx who famously wrote in his eleventh thesis on Feuerbach that 'The
philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to
change it". Quoted by H. Kung in Does God Exist, Doubleday & Company, New York,
1980, p.231.
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At a time when the philosophical agenda was being set by thinkers like
Wittgenstein3, Ayer4 and Gilbert RyleS, an agenda which refused to see any
significant role for philosophy beyond that of linguistic analysis and
verification, Macmw:ray's own philosophical efforts were of wider concern.
He was haunted by the attempt to come to an adequate understanding of
human natw:e, and felt that if we could only properly understand what it is
to be human then we might more easily find solutions to the many problems
besetting society and the world. His efforts received little appreciation from
his philosophical contemporaries. Ryle, famous for a book entitled The
Concept ofMinrf, dismissed Macmw:ray for writing and speaking too simply!
When Ayer, one of the most famous of the 20th centw:y English
philosophers, succeeded Macmw:ray as Grote Professor in Mind and Logic,
his inaugw:al lectw:e· was made controversial by his refusal to even mention
the name of his predecessor.
The growing sense of academic isolation that Macmw:ray must have felt was
perhaps partly lessened by the fact that there were other thinkers, though
not in Britain's academic circles, who shared many of his concerns and
values. His own philosophical approach was close to that of Martin Buber7,
author of the seminal work I and Thou8, and to certain existential thinkers
3 Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 - 1951), author of Tractacus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) and
Philosophical Investigations (1953).
4 A.J.Ayer (1910 - 1989) was one of the most significant of the logical positivists in
English philosophy, and best known for his work, Language, Truth and Logic (1936).
5 Gilbert Ryle (1900 -1976) was another of the analytic school in English philosophy.
6 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept ofMind, Penguin Books, London, 2000.
7 Martin Buber (1878 - 1965) was similar in approach to Macmurray in that he saw
human reality as essentially relational.
8 Martin Buber, I and Thou, T & T Clark, Edinburgh, 1970.
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like Gabriel Marcel9• Macmurray himself was fond of telling the story of his
lengthy meeting with Buber, after which Buber stated that there was no
significant philosophical disagreement between the two. The only
difference between them was that while Macmurray was the metaphysician,
Buber was the poet!10
Macmurray's search for an understanding of the nature of human being, one
that would be both philosophically and theologically comprehensive and
sound, is best summed up in the two books that emerged from the Gifford
Lectures11 which he had been invited to give at Glasgow University in 1953
and 1954, The Se!! as Agent and Persons in Relation. In these works, we
encounter a thinker who was unafraid to enter into debate with such
illustrious philosophers as Descartes, Kant, Hobbes and Rousseau. He was
convinced that philosophy had taken a wrong turn with the general
acceptance of Descartes' understanding of the human person as a thinker,
and that ever since, it had struggled to come to a proper understanding of
human nature. The acceptance of the Cartesian thinker had brought about a
9 Gabriel Marcel (1899 -1973) was one of the foremost French existentialist thinkers and
another who wrote about the nature of interpersonal communion.
10 John E. Costello,]ohn Macmurrf!Y: A Biograpf?], p.322.
11 In 1885 Lord Gifford made provision in his will for a series of lectures to be given at
the major Scottish universities on the topic of natural theology. Since their inception, the
Gifford Lectures have become a significant intellectual event in the question of religion.
Lectures are given in the universities at Edinburgh, St.Andrews, Glasgow and Aberdeen.
The fu:st lectures were given in 1888-89. A lecturer is given two successive years for his
lectures. The lecturers have included a prestigious and broad cross-section of scholars
from such fields as religion, philosophy, physics, and history, and have included scholars
such as Etienne Gilson, William Temple, Karl Barth, Paul Tillich, and, more recendy,
Alasdair MacIntyre and Stalliey Hauerwas, to name just a few. The lectures are often
published and achieve significant stature in the intellectual world.
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dualism between mind and body which made it impossible to account for
the unity of human life. For Macmurray, philosophical notions of the
human person had, Slice the time of Descartes, either focussed on a
mechanical or an organic perception of the world and of humanity. Neither
of these views, though partly true, presents an adequate understanding of
the universe or of the human person. The mechanical approach was to see
the universe as a determined order of reality, where everything is put in
motion and held together by mechanical forces and laws of nature. The
organic understanding of the universe was one where everything was seen as
part of an unfolding evolutionary process of life energies. While not
denying that human beings can partly be presented in these terms,
Macmurray felt that history shows the dreadful results of conceiving the
human persons in such a limited fashion. Neither a mechanical nor an
organic concept of the human person reveals the essential dignity of human
beings. To be human is to be more than a machine or an organism; it is to
be a person.
The greater part of both The Se!fas Agent and Persons in Relation is devoted to
an exposition of Macmurray's vision that the universe is more than
mechanical and organic but that it is ultimately personaL Modern
philosophy, in absorbing Descartes' view that the self is a thinker, could give
no real account of the fact that we are both persons and agents. By taking
the idea of agency as the starting point of an examination of human nature,
Macmurray believed that we might come to a fuller understanding of the
universe and our place in it. In examining the nature of the human person
from the standpoint of agency he comes to the conclusion that the deepest
truth of our humanity is not that we are thinkers or simply part of a great
organic process beyond our control, but rather that to be human is to be a
person living in a personal world. More significantly, to discover the
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personal nature of reality is to come to perceive that our relationship with
the world, with other human agents and with God is also personal. To be
fully human is to live with the intention of living out our communion with
the world, with others and with God in such a manner that peace and
goodwill becomes the hallmark of our human lives. Such a personalist
philosophy as that expressed by Macmurray will have significant
implications in the political, ethical and religious spheres, and many of his
writings serve as a guide to what those implications mean in the practical
living of human life.
Part of the reason for Macmurray's philosophical isolation can be traced to
the fact that, through his search for the meaning of human being, he came
to the conclusion that to be human is to be religious, and that the message
of Jesus reveals to us our own truest nature. While many dismissed his
views as simply another indication of his philosophical unreliability, he
himself felt that his greatest achievement was in articulating a coherent
account of human nature which gives due weight to the religious dimension
of our lives. Macmurray was convinced that the personal and religious
nature of all reality is perfectly expressed in the actions and the teachings of
Jesus. Christians, therefore, are called to manifest the truth of the personal
nature of life, through their own commitment to the intending of
communion and fellowship in the world. They are called to continue God's
action in history, to be witnesses to the fact that we are created to live in
personal relationship with God and with one another.
Sadly, the evidence of Macmurray's life suggests that, despite the depth of
his own faith in the person of Jesus, he was no more at home within the
institutional structures of the Churches than he was with the kind of
philosophy being conducted in the British academic world of his day. His
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major problem with the institutional Christian Churches was that, in his
view, they had lost sight of the radical nature of Jesus' teaching. In their
emphasis on the task of achieving salvation in the next world they failed to
grasp that Jesus was concerned with establishing the Kingdom of God here
on earth. As a result, they had fallen into the very same dualist notions that
impoverished so much of contemporary philosophy. By asking their
members to spend their life in preparation for heaven, they had absolved
themselves from finding solutions to the problems of this world.
This failure of the Churches to be faithful to the life and teaching of Jesus
was most clearly seen in their inability to offer a word of hope during the
great social crises of Macmurray's lifetime. The experience of both World
Wars showed that, rather than calling people to live out the communion that
God intends for the world, the Churches had compromised the truth and
had themselves gone along with the political, national and ideological
divisions of the time. Macmurray's own experience of this failure of the
Churches was to have a profound impact on his own relationship to
Christianity and to the Churches. Towards the end of the First World War,
while on home leave from the killing fields of France, he was invited to
preach at a Church in London. He used the opportunity to call his listeners
to focus on the need for Christians to be at the vanguard of the effort to
seek justice and reconciliation after the war had ended. His words were not
well received, and Macmurray was shocked at the hatred he felt coming
from a group of people who called themselves disciples of Jesus. The
trauma of this experience was so great that, after the First Wodd War had
come to an end, he made a decision not to be a member of any of the
institutional Churches, a decision he remained faithful to until he joined the
Society of Friends in 1959.
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Despite his refusal to participate in the institutional life and worship of the
Churches, Macmurray's personal faith in Jesus continued to be of the
greatest importance to him. His faith drove him to continually challenge the
Churches to rediscover the real significance ofJesus' life and teaching and to
accept their task of building communion between peoples whose actions are
more often guided by fear of one another than by love. He passionately
believed that only by committing themselves to finding practical expressions
of communion and love in the world could the Churches properly claim to
be made up of disciples of Christ. Only by taking practical steps to
incarnate the message of Jesus in the contemporary world could the
Churches avoid being irrelevant· to the need for human beings to properly
understand their own nature.
Some of the practical suggestions that Macmurray offered to the Churches
were at the time, and are still today, controversial. While many other
Christians shared his view that the lack of unity among the Christian
Churches was not only a scandal but also a major obstacle to the
proclamation of the message of Jesus, his solution to the problem was to
argue that unity between the Churches could not be brought about through
doctrinal agreement but only through actions in the world that create
fellowship and justice. His assertion that only a complete separation of the
structures of Church and State could prevent the Churches from being
compromised in their proclamation of the dignity of all human beings did
not garner much support from other Christian thinkers of his time.
Likewise, his belief that true Christianity was irreconcilable with the
economic practices of his day meant that he managed to alienate many well-
fed Christians who saw no contradiction between attending Church on
Sunday and seeking as much economic and political power as possible
during the rest of the week.
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It is now more than twenty-five years since the death of Macmurray, a
distance that perhaps allows us to begin to properly assess the real
significance of his thought. Was the fact that he was never quite at home in
the world of either his philosophical or Christian contemporaries a sign that
he failed in his efforts to provide a coherent philosophical and theological
vision of human nature? Or was he perhaps a prophetic figure,
uncomfortable as prophets tend to make us, reminding each of us of the
dignity of our human being, and offering the world a way to overcome the
horrors of division and war? Does the history of the world and of the
Christian Churches over the last twenty-five years offer us any hope that
Macmurray's views are no longer to be seen as either politically naive or
religiously utopian?
What cannot be doubted is that the world in which we live continues to be
marked by the divisions and competitiveness that Macmurray so abhorred.
Human beings continue to be treated as objects, political and ideological
divisions still lead to violence and death in many parts of the world, and
there is little sense of the emergence of a world community that might
overcome the manifold social problems of the contemporary world. Yet,
having said that, there are sure signs that the concerns that marked
Macmurray's academic and personal life, are being taken up by other
thinkers and by the Churches too.
From a philosophical perspective, although it remains true that much of
philosophy remains limited by relativism and by an undue humility regarding
what it might reasonably express about the nature of reality, there are a
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growing number of philosophers, like Alasdair MacIntyre
12
and Charles
Taylor13, who share Macmw:ray's belief that it is not possible to understand
the natw:e of human being without appreciation of the central fact that to be
human is to be part of a community of human beings, and that community
is largely responsible for our human identity, as well as providing the
context in which we can understand the ethical natw:e of our lives.
14
We see
similar developments in political philosophy, much of which no longer takes
for granted Hobbes' view that human beings gather together in community
out of fear and the desire for self-preservation.
It is, however, from a theological perspective that one can see the surest
signs that Macmurray's understanding of the natw:e of the human person is
being carried forward. Despite the fact that most Christians will never have
heard of Macmurray, it can be said that the vast majority of Christians and
Churches have come to share his awareness of the sinfulness of division
among the disciples ofJesus. The effort of the World Council of Churches
12 Alasdair MacIntyre (b.1929), in his famous work After Virtue (1981) argues that much
of the crisis affecting contemporary moral philosophy arises from the failure of
modernity to properly account for human nature, and proposes that we return to
Aristotle's notion of virtue ethics, which he believes reveals a more substantive
explanation of human nature than those offered in most contemporary ethical accounts.
13 Charles Taylor (b. 1931) is best known for his major work Sources 0/ the Self (1989),
which offers an historical and critical study of the modem concept of the human person.
14 MacIntyre concludes his work After Virtue with a call to create communities which are
ethically guided by the sense of what it means to live a good and virtuous life: "What
matters at this stage is the construction of local forms of community within which civility
and the intellectual and moral life can be sustained through the new dark ages which are
already upon us. And if the tradition of the virtues was able to survive the horror of the
last dark ages, we are not entirely without grounds for hope". Alasdair MacIntyre, After
Virtue, University of Notre Dame Press, Indiana, 1981, p.263.
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to achieve the unity of all Christians has itself developed, as we shall see,
along views very similar to those expressed by Macmillray. The recent
assemblies of the World Council of Churches, as well as those of the Faith
and Order Movement and Life and Work Movement, have revealed a
growing theological awareness that the question of communion is much
more than simply a practical expedient in terms of missionary effectiveness.
There is a deeper understanding that being in communion with others is the
expression of the deepest truth about religion and about human natille.
From a more personal perspective, I have long shared Macmillray's
dissatisfaction with the limitations of much of both modern and
contemporary philosophy. As a Christian, I have also felt deep sympathy
with his criticisms of the institutional Chillches and their faililles to live out
the call to create communities where all can feel at home. I too have longed
for an understanding of human natille that is both philosophically coherent
and able to guide the Chillches towards an adequate appreciation of the
central importance of friendship and communion in human life. It is
because the experience of real communion is always fragile and easily
destroyed that we need to base Oill commitment to fellowship and
friendship on more than a pious desire for unity or an emotional plea to
tolerate one another. While I make no claim that Macmurray has been the
only thinker to point us in the right direction regarding the significance of
communion with others1s, I do believe that his stringent philosophical
analysis of human natille, combined with his own profound faith in the
15 Stanley Hauerwas (b. 1940), for example, is a contemporary theologian who
approaches the subject of moral theology from the perspective of the significance of
communion and of the importance of narrative in making community possible. Among
his works are A Community of Character, University of Notre Dame Press, Indiana, 1981
and The Peaceable Kingdom, University of Notre Dame Press, Indiana, 1983.
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person of Jesus and his desire for the unity of the Churches, offers us an
approach that can still deepen the roots of our own commitment to the
unity for which Jesus prayed and died.
Given the wide scope of Macmurray's interests, it is necessary here to focus
on only a limited aspect of his work. I have chosen to take a close look at
his argument that it is by seeing the human person as agent rather than as
thinker that we can best come to a correct understanding of human nature.
I will next examine his writings on the significance ofJesus and the need for
the Churches to actively work towards the creation of real communion in
the world. This examination will help to reveal why Macmurray argued so
vehemently that the unity of the Churches should only be brought about
through practical social action and not through doctrinal agreement. It is
my intention in this thesis to show that, while his call for the Churches to be
united for the sake of the Kingdom of God is based on his philosophical
understanding of human agency, his refusal to accept that unity needs at
least a minimum of doctrinal agreement among Christians as to the nature
of Jesus and to the nature of discipleship reveals a logical inconsistency in
terms of his own philosophical understanding of action. I will conclude that
if only Macmurray had accepted that the search for doctrinal agreement
among the Churches was itself a living example of what he calls reflective
activity, then he would have recognised that the efforts of the World
Council of Churches were remarkably close to his own concern for unity
and friendship in the world.
The first chapter of my thesis, The Crisis of the Personal, will be based largely
on Macmurray's book, The Se!fas Agent, and will begin with an exposition of
Macmurray's notion that many of the social problems of his time are, at
least in part, a reflection of a philosophical and religious crisis too. It will
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explain why he believed that the fundamental problem of the day was the
difficulty of coming to a proper understanding of the nature of human
being. I will examine Macmurray's analysis of the philosophies of Descartes
and Kant and see why he felt that their major mistake was to attempt to
understand the human person as thinker rather than as agent. In so doing,
they had made the theoretical more important than the practical, and were
thereby unable to offer an adequate explanation of human action. I will next
describe Macmurray's argument that it is only by seeing the human person
as agent rather than as thinker that we can avoid the dualism which is
inherent in most post-Cartesian philosophical thought. The chapter will
also focus on Macmurray's view that, while by taking the self as agent one
can philosophically explain thinking, one cannot give an adequate account
of agency from the standpoint of the human person as thinker.
The second chapter, The Signijicance of Communion, will involve us in a close
reading of Macmurray's work, Persons in Relation. Building on his notion that
we can best understand human being from the idea of agency, I will explain
his argument that as agents we are confronted with the existence of other
agents and so with the whole question of relationships. In focussing on the
mother and child relationship, Macmurray wants to suggest that all
relationships are based on the fundamental attitudes of fear or love. I will
describe his argument that, given the fact that our relationships with others
will be based on the intention with which we approach them, the question
of intention in human action is crucial. This will lead to Macmurray's deep
conviction that since by nature we are persons in relation with others, we are
only fully ourselves when we overcome our fear of others and relate to them
with the intention of creating friendship and communion. The chapter will
continue with an elucidation of his argument that our approach to both
ethical and political issues will largely be determined by our understanding
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of relationships, and will express Macmurray's dissatisfaction with the
political and ethical approaches of Hobbes and Rousseau. The chapter will
conclude with Macmurray's explanation that while, to be true to our own
human nature, we need to intend communion and friendship with others,
there is also a deeply religious significance to the concepts of friendship and
commuruon.
The third chapter, The Significance of Religion, will continue to focus on the
arguments presented by Macmurray in Persons in Relation and will enunciate
his view that religious experience is always about community and
relationships. I will offer a summary of his rejection of the understanding of
religion of both Marx and Freud, views which have deeply affected
contemporary understanding of the nature of religion. The chapter will also
examine Macmurray's notion that religion is not only about communion,
but that it is properly inclusive too. The intention of religion is always to
overcome division and fear, and, given the fact that community life is always
fragile and easily broken, religion helps to create the conditions where unity
is preserved and deepened. I will then explain Macmurray's distinction
between what he terms real and unreal religion. If religion is to be real then
it must accord with the fundamental truths of human nature, that we are
agents in the world, and that through our agency we intend communion
with one another. This will lead us to another fundamental aspect of true
religion. If our experience as persons is that of agents in communion with
others, then our relationship with God must also be personal and concerned
with communion and friendship.
The fourth chapter, The Significance of Jesus, will attempt to express
Macmurray's understanding of the person ofJesus, an understanding that is
in harmony with the philosophical views already shown in the previous
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chapters. The thoughts of Macmurray on this question will largely be drawn
from his book The Clue to History, published in 1938. The starting point will
be Macmurray's belief that to be a Christian is not so much to share in a set
of doctrinal beliefs about Jesus, but to have some share in the intention that
directed Jesus' own life and actions. I will next reveal why he felt that Jesus'
intentions and actions can themselves only be properly understood when
seen within the context of the history of the Jewish people. The great value
of the Jewish religious consciousness, for Macmurray lies in the fact that it
sees all action and the whole of history from a profoundly religious
perspective. Thus, Judaism manages to avoid the dualistic division, between
theory and practice and between doctrine and action, that is to be found in
most other religions. The other significant factor that Jesus inherits from
the Jewish religious tradition is that religion is concerned with this world and
with the establishment of God's kingdom on earth. The chapter will then
focus on Macmurray's argument that the clear intention ofJesus was to lead
people to be true to their own nature and so to build communities of love
and friendship. For Christians, to intend communion and friendship with
others is to share in the intentions of Jesus. I will conclude the chapter by
examining Macmurray's view that through the compromises that the
Churches have made in history, such as the linking of the Christian faith
with the powers of the Roman Empire, the Churches have failed to
continue to act with the intention of Jesus in seeking the unity and
communion that God wills for us.
The fifth chapter, The Significance of Unity for the Churches andfor the World, will
begin with a description of Macmurray's own personal faith journey, and
will attempt to show that his philosophical and theological understanding of
the nature of human beings and of the reality of religion, was itself built on a
personal relationship and commitment to the person of Jesus. Attention
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will be paid to his decision not to give allegiance to any of the institutional
Churches a decision which stemmed from his view that the Churches had,
been unable to offer any meaningful answer to the crisis of the First World
War. I hope to show that, despite his decision, he remained convinced
about the truth of Christianity and indeed continued to be deeply involved
in the effort to make the Churches more faithful to the message of Jesus.
The chapter will also focus on a late work of Macmurray's, Search for Reality
in Religion, in which he addresses his fellow Quakers, the Society which he
joined in 1959. In this book he covers much of the same ground as that
discussed in the previous chapter, but I will pay particular attention to what
Macmurray considers to be the main failures of the Churches; that in
shifting the main focus of Christianity from action to doctrine they fall into
dualism, and that by calling believers to work towards the Kingdom of God
in heaven they fail to take seriously the need to establish the Kingdom here
on earth. I will conclude the chapter by noting Macmurray's view on how
the Churches ought to act in the future if they are to have anything
worthwhile to contribute to the needs of the world. The major tasks that
the Churches must commit themselves to is to bring about the unity of all
Christians, to avoid the temptation to seek worldly power and, within the
economic and social sphere, to find a practical means of expressing the
solidarity of all peoples.
The sixth and final chapter, A Sign of Hope: The Ecumenical Movement, will
begin with a review of Macmurray's position on the need for the Churches
to offer a visible sign of unity to the world, and with his position that such
unity can only be brought about through practical social action and not
through doctrinal agreement. I will then compare his views with the efforts
of the Ecumenical Movement in the 20th century to come to that unity
which is called for by God. Particular reference will be made to the
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assemblies of the World Council which took place during Macmurray's own
lifetime. It will be my argument that although the Ecumenical Movement
has also experienced a tension between moving towards unity through
action and through doctrinal agreement, the documents of the World
Council of Churches suggest that both elements are needed if unity is to be
properly achieved. I will also contend that Macmurray failed to appreciate
the complexity of achieving unity even when it is intended by Christians,
and that it can be even more difficult to find agreement about what actions
Christians should take in the world than it is to come to doctrinal agreement
about the nature of Jesus and the self-understanding of Christians. While
admitting that the efforts of the World Council of Churches do not
necessarily prove that Macmurray was mistaken in his refusal to see any
meaningful role for doctrinal agreement between the Churches, I will
conclude my thesis by suggesting that Macmurray's argument can be
criticised from his own philosophical view of the human person as agent.
Given his view that the person is best understood from the perspective of
agency, Macmurray argued that thinking can be described as a form of
reflective activity, and done for the sake of action. I will suggest that
Macmurray's refusal to see any value in seeking doctrinal agreement points
to a logical inconsistency in his own thought, and that if he had seen the .
efforts to find doctrinal unity as a form of reflective activity, conducted for
the sake of the Kingdom, then he might have viewed the efforts of the
World Council of Churches as offering the world a practical image of his
own philosophical and religious vision.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE CRISIS OF THE PERSONAL
The Crisis in Contemporary Philosophy
John Macmurray was invited to give the Giff01:d Lectures at the University
of Glasgow in 1953 and 1954. His lectures were subsequendy published in
two volumes, The Seif as Agent and Persons in Relation. A careful reading of
these texts reveals that they present Macmurray's mature thought on the
nature of the human person and on the significance of religion in human life
and therefore offer us a way to critically examine his ideas. In the opening
chapter of The Seifas Agent he offers the reasons why he had chosen to focus
on the question of the form of the personal in the Gifford Lectures.
For this choice I had two marn reasons; the first, that it is, in my
judgement, the emergent problem for contemporary philosophy; the
second, that it directs attention to that aspect of our common experience
from which religion springs and is in this respect appropriate for the
purpose of the Gifford foundation. For it is characteristic of religion that
it behaves towards its object in ways that are suitable to personal
intercourse; and the conception of a deity is the conception of a personal
ground of all that we experience. If then human reason, unaided by
revelation, can contribute anything to theology, it is through a
philosophical analysis of the personal that we should expect this to be
brought to light.16
16 John Macmurray, The Selfas Agent, Humanity Books, 1999, p.1?
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Macmurray is quick to assert that the attempt to express a natural theology
in the terms he has just described is problematic. Natural theology is seen
as a theology which is based on our common human experience of the
world, and which is not dependent on particular religious experiences or a
particular faith content. It is rather something which should be discovered
by reason alone. Yet many people would deny that a natural theology is
even possible.
In our time philosophers and theologians tend to unite, it would seem, in
agreement that religion must rest upon its own evidence, and that any
knowledge we may have of the divine must be revealed to us in 'religious'
experiences whose validity is evidenced by an inner conviction of their
authenticity in those to whom they are granted.17
It is Macmurray's view that while both theologians and philosophers tend to
see an unbridgeable gap between faith and reason, the whole movement of
philosophy since the time of Descartes has moved in the general direction
of atheism.
The more closely modern philosophy keeps to its programme, and the
more purely objective its procedure becomes, the more inevitable is the
atheism of its conclusion. Within the limits of its assumptions no other
result is permissible. Yet I cannot accept the conclusion, in spite of its
logical necessity...The view that there is no path from common
experience to a belief in God; that religion rests upon some special and
extraordinary type of experience apart from which it could not arise - this
seems to me hardly credible.18
16 John Macmurray, The Selfas Agent, p.18.
18 John Macmurray, The SelfasAgent, p.19.
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One of the reasons why Macmw:ray finds this viewpoint hardly credible is
because, in his understanding, religion is the original and universal
expression of the human capacity to reflect on the meaning and purpose of
life. While this does not in itself prove the validity of religious belief, it does
at least suggest that there is value in coming to a proper philosophical
understanding of the nature of belief. He goes on to suggest that by
examining the emergent problem of contemporary philosophy, which he
considers to be the form of the personal, one will come to a deeper
realisation of the centrality of religion in human and personal being, and so
move away from atheism to a more theistic vision of reality.
It is clear that the fust task is therefore to articulate in more depth the
problem that contemporary philosophy is facing. In Macmw:ray's view
there is a clear link to be found between philosophy and the social context
in which it arises. The philosophy of any historical period will be at least in
part determined by the social realities of that same historical age. It follows
that times of significant social change will demand a change in philosophical
outlook too; and the history of the 20th century, one of real social and
political change, presents a major philosophical challenge to the
contemporary world.
We need only recognise the break: with tradition which is apparent in all
fields in our own society - in religion and morals, in politics and
economics, and in the arts. In such circumstances we should expect to
find a break in the continuity of philosophical development, a radical
criticism of traditional philosophy and a search for new ways and new
beginnings. And this we do find. 19
19 John Macmurray, The Se!!as Agent, p.26.
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Macmurray suggests that a philosophical response to the contemporary
break with tradition can be found in both logical positivism20 and in
existentialism21 . While offering very different approaches to the need for a
new philosophical expression, they share an understanding that the
traditional methods of philosophy can no longer be sustained in a radically
changed world. Although Macmurray agrees that there is a need to find new
philosophical expressions, he argues that both logical positivism and
existentialism fail to provide an adequate response to the crisis of the world
which he sees as being a crisis of understanding the nature of personal
being.
Existentialism has discovered, with sensitiveness of feeling, that the
philosophical problem of the present lies in a crisis of the personal;
logical empiricism recognises it as a crisis of logical form and method.
Both are correct, and both are one-sided. The cultural crisis of the
present is indeed a crisis of the personal. But the problem it presents to
philosophy is a formal one. It is to discover or to construct the
intellectual form of the personal.22
20 Logical Positivism was a philosophical movement which began in the 1920s and was
very popular for a period of about 30 years. In its focus on verification and the belief
that any meaningful statement needs to be verifiable it led to the notion that the
assertions of religion and ethics, insofar as they cannot be verified, are ultimately
meaningless.
21 Existentialism was a philosophical and literary movement that emerged in France in
the aftermath of the Second World War. Jean Paul Sartre, Gabriel Marcel and Karl
Jaspers are among the more famous existentialist thinkers. Philosophically,
Existentialism focuses on the uniqueness of human individuality rather than on the
notion of abstract universal human qualities.
22 John Macmurray, The SelfasAgent, p.29.
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Macmurray suggests that a brief look at the crisis of the personal in terms of
contemporary history may enable us to specify more clearly the nature of
the questions that philosophy has to respond to if it is to find a meaningful
answer to the problems of contemporary society. He declares that two of
the major trends in society that point to the real crisis in the world are the
growing power of the state and the decline of religious belief and practice.
These two trends are closely related, as can be seen in the fact that there is a
growing tendency to seek salvation through political rather than religious
authority. It is Macmurray's belief that "the apotheosis of political power
involves the subordination of the personal aspect of human life to its
functional aspect".23 The two great political movements of Macmurray's
time were Communism and Fascism, and the reason he was ultimately so
opposed to them is precisely that as ideologies they reduce the human
person to the status of a functionary. The political crises of his time were
therefore to be understood as largely arising from an inappropriate
conception of the nature of the human person.
It is likewise Macmurray's opinion that the crisis in religion and the decline
in religious belief can largely be said to arise from a failure to understand
human nature. He states that the decline in religious belief manifests and
also intensifies a growing carelessness and indifference to the personal
values that are most significant for all human beings.
Christianity, in particular, is the exponent and the guardian of the
personal, and the function of organised Christianity in our history has
been to foster and maintain the personal life, and to bear continuous
witness, in symbol and doctrine, to the ultimacy of personal values. If
this influence is removed or ceases to be effective, the awareness of
23 John Macmurray, The Se!!as Agent, p.29.
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personal issues will tend to be lost, in the pressure of functional
preoccupations, by all except those who are by nature especially sensitive
to them.24
There is, for Macmurray, a clear link between the social crises of the 20th
century and the need for philosophy to create an adequate notion of human
being. Modern philosophy has, no doubt unwittingly, contributed to
creating a world where people are seen as functionaries rather than as
persons, and as isolated individuals rather than as beings who .find true
fulfilment through being in communion with others. Macmurray suggests
that in order to find a way out of the social, philosophical and religious crisis
of the contemporary world it is necessary to find a new philosophy that will
allow us to discover what it is to be a human person.
The form of the personal will be the emergent problem. Such a new
phase of philosophy would rest on the assertion that the Self is neither a
substance nor an organism, but a person. Its immediate task would be to
discover the logical form through which the unity of the personal can be
coherently conceived.25
In order to make the fundamental philosophical shift that will allow us to
understand human nature more properly, Macmurray suggests that we need
to approach the question of the Self not in terms of the Cartesian thinker,
but from the more practical standpoint of the human person as agent. Also,
it is necessary to see the human person not as an isolated, individual being
but as a being who can only be rightly understood in terms of being in
relationship with othe:r persons.
24 John Macmurray, The Se!!asAgent, p.30.
25 John Macmurray, The Se!!as Agent, p.37.
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The isolated, purely individual self is a fiction. In philosophy this
means ... that the unity of the personal cannot be thought as the form of
an individual self, but only through the mutuality of personal relationship.
This ... compels us to abandon the traditional individualism or
egocentricity of our philosophy. We must introduce the second person
as the necessary correlative of the first, and do our thinking not from the
standpoint of the 'I' alone, but of the 'you and 1'.26
This is the task that Macmurray sets out for himself, and he declares that the
remainder of The 5e!f as Agent will be devoted to the attempt to understand
personhood from the aspect of agency while the second volume of his
Gifford Lectures, published as Persons in Relation, will examine the
significance of the mutuality of the personal.
Romanticism, Kant and Descartes
Macmurray next turns to an examination of the ways that Romanticism has
influenced philosophy, and how Romanticism emerges as a reaction to the
philosophical ideas of both Kant and Descartes. His hope is that by making
a deep study of each of these influential views he might more clearly show
why it is necessary to make agency rather than thought the perspective that
manifests the true nature of the human person.
According to Macmurray, Romanticism has often been understood as being
primarily concerned with matters either literary or artistic. While it was
undoubtedly a literary and artistic movement, he prefers to see Romanticism
as something that created a revolution in terms of both social outlook and
thought. The Romantic philosophy that emerged in eighteenth and
26 John Macmucray, The Se!!as Agent, p.38.
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nineteenth century Germany, and particularly the Romantic understanding
of reason, can be seen as a response to Kant's philosophy of reason.
Indeed, some of the most notable German Romantic philosophers, such as
Herder27, were in fact pupils of Kant. Writers such as Hamann
28
, Herder
and Lessing29, in turning away from the abstract and scientific notions of
reason they found in Kant, proposed rather that aesthetic intuition and the
imagination are the purest and fullest form of knowing available to us.
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Given such a view, it is feelings and emotions that are closer to the fullness
of knowing than is pure intellect. One should trust more to the power of
intuition than to scientific reasoning.
The Romantic understanding of the human person is also radically different
from that of Kant. For the Romantics, each person is part of both nature
and society. Because each person is social by nature one can suggest that it
is culture rather than the laws of science that provides us with the most
appropriate means of understanding personal existence. Another
significant aspect of Romantic philosophy is its organic view of the human
person and indeed of the whole of life. According to the teleological view
that is inherent in Romanticism, each individual being is aimed at a
27 Johann Gottmed von Herder (1744 - 1803) studied theology at the University of
Konigsberg and while there fell under the intellectual influence of Kant.
28 Johann Georg Hamman (1730 - 1788) was another German philosopher who lectured
at the University of Konigsberg.
29 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729 - 1781) was an influential figure in the Romantic
Movement. He believed that all religions share an equal dignity. No single religion
possesses the fullness of truth; rather, they present only moments in the ethical and
practical history of humanity.
30cf. John E. Costello,fohn Macmurrqy: A Biogrcrpf!y, Floris Books, Edinburgh, 2002, p.131.
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progressive self-realisation and fulfilment. Indeed, the whole of creation can
be understood in this way, so that all things in our world are participating in
a progressively unfolding universe. Romantic philosophy therefore
encourages the notion of an evolutionary world, where each being aims at
both personal growth and at finding its proper place within the wider
evolutionary pattern of the universe.
While Macmurray is grateful to Romanticism for offering a view of the
human person which gives space to the emotions as a valid form of
knowing, he remains unconvinced that their organic and evolutionary
understanding of the person and of the universe is finally sustainable. In
particular, he believes that Romanticism ultimately offers a diminished
vision of human nature, one where each person is only part of a greater
evolutionary process. It is precisely such a view that, in failing to take
account of the freedom and the dignity of each person, has permitted the
great atrocities of the twentieth century. According to Macmurray's
understanding therefore, Romanticism can at best offer only a partial
explanation of the human person, one which highlights the fact that
knowledge has as much to do with feeling as with thinking.
Having examined Romanticism in terms of its reaction to the ideas of Kant,
Macmurray is now ready to look more closely at Kant's own philosophical
views. He begins by applauding the central place that Kant31 enjoys in the
history of philosophy. His is a philosophy that is notable· for the
comprehensive unity of its concerns and for the way in which all subsequent
31 Immanuel Kant (1724 - 1804) is recognised as being one of the most important
philosophical thinkers of modem times. Among his works are Cn'tique of Pure Reason
(1787), Critique ofPractical Reason (1788), and Groundwork to the Metap!?Jsics ofMorals (1785).
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philosophy has been unable to ignore Kant's vision. MacmUfray believes
that Kant's approach to Romantic philosophy was one of critical sympathy.
The major difference between Romantic philosophy and the earlier
philosophical views of Descartes lies in the place each gives to the role of
the imagination in knowledge. While Cartesian philosophy sees the
imagination as unreliable in terms of producing certain knowledge, the
Romantics argued that it is precisely imagination .that underlies all
experience and all forms of knowing. Kant, while being sympathetic to the
role of the imagination, is at the same time critical in that such imaginings
must necessarily elude necessary objectivity. Imagination cannot yield
certain knowledge.
In turning to a deeper examination of Kant's philosophical. notions,
Macmurray acknowledges that he is not offering a sufficiendy detailed
criticism of Kant, but rather that "we must confine ourselves ... to those
general features of Kant's doctrine which are essential to our purpose".32
However, in order to make sense of Macmurray's criticism of Kant it may
be helpful to offer a brief synopsis of the main aspects of Kant's views.33
It has often been suggested. that Kant is responsible for creating a
Copernican revolution in philosophical thinking, one that all subsequent
philosophers have been unable to escape. He attempted to move beyond .
what had been seen as an inevitable dichotomy between rationalism and
empiricism. The rationalists had argued that we are able to understand the
world by the use of reason while the empiricists had long argued that all our
32 John Macmurray, The Se!/asAgent, p.47.
33A good summary of Kant's thinking is to be found in the article on Kant in The
Philosophers, edited by Ted Honderich, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 115 -122.
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knowledge must be based on experience. Kant's way forward, and indeed
his Copernican revolution, was to suggest that we need to examine the
whole question of epistemology from a different angle. Rather than ask
how it is that we are able to understand the world, we should ask how it is
that the world comes to be understood by us. Instead of suggesting that it is
reason or experience that allows our concepts to match the actual nature of
objects, in fact it is the structure of our concepts that give shape to our
experience of objects. The truly radical nature of Kant's argument emerges
when he suggests that we cannot know anything at all of the world as it is in
itself but we can only know the world as it appears to us. If taken seriously,
Kant's view would have profound implications not only for epistemology,
but also for ethics and for religion.
Much of Kant's philosophy, particularly in Critique ofPure Reason and Critique
of Practical Reason, is concerned to show how reason determines the
conditions under which experience and knowledge are possible. He draws a
distinction between what he calls apn"orijudgements and aposten·onjudgements.
All a priori judgements are based solely on reason, independent of any
sensory experience, and therefore apply with complete universality. A
posteriori judgements, on the other hand, are grounded in experience and
are consequently limited and uncertain. !<ant next draws another major
distinction between analYtic judgements and synthetic judgements. Analytic
judgements are those whose predicates are completely contained in their
subjects; they are purely explanatory and add nothing to our concept of the
subject. Synthetic judgements are those whose predicates are wholly distinct
from their subjects, and they must be shown to relate to them through some
connection which is external to the concepts themselves. Synthetic
judgements are therefore informative in that they do tell us something about
the subject but they require justification by reference to an outside principle.
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Kant argued that synthetic a priori judgements are necessary to provide the
basis for much of our human knowledge. Mathematics, arithmetic and
geometry provide us with examples of such judgements, and natural science
depends on synthetic a priori judgements in order to explain natural events.
Metaphysics, Kant suggests, must also be based on such judgements if it is
to offer anything meaningful. But how is it possible to make synthetic a
priori judgements at all? This is the crucial question that Kant must answer
if his thesis is to be maintained.
Turning first to the question of mathematical principles, Kant suggests that
they offer us a clear picture of synthetic a priori judgements at work. Taking
the example of a triangle, how can we know that the interior angles of a
triangle must add up to a straight line? Our knowledge of this must be a
priori, since it applies with complete universality to all the objects of our
experience without having been derived from that experience itself. Our
knowledge of the triangle's interior angles adding up to a straight line must
also be synthetic since, although such knowledge contributes to our
understanding of the world, the sum of the interior angles is not contained
in our concept of a triangle. Now, if experience cannot provide us with
the required connection between the concepts involved, where does our
knowledge of the truths of triangles come from? Kant's argument is that
such knowledge is imposed by ourselves. We impose, as a precondition on
all the possible objects of our experience, conformity with the truths of
mathematics. The same holds true for our knowledge of the natural world.
Kant held that the general laws of nature, like mathematical truths, cannot
be known to us through experience. These laws of nature are general
principles that we impose on everything that we experience. So, rather than
suggesting that we are able to know the world through our rationality or
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through sense exper:tence, Kant suggest that it is synthetic a priori
judgements that provide the necessary foundations for our human
knowledge.
This suggestion leads us directly to Kant's distinction between the noumenal
world and the phenomenal world, or the world as it is and the world as it
appears to us. All our synthetic a priori judgements apply only to the world
as it appears to us. The world as it is in itself is absolutely beyond our
capacity to know, since we can never have any experience of it. What Kant
is here suggesting is that we can know something of the world as it appears
to us, but only because we ourselves impose a meaningful structure on it.
In his attempt to describe the possibilities of knowledge Kant is next forced
to confront the question of metaphysics. The difficulty of metaphysics is
that it aims to completely transcend experience in the attempt to discover
the nature of being and reality itself through pure reason. But if, as Kant
suggests, we cannot know the world as it really is, how is it possible for us to
have any metaphysical knowledge? It is impossible that we can make any
synthetic a priori judgements about things as they are in themselves. Kant's
way out of this dilemma is to argue that, as rational beings, we have to think
of the world as it is in itself as if our speculations about it are in fact true.
He suggests that although we cannot have any real knowledge of the world
as it is, we are forced to posit certain factors that ultimately we can only
believe to be true. Among the things that we need to believe about the
world as it really is are the ideas that we are substantial beings, that we are
free to act in a world that is causally determined and that God exists.
To conclude this basic summary of Kant's approach to epistemology, he
argues that most of the things that we take to be most true about ourselves
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are in fact nothing other than expressions of hope that our experience of the
world is not meaningless. We are therefore forced to impose order on the
world as it appears to us, though with no certainty that there is any
connection between the world as it appears to us and the world as it actually
is. It was perhaps for this reason that Kant himself came to the conclusion
that the real value of his philosophy lay in his ability "to criticise reason in
order to make room for faith".
Returning now to Macmurray's view of Kant's Copernican revolution in
philosophy, while it is clear that he ~eady admires Kant's efforts, he
declares himself unhappy with many aspects of Kant's philosophical
epistemology. In particular he feels that Kant's distinction between pure
reason and practical reason is fundamentally problematic. Given that
Macmurray's main concern is to come to a proper understanding of human
nature, he argues that one needs to know the precise relationship between
pure reason and practical reason, and that a decision needs to be made as to
whether pure reason or practical reason is primary. Such a decision would
have important implications in terms of understanding human being and
human knowledge.
According to Macmurray, Kant's way out of the dilemma as to whether pure
reason or practical reason is primary is to suggest a distinction between the
roles of understanding and of reason. Understanding is concerned with the
world of objects as they reveal themselves to us through the senses. Kant
produces a set of categories which can be applied to our sense experience
and to imagination and intuition in order to produce knowledge of the
limited and conditioned world of objects. Understanding therefore offers us
practical knowledge. Reason, on the other hand, concerns itself with the
ultimate nature of things. It deals with purely formal concepts and offers
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rules or principles which can impose proper order on the imagination.
Reason, as distinct from understanding, offers us theoretical knowledge.
However, while striving to reach knowledge of what lies beyond the world
of senses or the world as it appears to us, reason is ultimately doomed to
failure in this effort. The root of this failure lies in the fact that reason
cannot actually verify anything beyond sense experience: Nor can it succeed
in reaching the 'thing-in-itself which lies beyond the limitations of human
categories.
Having interpreted Kant's efforts to express the relationship between pure
reason and practical reason as one where they both are necessary but serve
different epistemological functions, Macmurray comes to the conclusion
that Kant's efforts are doomed to failure. This failure is largely due to
Kant's inability to offer a coherent connection between the two worlds that
he posits, the world as it is in itself and the world as it appears to us. The
idea of the world as it is in itself presumes the primacy of the theoretical in
reason while the idea of the world as it appears to us supposes the primacy
of the practical. Again, Kant's Critique ofPure Reason presumes the priority of
thought, formal concepts and categories, but his Critique of Practical Reason
argues for the primacy of praxis or action. This inability to relate pure
reason to practical reason in any meaningful sense means, for Macmurray,
that Kant falls into the fatal trap of dualism. He then goes on to make more
explicit the reasons for his ultimate rejection of Kant.
We must now turn to the criticism of Kant's philosophy as a whole;
leaving aside all questions of detail, however important. There are two
major criticisms to be made, one concerning its coherence, the other with
reference to its adequacy. The first is that there is a radical incoherence
in Kant's method of relating the theoretical and the practical activities of
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Reason; the second that he fails to do justice to the religious aspect of
h
. 34uman expenence.
The incoherence that Macmurray finds in Kant stems from the attempt to
bring theory and practice together. It is Macmurray's view that Kant
constructs his whole philosophical vision on the presupposition that pure
reason is primary. A deeper examination of the conclusions of Kant's
philosophy however reveals that it is practical reason that is primary. This
can be seen clearly in Kant's ethical views on the rationality of ethics, a
matter that is inherently practical.
Despite the fact that Macmurray takes Kant's philosophy to be essentially
incoherent, he'does not deny that Kant offers important insights and creates
an opening that may help to manifest more clearly what best defines human
being. "The Critical Philosophy (of Kant) points the way, even if it forbids
the attempt, to a formal reconstruction which would start from the primacy
of the practical, and take up into itself the theoretical as an element within
the practical".35 In concluding that reason is primarily practical Kant has
opened the door that may allow us to see the human person from a more
active and practical standpoint than that of the thinking being.
Having dealt with the inadequacy of Kant's philosophy in terms of its
incoherence, Macmurray next turns to what he perceives as Kant's failure to
give an adequate account of the significance of religion in human
experience. The fundamental weakness of Kant's account of religion is that
he fails to understand the centrality of religious belief in human life.
34 John Macmurray, The Se!!asAgent, p.63.
35 John Macmurray, The Se!!asAgent, p.69.
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It treats religion not as a distinct field of experience, grounded in a form
of judgement which claims to be valid in its own right, but simply as a set
of beliefs which are justifiable pragmatically in so far as they tend to
support the rational will in its struggle against the incitements of
inclinations.36
Macmw:ray's mam concern however is not so much with the details of
Kant's inadequate account of religious experience but rather the reason
behind Kant's views. The major failw:e in Kant is to be found in the fact
that the starting point of his philosophy is the adoption of the Cartesian '1
think' as the centre of reference in the search for knowledge. Such a starting
point, Macmw:ray believes, makes it impossible to do justice to religious
experience. Since thought is inherently private, then any philosophy which
begins with the idea of the self as a thinking being is committed thereby to
viewing the human person in pw:ely individual and egocentric terms. By
taking the idea of the self as thinker as being the primary reality of human
being one cannot give an adequate account of the mutuality of persons or of
religious belief.
The form of religious experience involves the distinction between the
first and second persons. The idea of 'God' is the idea of a universal
'Thou' to which all particular persons stand in personal relation. The
question of the validity of religious belief is a question of the validity of
this form. Consequently, a philosophy which does not formally recognise
the distinction between 'I' and 'You' cannot even formulate the religious
problem, and a Critique of religion is thus rendered impossible.37
36 John Macmurray, The Selfas Agent, p.70.
37 John Macmurray, The Selfas Agent, p.72.
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The problem that any critique of religious expenence has to confront is
precisely the problem of interpersonal knowledge. According to
Macmurray, Kant's inability to come to an appropriate understanding of
religion stems from the fact that he cannot do justice to, or even allow room
for, the fact that as human beings we can know one another and that
interpersonal relations are constitutive of human experience. This failure in
the Critical philosophy of Kant suggests that the roots of all the difficulties
are to be found in his inadequate starting point.
These two criticisms of !<ant's philosophy - of its formal coherence and
its formal adequacy - have a common root. It is that any philosophy
which takes the 'Cogito' as its starting point and centre of reference
institutes a formal dualism of theory and practice; and that this dualism
makes it formally impossible to give any account, and indeed to conceive
the possibility of persons in relation, whether the relation be theoretical,
as knowledge, or practical, as cooperation.38
A further difficulty that emerges in taking the 'Cogito' as the starting point
in philosophy is that it makes the notion of action logically inconceivable.
No matter how far we take a process of thought it cannot, by itself, become
an action, nor can thought ever spontaneously generate any action.
After this lengthy critique of Kant, Macmurray wants to suggest that despite
the many weaknesses of Critical philosophy, it can still provide a way
forward in the attempt to grasp a fuller understanding of what it means to
be a human person. But such a way forward can only be found if we start
from Kant's conclusion that practical reason is primary and thereby avoid
the difficulties inherent in the notion that the theoretical is primary.
38 John Macmurray, The Se!!as Agent, p.73.
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The final question then which the Critical philosophy leaves on our hands
is this, 'Is it possible to take its conclusion - that reason is primarily
practical - as the starting point and centre of reference for a new effort of
philosophical construction?' Can we substitute for the '1 think' the '1
do';>39
In order to strengthen his thesis that it is necessary to begin with the idea of
action if we are to come to a correct understanding of being, Macmurray
next turns his attention to the philosophy of Descartes40• It is Descartes
who introduced a radical turn in philosophy by introducing, through his
famous Method of Doubt, the idea of the self as a thinker. All philosophy
subsequent to Descartes, exemplified in Kant, has taken the 'Cogito' as the
starting point of philosophical investigation. The new philosophical
tradition initiated by Descartes has of course been criticised but, in
Macmurray's view, these criticisms have all been internal criticisms that
accept Descartes' foundational principle. It might be better therefore to
attempt to criticise Descartes from a different angle.
The 'Cogito' establishes a new starting point and centre of reference for
philosophical reflection; it can only be challenged from outside the
tradition it establishes, by establishing a different starting point, with
which it can be shown to be incompatible.41
39 John Macmurray, The Se!!asAgent, p.74.
40 Rene Descartes (1596 ...,... 1650) is universally acknowledged as being the thinker who did
most to lay the philosophical foundations of the modem period in the western tradition.
His most famous works are Discourse on Method (1637) and Meditations on First Philosophy
(1641), both of which aim to achieve philosophical certainty without relying on the
metaphysical presuppositions of all earlier philosophy and theology.
41 John Macmurray, The Se!!eJSAgent, p.75.
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Descartes was able to come to the certainty of the existence of the mind,
and therefore to the existence of the self as thinker, through his method of
doubting everything in order to find certain knowledge. The end result of
doubting everything is that we can be certain that we are thinking, therefore
the one certainty that we can have is that the thinking self exists. One result
of the acceptance of Descartes' method by most, if not all, subsequent
philosophers is that knowledge came to be understood as something utterly
different than belief. Only by doubting everything and by a process of
rational criticism could one move from belief to true knowledge.
Macmunay argues that both Descartes' method of doubt and his notion of
the self as a thinking being must be rejected. He suggests that belief and
knowledge, rather than being quite different, are in fact closely related.
Belief should be seen as being a necessary aspect of knowledge. For
anything to be truly knowledge it must also be believed by someone.
Knowledge cannot exist in a void; it must always be somebody's knowledge.
Macmurray is prepared to accept that a proposition may be true even
although no one actually believes in the truth of that proposition, but a
proposition, even if true, cannot be an element in knowledge unless it is
believed.
Macmurray's major difficulty with Descartes, however, is that his
philosophical method inevitably leads to a dualism between practical and
theoretical activity. The problem of the 'Cogito ergo sum'is that, in spite of
its form, it does not infer real existence from thought but rather identifies
the two. Thought becomes the essence of being, and this immediately
creates an insurmountable dichotomy between thought and action. The
same dichotomy is to be found in Kant's distinction between pure reason
and practical reason. Descartes' commitment to the idea of the self as
thinker presupposes that the theoretical is primary, and this notion has been
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one which has had a profound influence on all subsequent philosophy.
Macmurray is anxious to show that such a view cannot do justice to the true
nature of the human person, and that it is necessary to find a more complete
description of what constitutes human being. In order to do this one must
overcome the dualism of mind and body or theory and practice that is an
inevitable result of Cartesian philosophy. Action and thinkin& rather than
being seen as irreconcilable opposites, should be seen as different aspects of
a person's being. But, for Macmurray, it is action rather than thinking which
is the primary reality.
We are now able to interpret the 'Cogito'in its essential significance, and
in doing so to refute it. If thinking is my essence, then I am an active
being...My activity of thinking is what constitutes my existence. Now
this is a contradiction in terms. Action is practical, and thinking denotes
an activity which is not practical but purely theoretical. To exist is to
have a being which is independent of thought; and what depends on
thought for its being is no thing but a mere idea, like the unicom.42
Having examined at length the philosophical views of Descartes, Kant and
the Romantic thinkers, Macmurray believes that he has shown their vision
of the human person to be inadequate. It is this that convinces him of the
need to find a better way of understanding human nature, and it is to this
task that he now turns.
The conclusion we have reached is that our problem is the form of the
personal, and that we may hope to resolve it only by starting from the
primacy of the practical. For we have seen that it is the assumption of
the primacy of the theoretical in our philosophical tradition which
institutes a· formal dualism which cannot be resolved; that the basic form
42 John Macmurray, The Se!fasAgent, p.80.
40
of this dualism is the division of experience into theoretical and practical,
and that this dualism makes it impossible to think the unity of the Self
and so to determine the form of a personal experience. We have,
therefore, to begin by rejecting dualism through asserting the primacy of
th . al 43e pracuc .
The Person As Agent
Macmru:ray next attempts to reveal the profound implications of seeing the
human person from the standpoint of action rather than of thinking. The
first thing to be noted is that the human person is one who both thinks and
acts, and that· thinking and action are to be properly understood as being
simply contrasted modes of activity in the same person. This is not,
however, to suggest that thinking and action share an equal status in the
being of the person. When a person is thinking it is the mind alone that is
active, but when a person is acting both the mind and the body are active.
Macmru:ray argues that this simple fact already points to the idea that action
is primary while thinking should be seen as being secondary and derivative.
This itself is enough to suggest that viewing the natru:e of the human person
from the perspective of action will provide a fuller explanation than that
offered from the perspective of the self as thinker.
We may now formulate Oill starting point more clearly. We have to
substitute for the '1 think' as Oill centre of reference, the '1 do'. The '1
think' is not ultimate; it is the negative mode of the activity of the Self,
and presupposes the '1 do' ...We must therefore conclude that the 'I do' is
the primary principle which is presupposed in all Oill experience; and that
acting and thinking are opposite modes of 'doing', acting being the
positive and thinking the negative mode. The Self, then, is not the
43 John Macmillray, The Selfas Agent, p.84.
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thinker but the doer. In its positive doing it is agent; in its negative doing
it is subject.44
The question that immediately arises is concerned with the relation of the
self as agent to the self as thinker or subject. Is it possible to avoid the
danger of a dualistic understanding of the human person by finding the
unity of the self through two different modes of activity, doing and
thinking? Macmurray believes that it is indeed possible. What is needed is
to see that thinking is nothing other than the negative aspect of action, and
that thinking is done for the sake of action. However, in order to come to
this point of view it is necessary to first look more closely at the nature of
action.
It is Macmurray's belief that the fact of our own doing and acting forms the
absolute presupposition behind all our human experience. He defines
action as 'a unity of movement and knowledge'.45 It is the idea of unity that
is most significant here. Movement and knowledge, the knowledge that we
are acting, are not to be separated but rather to. be seen as being inseparable
dimensions of all action. It is knowledge, which makes an action precisely
an action rather than an event or a happening. In this way, knowledge and
thinking can be properly perceived to be a necessary, though negative,
aspect of all action.
There are other aspects of action which should also be considered if we are
to properly conceive the nature of the human person. By the very fact of
acting, a person generates a past by actualising what was previously only a
possibility. To act is therefore to determine the future, and that involves a
44 John Macmurray, The Se!!asAgent, pp.90-91.
45 John Macmurray, The Se!!as Agent, p.128.
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further significant implication. Since the agent is one who, by his actions,
determines the future, then the agent must have free will. To suggest that
we live in a world where everything is ah:eady determined is to deny the
possibility of action at all. But, in determining the future through her action,
the agent at the same time determines an environment which provides a
limiting context for all her further actions. This is what Macmurray calls the
principle of the irreversibility of action. Since action is therefore only truly
possible when the agent is free, one can state that action is linked to the idea
of choice..
To do anything is to do this and not that. After it is done I may wish I
had done something else, but I cannot do it. What I have done remains
actual and I cannot undo it. Action is thus the actualising of a possibility,
and as such it is choice.46
It is precisely the concept of choice which allows us to distinguish between
an event and an act. Macmurray makes a distinction between the two by
saying that for every event there is a cause, whereas for every act there is a
reason. To call something an action rather than an event is therefore to
refer to an agent as its source. Indeed, he goes even further by suggesting
that 'no act can have a cause; and no event a reason,.47 The reason for an
action will therefore be found in the intention of the agent rather than in
some teleological explanation of human nature.
Our point of reference is not the end actually reached, but the end
proposed to himself or intended by the agent, and we understand the
process of action as a successful or unsuccessful attempt to realize this
46 John Macmurray, The Selfas Agent, p.139.
47 John Macmurray, The Selfas Agent, p.149.
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intention, which is the agent's reason for acting as he has acted ...Action
is not teleological but intentional. It is described and understood by
reference to the purpose of an agent.48
To the extent therefore that action is intentional it presumes consciOUS
intentionality. For Macmurray there is no such thing as an unconscious
intention. And to speak of acting intentionally is to imply that knowledge is
an essential aspect of action. By now, although not having come to a
complete understanding of the nature of action, Macmurray believes that we
are at least able to overcome the dualism of Descartes and Kant, and to see
that action and thinking are both significant aspects of the human agent.
If we start from the 'I think' there is no possibility of arriving at action;
whereas it is possible to derive the theoretical from the practical if we
affirm the primacy of action. The first step we have already taken, when
we recognised that the 'I do' contains the 'I think' of necessity, as its
negative aspect. Without knowledge there may be activity, but not
• 49actron.
Thinking as Reflective Activity
Macmurray now attempts to clarify exactly what he means by suggesting
that action depends largely on knowledge. The knowledge that makes
action possible is a practical knowledge, one that allows a person to
recognise the various courses of action open to him and that enables him to
discriminate appropriately between different possible actions. Going further
than that, the knowledge that allows one to act is one that recognises the
existence of others in our world. There are no isolated agents, nor are there
48 John Macmurray, The Selfas Agent, p.150.
49 John Macmurray, The Selfas Agent, p.165.
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isolated actions. Indeed, it is human nature to act always in relation to the
other.
It is thus the nature of an agent to act not in terms. of his own nature but
in terms of the nature of the object, that is, of the Other. However
simple and immediate an action may be, so long as it is an action and not
merely a reaction to stimulus, then it is informed and directed by an
awareness of the Other-than-self as other; and the ground of choice, that
is the determination of the action, lies therefore in the agent's knowledge
of the Other.50
It would appear therefore that in order for a person to be able to act
appropriately he needs to have an adequate understanding of the nature of
the other, whether it be an object, animal or person. Such an understanding
comes about, at least in part, through memory and through reflection or
attention. Thus, Macmurray suggests that there are two significant aspects
of knowledge which serve to guide our actions: intention and attention. We
can only properly act when we intend to act, and we can only act with
knowledge when we take the time to adequately reflect and think. So,
although reflection is constituted by a withdrawal from action, it is done for
the sake of action. Macmurray believes that the life of the human person is
made up of action and reflection, and that these combine to create the
rhythm of the personal life.
The succession of positive and negative phases, of movement and of
reflection, is so characteristic of the personal life that it would be well to
have a name for it. We shall refer to it whenever we meet it as 'the
rhythm of withdrawal and retum,.51
50 John Macmurray, The SelfasAgent, p.168.
51 John Macmurray, The Selfas Agent, p.181.
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Macmw:ray states that there are three basic modes of reflection in human
life: religion, art and science. These three modes of reflection will be
examined in much greater detail in Persons in Relation, but they are referred to
here as signalling the fact that all reflective activities are derived from
practical experience and are aimed at the practical acts of the agent.
Up to this point Macmurray has been trying to show that it is possible to
come to an understanding of the nature of the human person which does
not lead to dualism, to a split between mind and body. He has suggested
that by seeing the self as agent one can plausibly see thinking as a reflective
activity, one that leads to action. But now he wants to make clearer what he
understands by the notion of an individual act.
An individual act has a beginning and an end of its own, and these are
determined by the intention which constitutes it as an act. It begins when
it is initiated and ends when it is either completed or broken off. Its
beginning and ending are intentional, not merely factual. 52
It is in fact because of the centrality of intention in human actions that
reflective activity itself is of such importance. It is only in taking the time to
reflect adequately that we will be able to find the appropriate action to bring
about our intentions. What is clear, however, is that for Macmurray
thinking does not define the nature of the human person but is rather a
means to an end. All thinking and all knowledge is for the sake of action.
"From the standpoint of the Agent, then, intellectual reflection is an activity
which intends an improvement of our knowledge of the world as means to
our ends".53
52 John Macmurray, The Selfas Agent, p.189.
53 John Macmurray, The Selfas Agent, p.193.
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Along with the notion that reflective thinking and knowledge function as
means to an end, which is action, a further purpose in thinking and
reflection also needs to be stressed. This is that we not only reflect and
think intellectually, but also emotionally. The purpose of emotional
reflection is to help us evaluate our actions and our world, and to make
decisions about our chosen ends. For Macmurray, therefore, emotional
reflection is also linked to the fact that the person is an agent. But whereas
intellectual or scientific reflection is always a means to an end, emotional
reflection is more direcdy concerned with the ends of an agent.
We may say of the emotional mode of reflection that it seeks to
determine the world as an end in itself, or rather as a manifold of ends.
As we called intellectual knowledge, knowledge of the World-as-means,
so we may describe emotional knowledge as knowledge of the World-as-
end.54
In Macmurray's view, the intellectual mode of reflection, when conducted
for its own sake, produces science. It enables us to come to a deeper
understanding of the nature of the world and, in so doing, helps us to act
within an environment that is not entirely alien to our understanding. The
emotional mode of reflection, when it is conducted for its own sake,
produces art rather than science. It creates a contemplative stance, where a
person is able to see and to enjoy what she considers to be valuable in itself,
to see the truth in things.
In now drawing his first set of Gifford Lectures to a close, Macmurray is
aware that he has only pardy managed to overcome what he considers the
54 John Macmurray, The SelfasAgent, p.194.
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serious defects of a Cartesian approach to the nature of the human person.
He believes that he has adequately shown that to see the person as agent
rather than thinker offers a more comprehensive understanding of human
nature. But, up to this point, he has generally examined the agent in
isolation from all other agents. This is a failing that he intends to deal with
in the second set of his Gifford Lectures, lectures which would be
subsequently published as Persons in Relation. Macmurray, however, chooses
to complete his first set of lectures by making some further assertions about
what we can know of the world through the notion of agency. The first
assertion that he makes takes him to the murky depths of metaphysics.
The particular metaphysical assertion which I have in mind is that the
world is one action. This is the conclusion to which our whole argument
moves, and it has been implicit from the beginning. For to think the Self
as agent is to think the unity of the world as a unity of action.55
Macmurray is here argumg against any idea that the world can be
understood as simply an unfolding series of events. He acknowledges that
much of science accepts such an idea, seeing the world as either a biological
or evolutionary process or as a material process which obeys the physical
laws of nature. The problem with such views is that they can offer no
coherent account of human action and human freedom, and seem to
suggest only a world that is determined.
If the world is a unitary process, it must be a world in which nothing is
ever done; in which everything simply happens; a world, then, in which
everything is matter of fact and nothing is ever intended. We should
have to assert, in that case, that there are no actions; that what seem such
55 John Macmurray, The Se!!as Agent, p.217.
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are really events. It will not be sufficient to say that all our actions are
determined; for this is a contradiction in terms. The capacity to act is
freedom; what has to be denied if the world is one event, is that anything
is ever intended ... In rejecting this alternative we are merely using the
criterion that we established earlier, that since the '1 do' is the primary
certainty, any theory which explicitly or implicitly denies it must be false. 56
So, while it is logically impossible, for Macmurray, that the world should be
understood in terms of being a single process or event, it is not logically
impossible to understand the world as being a single action. Although it is
not possible to come to a purely intellectual conclusion that the world is one
action, our own experience of agency does point us towards such a
conclusion.
We exist only as agents; and in our existence we are parts of the world,
dependent on it for the support and resistance which make our action
possible. The thought of the world as a unity is a postulate of action.
For any action in the world depends on the cooperation of the world. It
is indeed an integration of the movements of the Agent with the
movements of the Other, so that in action the Self and the Other form a
unity. This integration is the action and its unity is intentional.57
What Macmun:ay is suggesting here is that we should interpret the history of
the world not simply as event or process but as action. In so doing, and by
reflecting on the centrality of intention in our own actions, we will recognise
that there is an intention too in the action of the world. Such a viewpoint
itself has important repercussions in terms of our understanding of human
nature and of the world. At a personal level, it helps us to appreciate the
56 John Macmurray, The Selfas Agent, p.219.
57 John Macmurray, The Selfas Agent, p.220.
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fact that Oill actions are significant and that they influence, at least to some
extent, the history of the world. It means too that the intentions behind Oill
actions always carry an ethical dimension.
If we act as if the world, in its unity, is intentional; that is, if we believe in
practice that the world is one action ...we shall act differently from
anyone who does not believe this. We shall act as though our actions
were our contributions to the one inclusive action which is the history of
the world.58
The other crucial corollary of seeing the world as one action 1S that it
enables one to avoid the atheistic conclusions of much of philosophy
subsequent to Descartes. Once we accept that it is not only individual
human agents who act with intention but that it is possible to see the world
as one action and therefore as intentional, we are drawn again to the idea of
a God who is the Act of the world.
Very much remains obscure; but there is one result which is sufficiently
clear. The argument which starts from the primacy of the practical
moves steadily in the direction of a belief in God. To think the world in
practical terms is ultimately to think the unity of the world as one action,
and therefore as informed by a unifying intention. It may, indeed, prove
possible to think the process of the world as intentional without thinking
a supreme Agent whose act the world is. But prima facie, at least, it is
not possible to do SO.59
It is clear by this stage that Macmurray believes that the notion of agency,
when analysed properly, offers us a meaningful way to come· to an
58 John Macmurray, The Se!!as Agent, p.221.
59 John Macmurray, The Se!!asAgent, pp. 221-2.
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appropriate understanding of human nature. But our experience of the
world is that we are not the only agents. Indeed, it is largely through our
own actions that we discover the presence of others. The next step for
Macmurray therefore is to examine the ways in which human agents relate
as persons, and to discover what significance this has, if any, in terms of the




THE SIGNIFICANCE OF COMMUNION
By the end of The Self as Agent Macmru:ray believes that he has only partly
managed to overcome the crisis of the personal. He has suggested that in
treating the human person as agent rather than as thinker one is able to
move beyond the difficulties inherent in a Cartesian approach to human
natru:e. But, at this point, the agent remains an isolated agent. His intention
in Persons in Relation is to move towards a more complete understanding of
the human person by drawing out the significance of his view that an
individual person can only be properly understood in the light of her being
in relationship with others.
Relationships and Intentionality
In the opening chapter of Persons in Relation Macmru:ray makes clear his
desire to pru:sue the relational aspect of human being:
''The Self exists only in dynamic relation with the Other. 1bis assertion
provides the starting-point of our present argument. The thesis we have
to expound and to sustain is that the Self is constituted by its relation to
the Other; that it has its being in its relationship; and that this relationship
is necessarily personal. Our main effort, therefore, must be directed
towards determining the formal characters of personal relationship".6O
60 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, (Faber and Faber, London, 1995), p. 17.
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It is Macmurray's understanding that the very notion of an isolated agent is a
contradiction. To be an agent is necessarily to be in relation to others.
Indeed, Macmurray goes further by stating that, apart from this essential
relation, the agent does not even exist! The relation between agents must
properly be a personal one because persons are constituted by their mutual
relation to one another. These are strong claims and it is now Macmurray's
task to justify his viewpoint.
At this stage Macmurray introduces a concept which will assume great
importance as he continues to develop his idea of the necessity of personal
relations if we are to become more fully human. He states that if we are to
achieve personal relations we must act with the intention of creating a
personal relation with others. If relationships are to move beyond the
impersonal level then there will always be the need for the intending of a
personal relationship. Macmurray does not wish to deny the fact that many
human relations are impersonal but wants to stress that our attitude to
others will either create the conditions where personal relations are possible
or else where the other will be seen simply as an object.
"The personal attitude is the attitude we adopt when we enter into
personal relations with others and treat them as persons ...The
impersonal attitude is the one in which we do not treat other people as
persons in personal relation with ourselves, but as men, that is as
members of a determinate class of objects in our environment whose
presence and behaviour limits, and so helps or hinders the realisation of
our own personal ends".61
61 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 40.
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In order to better determine the formal character of personal relations
Macmurray invites us to reflect on the experience of relationship between
mother and child, which is where all human experience begins62. It is his
hope that in doing this we might discover the essential nature of human
relations and of personal development. In using the analogy of the mother
and child relation Macmurray does not limit his focus to the relationship
between the child and the biological mother but rather any relationship
between a child and the one who cares for the child.
The most significant fact of an infant's life is that he is utterly helpless and
therefore dependent on others. This suggests that a newborn child is
somehow made to be cared for. He is bom into a relationship which is
inherently personal. Without such personal care it is questionable whether
the child will even be able to survive, never mind prosper. Since a child is
utterly unable to do anything for himself, he is dependent on others for
everything. Macmurray suggests that to describe the mother and child
relationship simply in biological terms cannot do justice to the personal
nature of the relationship. "The infant has a need which is not simply
biological but personal, a need to be in touch with the mother, and in
conscious perceptual relationship with her".63
From the very beginning of life, therefore, a child cannot live an isolated
existence. His own being is marked by the fact that he can only live and
grow through other people, and is always in relationship with others. This
62rn his biography of ,Macmurray, John E. Costello claims that Macmurray's
understanding of the mother!child relationship was largely influenced by a book written
by Dr. Ian Suttie in 1936, entitled The Origins ofLove and Hate. Cf. John E. Costello,John
Macmurrqy: A Biograpf!], p.279.
63 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 49.
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very obvious point is enough, as far as Macmurray is concerned, to show
that the child is a person precisely through the experience of being in
relation to others. Returning to the significant concept of intention, he
states that even within the mother and child relationship there is need for
the intending of a personal relationship. The life of the child, and his very
survival, is dependent on the mother's intending of the well-being and care
of the child.
Rather than taking an orgaruc Vlew of the human person which would
suggest that the child is not yet a person till he acquires rationality,
Macmurray sees the child as already a person who is in personal relation
with his mother. . As the child develops, he begins to show signs of
intentional activity and awareness. He is able to act and to react, and the
skills that the child learns are skills which are based on the fact that he is a
member of a personal community. The skill which reveals this most dearly
is the ability to speak. and to communicate.
"In the human infant... the impulse to communication is his sole
adaptation to the world into which he is born. Implicit and unconscious
it may be, yet it is sufficient to constitute the mother-child relationship as
the basic form of human existence, as a personal mutuality, as a 'You and
l' with a common life. For this reason the infant is born a person and
not an animal.,,64
Macmurray is adamant that by looking at the mother and child relationship
one can come to a proper understanding of the nature of human being.
What is revealed is that human experience is primarily a shared experience
and that our human behaviour is marked by reference to other persons.
64 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 60.
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"All this may be summed up by saying that the unit of personal existence
is not the individual, but two persons in personal relation; and that we are
persons not by individual right but in virtue of our relation to one
another. The personal is constituted by personal relatedness.,,65
Fear and Love
Macmru:ray now suggests that the behavioru: of a child is marked by the
germinal forms of fear and love, both qualities that will assume great
importance in the life of every person. The cry of the child in discomfort is
an implicit fear of isolation. The cry of delight which the child gives, in
recognising the mother and in being cared for, is to be understood as being
a germinal form of love. Fear and love, therefore, will be significant
elements in all human lives, and will often reveal the natru:e of oru: relations
with others. There will be a need to look more closely at the significance of
fear and love in all human relations, but for now it is necessary to draw out
the origins of fear and love in the life of the child.
For Macmurray, fear and love emerge in the life of the child as he learns to
distinguish between the people to whom he is in relation. The child
develops the ability to recognise the people who form a part of his life and
he begins to understand that he belongs to a community of persons. The
ability to distinguish between different members of the family, for example,
is something that Macmru:ray believes happens early in the life of the child.
Along with this ability, the child also learns that his relations with others are
in each case unique and different. The child, in other words, begins to
65 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 61.
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discover his own personhood in the experience of relating to, and reacting
to, others. While his relation to the mother remains the central relationship,
the child discovers that other relationships are necessary too.
Fear and love emerge as realities in the life of the child first and foremost
through his relation with his mother. Macmurray suggests that the ordinary
acts of mothering; feeding, washing and caring for example, creates a
rhythm of withdrawal and return within the relationship. Initially, at each
moment of the mother's withdrawal there will be an experience of fear in
the child. With the mother's return the child feels again secure in love. As
the child grows in awareness he begins to understand the relationship with
his mother precisely in terms of withdrawal and return. He comes to terms
with the fact that his mother is not with him at every moment of the day,
but that there are times when she withdraws and always returns. This
process of withdrawal and return, while it may initially be frightening for the
child, is necessary if the child is to learn to trust and to grow. Without such
a process there can be no proper development in the life of the child.
The rhythm of withdrawal and return assists the child to discover that he is
an individual and that others are individuals too. Through the experience of
the mother's withdrawal he discovers that he cannot always have what he
wants. The absence of the mother makes the child cry for attention. If
there is no immediate response, the cries of fear soon become cries of anger.
Macmurray sees this as the emergence of the will. The child experiences a
conflict of will between himself and his mother and this conflict is again a
necessary stage of development. "There is a point in personal development,
which may vary considerably from child to child, at which the contrast
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between Self and Other is finally established as a pervasive attitude in action
d fl . ,,66an re ect1on.
This clash of wills between mother and child is what enables the child to
discover both his own individuality and the individuality of the mother. But
what is even more significant about this clash of wills, for Macmurray, is
that he sees it as the starting point of the moral life of the child.
'What we are here considering is the origin of the moral struggle, in a
situation which is universal and necessary in human experience. This
situation is the conflict of wills between mother and child. The moral
struggle is primarily a struggle between persons. It is only secondarily,
though also necessarily, a struggle within the individual."67
The rhythm of withdrawal and return therefore provides the context for the
child to discover that there exists in all human relationships the possibility of
a clash of wills. The child's response to this conflict is of great significance.
Macmurray views this experience in terms of reconciliation. How is the
child to be reconciled with his mother? How is he to overcome his fear that
his mother does not love him anymore? We might take the simple example
of a child who has his shoelaces tied each morning by his mother. At a
certain point, for the good of the child, she will refuse to tie his laces any
more. This is something that he must now do for himself. Here is a small
but, to the child at least, painful moment of conflict. Doesn't his mother's
refusal mean that he is no longer loved?
66 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 96.
67 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 98.
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It is likely that the child's initial response to his mother's refusal will be
anger, stemming from fear and from the rejection of his will. Macmurray
suggests that a positive reconciliation between mother and child is possible
only when the child discovers that he was wrong in his view that his mother
did not love him anymore. Although his mother did not do as he willed, the
fact is that he is still loved and cared for. This positive response to conflict
shows that the child is able to distinguish between appearance and reality.
Although, in refusing to do what the child wills, it might appear at first that
his mother no longer cares, the reality is that the mother wills the best for
her child.
It is of course possible that the conflict between mother and child, over the
tying of his shoelaces, is not resolved positively. Because he is so dependent
on his mother for so much the child may accept the fact that he has to obey
his mother's will. But this can be done without the conflict between mother
and child being properly resolved. Macmurray suggests that, although the
child might conform his behaviour to what is expected of him, he may still
act from a purely egocentric perspective and thus be unable to recover
communion with his mother.
"The child who has been forced back into cooperative activity without a
resolution of the conflict has two courses open to him. He remains
egocentric, and the objective of his behaviour is security through self-
defence. What he cannot do, so long as his fear is not overcome and
dissipated, is to give himself freely to his mother in the fellowship of
mutual affection without constraint. The conflict remains.,,68
68 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p 103.
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Retw:nillg to his understanding of the human person as an agent,
Macmurray believes that, since we can only act within the context of other
agents, the attitude we take to others will affect the morality of our
behaviour towards them. The approach that we take to others, stemming
either from love or from fear, will have serious moral implications. Given
the inevitability of a conflict of wills in our relations with one another, our
attitude to the other will reveal the morality of our actions.
"The moral rightness of an action therefore has its ground in the relation
of persons. The moral pr:oblematic of all action- the possibility that any
action may be mor:ally right or wr:ong- arises fr:om the conflict of wills,
and morality...is the effort to resolve this conflict.,,69
If conflict between agents is to be prope:dy resolved then it is necessary for
us to have the right intention in our actions. If our understanding of others
is basically positive and lovirig then we will intend communion with others.
But if our concept of others is based on fear and negativity then it is likely
that our actions will be defensive and egocentric. The intention will be not
to create communion but to look after one's own interests. For Macmurray
only an action which intends communion with the other is morally
appropriate. "A morally right action is an action which intends
community.,,7o
As individual human beings we live with both freedom and responsibility.
But true freedom emerges for us only when we are able to acknowledge that
we are mutually responsible for one another. By recognising our need of
69 John Macmur:ray, Persons in Relation, p. 116.
70 John Macmur:ray, Persons in Relation, p. 119.
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one another and our responsibility for one another we are able to see that
our actions and attitudes towards others always carry an ethical dimension.
"Every individual agent is ... responsible to all other agents for his actions.
Whatever he does is morally right if the particular intention of his action
is controlled by a general intention to maintain the community of agents
and wrong if it is not so controlled.,,?l
In returning to his view that as human beings we can either approach others
from the positive idea of love and communion or from the negative idea of
either submission or aggression, Macmurray suggests that we can draw a
distinction between three basic modes of morality.
Modes of Morality
The first mode of morality is based on a positive vision of the other, and is
described as being the communal mode. The image that helps us to
understand this idea is that of the child who manages to overcome the fear
that he experiences when his will conflicts with that of his mother. He is
able to overcome both the fear and the conflict by accepting the love that is
at the heart of his relationship with his mother. What is central to this
communal ethic is that each individual approaches others with the intention
of being in a positive relation with them. The centre of reference for the
individual agent is always the personal other, and to act rightly is to act for
the sake of the other person and for the sake of communion. The objective
behind a person's actions is to maintain positive relations with others
through the intending of communion. Such a positive approach to the
ethical life is only possible through the overcoming of fear. Macmurray
71 John Macmumiy, Persons in Relation, p. 119.
62
identifies this positive mode of morality, at least within the Western
tradition, as steffi1ll11lg from the Judaeo-Christian vision of the human
person.
The two other modes of morality, as far as Macmurray is concerned, differ
from the communal mode in that they are both egocentric and negative.
Macmurray describes the first of these two negative expressions of morality
as being the contemplative mode of morality. It is to be understood as
being related to the image of the child who conforms to the wishes of his
mother but remains resentful and in a state of conflict. In this
contemplative mode of morality the agent is inclined to deny the reality of
conflict with others and to be seen to conform to the values of the
community or society in which she lives. Such a response however is
basically negative and passive. One who lives in this way takes the attitude
of a spectator and does not consciously intend communion with others.
Rather, she prefers to live in a private world, conforming in practice to the
values of the society in which she lives but finding happiness in the isolated
world of her own thoughts and emotions.
The third mode of morality, according to Macmurray, is best described as
the pragmatic mode. This mode is related to the notion of the child who
rebels against the wishes of his mother and so is unable to overcome
conflict through love. In the pragmatic mode of morality conflict is met by
aggression and the goal of one's actions is the furthering of power. Rather
than seeking communion with others through the intending of, and practice
of, love, relations with others are marked by fear and threat. One is always
competing with others for power. Aggression towards others becomes the
norm of one's behaviour. Since humans are understood to be in a state of
competition for power it is necessary to find ways of keeping such
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competition under control. There is need therefore for the law to serve as a
means of keeping the peace between people who are naturally hostile to one
another. Macmw:ray suggests that the pragmatic mode of morality will
properly express itself as obedience to the law.
At this point Macmw:ray has developed his original notion of the mother
and child relationship into a way of understanding three different
approaches to the question of morality. He has shown how the mother and
child can only live in proper communion with one another when they are
able to grow through experiences of conflict and still continue to intend
love and communion with one another. By not dealing with the conflict in
their relationship it is likely that fear and not love will be the determining
quality of their relationship. If the child's relationship is marked by fear of
his mother he will either conform to what is expected of him but remain
resentful or else he will rebel against his mother. The presence of fear in the
relationship makes it impossible to discover real communion and love. So
too, with regards to morality, Macmw:ray believes that the positive approach
to morality stems from the desire for communion and the overcoming of
fear. But when ow: ethical vision is based on fear of the other then we are
likely to either conform to the moral practices of the family or society in
which we live while remaining somehow withdrawn, or else we might see
morality simply in terms of the law which serves to keep each person's
desire for power within acceptable constraints.
Macmw:ray now wants to develop the implications of his basic vision in
terms of the distinction between community and society. It is his belief that,
ideally at least, a human society is a unity of persons. He stresses that the
unity of a society or any group of people is not to be taken as a matter of
fact but must necessarily be intended. In saying this he denies that society
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can be properly understood in biological or organic terms. In other words,
a society is not to be seen as simply a natural phenomenon. He is equally
adamant that society is not adequately understood when it is viewed as part
of a greater evolutionary process, as if human beings have developed to the
point where society is possible. It is intention that makes a common life
possible.
"Any human society is a moral entity. Its basis is the universal and
necessary intention to maintain the personal relation which makes the
human individual a person, and his life a common life. It is an
instantiation of the 1 and You' as the unit of the personal. It is
constituted and maintained by loyalty and keeping faith.,,72
Society and Community
Macmurray now uses his basic distinction between relationships based on
fear and those based on love to highlight the significant differences between
society and community. He argues that most traditional philosophical
analyses of society take the form of a philosophy of the State. This suggests
that we tend to think of the State as providing us with a model of a
complete and mature society. But is it accurate to understand the State in
this way? By analysing the political philosophies of both Hobbes and
Rousseau, Macmurray wants to reveal the flaws in their vision of society and
then to put forward his own understanding.
72 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 128.
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The political theory expressed by Hobbes73 is seen by Macmurray as being
an excellent example of an analysis of society which is pragmatic. In his
view Hobbes understands human beings to be living in a constant state of
fear of one another. This means that their relations with one another will be
both negative and aggressive. Each person is an isolated individual who
seeks the power to do as she wills. But since humans are rational they
realise that the best way to achieve their own will is to form societies where
much of the fear of the other can be controlled. At the heart of Hobbes'
vision of society is the idea of the social contract. Individuals form a society
not out of a desire for love and communion but out of fear of others. The
only way to safeguard one's life and interests is to make a contract with
others which takes the form of law. Each person agrees to keep the laws of
a given society on the understanding that all other members of the society
will do the same. This is only possible when there is an external power,
namely the State, which can compel each individual to keep the law or to
punish those who disregard the law of the society. Hobbes therefore sees
societies as being nothing other than pragmatic devices which are ultimately
based on self-interest. There is no intending of communion but rather the
controlling of fear through the guarantees of the law.
''The pragmatic mode of society then is society maintained by power, and
it identifies society with the State, since the power of government is a
necessary condition for the existence of such a society. It conceives the
structure of society in terms of law- whether moral or civil law- and its
73 Thomas Hobbes (1588 - 1679) is recognised as being an important philosopher who
contributed much to both moral and political philosophy. He is often seen as being
instrumental in promoting a social contract theory of political life. His most famous
work is Leviathan (1651).
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maintenance as achieved by power. This yields a mechanical concept of
. ,,74society.
Macmw:ray believes that Hobbes' understanding of society is basically
flawed because it cannot see in human natw:e anything which can act as a
bond of unity between human beings. To disprove Hobbes' theory one only
has to show that benevolence towards others is as natw:al to us as is self-
interest. Macmw:ray suggests that rational self-interest could never by itself
construct a society or State. Rather, there must be something in human
nature which allows us to make the bonds necessary for a common life.
Tw:ning now to the political philosophy of Rousseau7s, Macmucray sees him
as being the antithesis of Hobbes, yet also flawed in his analysis of society.
Liberal humanism and Romanticism are both indebted to Rousseau in that
he provides an idealist theory of the State and of society. Taking a very
different approach to human natw:e than Hobbes, Rousseau offers a more
positive view of society. In Macmucray's view, the philosophy of Rousseau
invites us to allow the natw:al goodness of human beings to determine
whatever form of society is most appropriate. Rousseau understands society
in an organic fashion, that society is always in a state of evolutionary
progress towards full matw:ity. The full expression of society lies at the end
of a long process of development. Once we understand that we are
constantly living in a state of progress, each person can take her part in
society and accept our function within the process.
74 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 136.
75 Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712 - 1778) is best known for his theories on social freedom
and rights, which are based on the idea of a social contract. Among his major works are
Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality among Mankind (1755) and The Social
Contract or Principles ofPolitical Right (1762).
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Given his organic view of the world, Rousseau urges us to accept that our
true being is a social being, and that each individual is simply a part of
something greater than herself. Macmurray suggests that Rousseau's vision
is basically a contemplative view of the world and of society because the
human person remains somehow an isolated and divided self. Each has a
necessary social function which is part of the whole process of growth but
each person experiences life as a spectator of something greater than her
own limited experience of life. Each is asked to submit her own being to
the general will of society which is determined by the process of
development.
Macmurray's problem with Rousseau's understanding of society is that it
leads to a form of dualism between the general will and the private life of
each person. Since society is constantly in the process of moving towards
the general will, each person is somehow withdrawn and yet caught up in a
process over which he has no control. Thus, in Rousseau's society, just as in
that of Hobbes, the bond between individuals is always an impersonal one,
and therefore inadequate.
The inadequacies of Rousseau and Hobbes allow Macmurray to conclude
that there is a serious distinction to be drawn between society and
community, the main distinction being that relations between people in
societies are always understood to be impersonal, whereas in community
relations are always understood as being inherently personal.
"It may serve us well if we distinguish between society and community,
reserving the term community for such personal unities of persons as are
based on a positive personal motivation. The members of a community
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are ill commuruon with one another, and their association is a
fellowship ... Every community is therefore a society; but not every
.. . ,,76
society is a community.
Macmurray suggests that we should understand societies as being forms of
human association where the bond of unity between individuals is
impersonal and negative. Communities, on the other hand, are forms of
human association where the bond between individuals is positive and
personal. It is apparent therefore that the types of society suggested by
Hobbes and Rousseau are not communities. Both suggest that society is
negatively motivated, aiming simply at the protection of individuals against
the threat and fear of other individuals.
It is Macmurray's understanding that the conception we have of our relation
to others will largely determine those relations themselves. If we see other
people as a threat to our well-being then we will relate to others in a
constant atmosphere of fear and distrust. Societies, since they do not allow
for the possibility of seeing people as other than a threat, cannot offer a
vision of a life based on anything other than protection and security. Can
the concept of community offer a more positive and meaningful vision of
our life together? This is the question to which Macmurray now turns.
The major distinction between community and any other form of society,
for Macmurray, is that community is grounded not in fear but rather in the
intending of communion and friendship. "A community is for the sake of
friendship and presupposes love. But it is only in friendship that persons
76 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 146.
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are free in relation; if the relation is based on fear we are constrained in it
and not free.,,77
Just as earlier Macmurray used the mother and child relation to examine the
distinction between relationships based on love and those based on fear, so
now he turns to the image of the family as offering us an insight into the
meaning of community. It is his view that the family serves as the original
human community and as the basis of all subsequent communities. The
family therefore acts as the norm of all community life.
''What is characteristic of the family is that it is neither established by
force nor maintained by a sense of duty. It is established and maintained
by natural affection; by a positive motive in its members. They care for
one another sufficiendy to have no need to fear one another.,,78
The relation between members of a society can at best be functional. A
community however cannot be defined simply in terms of function or
purpose. The members of a community are in communion with one
another, joined by the bonds of friendship, and by the intention to approach
others not with fear but with love.
It might well be argued that the bonds of family life, which Macmurray
suggests can serve as a model of community life, are more taken for granted
rather than intended. That is perhaps why he also uses the image of
friendship to reveal more of what distinguishes community from society.
The suggestion put forward by Macmurray is that since friendship is central
to community one can discover more about the true nature of community
77 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 151.
78 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 156.
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by examining the qualities of friendship. The relationship between friends is
a positive one. Each remains a distinct individual but each realises herself
through the other. It is a relationship of equality, an equality which is itself
intentional. In friendship each person is able to experience real freedom.
Since there is no fear of the other, each person can be freely herself.
Macmurray wants to suggest that the qualities to be found in friendships are
the same qualities that one finds in community. Therefore, equality,
freedom and a lack of fear should be distinguishing marks of any
community. But the significant aspect of Macmurray's view is that, if the
idea of community is to be properly effective in offering a better model of
human relations than that offered by political philosophers like Hobbes and
Rousseau, it must be in principle inclusive and without limits. Macmurray
·believes that it is possible for us to seek a universal community of persons,
one in which each cares for all the others. The unity of all peoples becomes
possible when we first imagine community as a matter of intention. It is
possible for us to move beyond fear in our relations by intending friendship
and communion with all others.
Macmurray was not unaware of the criticisms made of such a view. In an
age where it is difficult to know even one's neighbours, never mind the
people of other societies, the idea of a universal community can easily
appear as, at best, niive. With this in mind, Macmurray develops the
distinction between direct and indirect relations. He acknowledges that
community can be actual only where people are in direct relation to one
another, where people know one another personally.
It is precisely because most of our relations are indirect that there is need of
politics, law and nations or states. Politics is concerned with the improving
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and adjusting of indirect relations with others. The state or the nation is the
institutional expression of indirect relations, and the most important
function of the nation is to maintain justice in indirect relations.
"The necessity for the State and for politics arises with the breakdown of
the customary community of direct personal relations ... It was this
growth of a system of indirect personal relations, superimposed upon the
direct relations within the separate communities, which made politics a
. ,,79necesSity.
In all human relations, direct or indirect, there is a need for justice. Because
so many of our relations are indirect there is the need for a mechanism
which will maintain those relations in peace. It is the law which serves as
this mechanism. The role of the nation or the society is to act in service of
the law, ensuring justice for all people. The significant thing for Macmurray
is that the law is nothing other than a technological device to maintain
indirect relations, and the state or the nation is primarily a technical device
for the development and maintenance of law. This suggests that the State is
simply a tool for creating and maintaining relations, and not the primary
source of a person's identity.
''We should treat the law, and the State which is the creature of law, for
no less but also for no more than it is - a necessary system of devices for
achieving and maintaining justice. If we do this we will then realise that
justice itself is not enough. For justice is only the negative aspect of
morality, and itself is for the sake of friendship."80
79 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, pp. 192-193.
80 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 205.
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Macmurray is able to acknowledge the existence of, and even the necessity
for, states and nations but he is not prepared to admit that one can find the
truth of one's identity in the negative ideas associated with societies and
States. He suggests that we are able to imagine another form of community.
In such a community each person acts out of the intention to make
friendship the heart of all direct relations, and justice is understood as being
simply the minimum requirement in all our human relations, direct or
indirect.
It would appear that Macmurray, while acknowledging the difficulties of
creating meaningful communities in a world in which it is virtually
impossible to know many others personally, sees that in order to be fully
ourselves we need to act with the intention of seeking friendship and
communion with all those who come into oUr lives. Such a task necessarily
involves a movement away from fear and a movement towards trust in
others. How is such a difficult enterprise possible? "To create community
is to make friendship the form of all personal relations. This is a religious
task, which can only be performed through the transformation of the
motives of our behaviour."sl
Macmurray here seems to be hinting that there is an essentially religious, as
well as ethical, dimension to our life. If we are most truly ourselves when
we actively intend communion and friendship with others, then we are also
most truly ourselves when we come to an appreciation of the fact that to be
human is to be religious. We can therefore turn now to Macmurray's
understanding of the religious aspect of human being.
81 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 198.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RELIGION
Macmurray begins his reflection on the nature and significance of religion in
Persons in Relation by claiming that religion cannot be adequately understood
when looked at from the perspective of the isolated human agent but only
from the idea of persons in relation.82 His concern is to discover the nature
of religious experience as forming part of human experience and he is
therefore not primarily interested in any specific faith expression or belief.
Before offering his own views on the nature of all religious experience,
Macmurray acknowledges that many thinkers, notably Freud and Marx,
believe religious faith to be nothing other than fantasy and illusion. Rather
than simply sidestep their criticisms of religion, he offers his own criticism
of their views.
It is Marx's83 view, according to Macmurray, that religion is nothing other
than a device for taking people's minds off their struggles and miseries in
life by promising them a better life in a better world. This hope in a better
life hereafter serves only to reconcile people to the unjust structures of the
world and thereby denies the proper dignity of the human person.
Macmurray questions how Marx was able to come up with such a theory
and suggests that, whatever else, it could not have emerged from a careful
and objective study of the varieties of religious experience and belief. While
82 John Macmru::ray, Persons in Relation, p.151.
83 Karl Marx (1818 - 1883) was a radical social and political theorist whose thought has
been hugely influential in the political life of the 20th century. Along with Friedrich
Engels he wrote The Communist Manifesto (1848) and also wrote the three-volume Capital
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it may be true that some forms of religion are open to the very criticisms
made by Marx, this would only suggest the need for a religious reform. It
does not prove that religious experience is inherently illusory. The weakness
of Marx's understanding of religion stems from the fact that he can produce
no cogent argument to show that all religion is necessarily a form of escape
from the concerns of this world and therefore an illusion.
In abstai.ning from a critical examination of the facts ... such a theory of
religion surely betrays its origins in a subjective and emotional reaction.
Such atheism indeed strongly suggests the projection of a childish fantasy
th
. 84upon e Ulliverse.
In next turning to Freud85, Macmurray suggests that the criticisms of
religio~ offered by Freud deserve to be treated more seriously than those
made by Marx. He is prepared to accept Freud's view that religion is a
projection of the child's experience of family life, and sees that his own
account of the mother and child relationship support Freud's claim. Where
Freud is mistaken, however, is in his conclusion that religion is therefore
illusory, which Macmurray suggests is a complete non sequitur. While it
may be true that there is plenty of illusory religion to be found this does not
84 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p.154.
84 Sigmund Freud (1856 - 1939) is generally recognised as being the founder of psycho-
analysis. He mistrusted religion as a form of neurosis and argued that all religion takes its
origin from a primitive but historical father complex in which the Father figure was killed
and eaten. Views such as this are to be found in many of Freud's writings, including
Totem and Taboo (1912), The Future ofan Illusion (1927), and Moses andMonotheism (1939).
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prove that all religion is illusory. In order for Freud to successfully prove
that all religion is illusory he must be able to show that religion as such is the
product of fantasy. This he fails to do. Rather, the image of the child's
dependence on a personal other offers us a way of beginning to understand
the nature of religion.
We have seen that the form of the child's experience is dependence on a
personal Other; and that this form of experience is never outgrown, but
provides the ground plan of all personal experience which is constituted
from start to finish by relation to the Other and communication with the
Other. It is this form which finds expression in religion, no doubt; but
there is nothing illusory about this.86
The Inclusive Nature of Religion
Having dealt with the criticisms made of religion by both Man and Freud,
Macmurray now reveals his own understanding of the nature of religion. He
begins by calling attention to what he considers important facts about
religion, facts which, if not taken seriously, would inevitably lead to an
impoverished and inadequate conception of the significance of religion.
~e first fact to be noted is the universality of religion in human society.
This suggests to Macmurray that the source of religion lies in some
characteristic of human experience which must be both common· and
universal. Secondly, no concept of religion is to be found in even the
highest forms of animal life. This fact serves as an indication that the
universal experience of religion in human experience must be a personal
experience. Macmurray thirdly argues that it is a matter of historical fact
that all the various aspects of culture and civilisation find their roots in the
86 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p.154.
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foundational experience of religion. The final fact ~hich is claimed by
Macmurray i.;;_. that .religion is always, in inte~tion at least, ip.clusive of all
members of a given society; arl;d that reli .on de ends _on the activ~ \ "
c.~op~ration of the members of a given soc~ if it is to fulfil its proper'
function.
As if to highlight his dissatisfaction with the views of Freud and Marx,
Macmurray claims that any theory of religion that fails to take into account
these four characteristics of religion will be at best inadequate, if not simply
erroneous. More positively, he argues that these four characteristics at least
hint at something of far greater significance. Religion is about the
community of persons.
In order to test this hypothesis, Macmurray asks that we consider what he
calls 'a primitive tribal religion'. The advantage of using such an example is
that allows us to see more clearly the precise function of religion in
community. In Macmurray's view a primitive tribe is made up of a group of
people who live a common life. The unity of the group is not to be taken as
simply a matter of fact but, as was noted earlier, a matter of intention. Such
intending of communion with others must therefore be a conscious act. "In
any actual community of persons ... there is not merely a common life, but
also a consciousness of the common life, and it is this consciousness which
constitutes the association a personal association or community".87
This consciousness, which is necessary if a community is to be built on the
positive intention of its members, also involves the realisation that
community life is fragile. There is always the possibility that hostility might
87 John Macmun:ay, Persons in Relation, p.161.
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take the place of fellowship and that the unity of a group might be
fragmented. This will happen if the motive behind personal relations is
negative, or if fear of the others replaces the love that should unite the
members. One of the primary functions of religion therefore is to help the
members of a given community to maintain its consciousness of the
necessity of intending communion.
Religion is the form of reflection which relates to the problematic of
community...Religion, we shall say, is the reflective activity which
expresses the consciousness of community; or more tersely, religion is the
celebration of communion.88
Macmurray suggests that to celebrate anything is in fact to do something
which acts as a symbolic expression of our consciousness of the thing to be
celebrated. The celebration of communion or fellowship should therefore
properly involve a communal reflection in which all the members of the
community participate. The celebration of communion with others cannot
be a solitary or private affair. It must be a common activity, and such
activity must have a symbolic character with a reference beyond itself. The
activity itself, whatever it might be, should be undertaken not for its own
sake but rather for the sake of what the activity represents or signifies.
Returning to -the idea of primitive communities, Macmurray believes that the
members of such communities do not simply live a common life. They also
perform certain ritual activities together, which is an expression of the fact
that each member is conscious of the common life and finds meaning in it.
88 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p.162.
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This celebration of their fellowship is their religious activity; and since it
symbolises or expresses their common consciousness of the community
life, such activity is an activity of reflection.89
The religious activity, which is an expression of a group's consciousness of
community, takes place amid the awareness that community life is itself
some kind of achievement. There always remains the possibility that the
fellowship of a group might break down and be replaced by hostility and
enmity. Moreover, community life is always l~ss than perfect and there is
always evidence of failure to be found in any group of people. The
awareness of the fragility of community life points to another aspect of
religion. It serves as a means of strengthening the members, that they might
have the appropriate intention regarding their life together.
Religion is itself intentional. Its celebration of communion is also a
means of strengthening the will to community. The function of religion
is then to mobilise and strengthen the positive elements in the motivation
of its members, to overcome the negative modes where they exist, to
prevent the outbreak of enmity and strife, to dominate the fear of the
other. .. 90
Macmurray acknowledges that society has developed beyond the small,
'primitive' family or kinship groups to nations and states which are much
larger and more impersonal. This however does not mean that religion can
no longer fulfil the function it has served in smaller groups. Indeed, if
religion were able to fulfil its function properly, it would gready assist in
creating a universal community of persons. Such a universal community
89 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p.162.
90 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p.162.
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would be based on freedom and equality, and would be one where each
person would have the positive intention of creating communion with
others. Many would perhaps argue that such a universal community is
beyond imagining; that it is nothing other than a utopian fantasy. But, for
Macmurray, such a universal community "would be the full self-realisation
of the personal".91
He goes on to suggest that if the religious ritual, in which the members of a
community participate, is to have any real significance, then each member of
the community must be personally aware of the meaning of the ritual
practiced by the community. The symbolism of religious ritual must be
such that it has significance for each member, and if the symbolism is to be
valid it ought to be one which expresses the unity of all the members. Can
such a symbol be found? Macmurray believes so.
How can a universal mutuality of intentional and active relationship be
represented symbolically? Only through the idea of a personal Other
who stands in the same mutual relation to every member of the
community. Without the idea of such a universal and personal Other it is
impossible to represent the unity of a community of persons, each in
personal fellowship with all the others.92
The Universal Other
Macmurray suggests that such a universal Other must be understood as
being a universal Agent, whose actions serve to unite the actions of all the
members of the community. The need for such a universal Agent partly
91 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p.163.
92 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p.164.
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stems from the need for any community to have a person who is seen as its
head as the uniting inspiration of the whole group. It is Macmurray's view
that the ritual head of an existing group or community, such as the chief of
the tribe, cannot adequately represent the universal Other, because he acts
only as the temporary representative of the community. Rather, what is
needed is an Other who can appropriately represent the unity of the
community, and who stands as the centre of a given community, so that all
the members might be able to relate personally to what is perceived as being
the heart of the community. It is Macmurray's belief that, when fully
developed, "the idea of a universal personal Other is the idea of God".93
The idea of God which Macmurray here refers to is one which understands
God in personal terms. God is to be seen as being the personal author of
the community and of the world itself. Since God is at the heart of all that
is, the life of the community involves not only fellowship with the other
members of the community, but also a fellowship with all of nature. God is
to be found in all things, and creates community with all that is.
It remams true that the creating of community 1S dependent on the
overcoming of hostility and fear. It is only when all hostility between people
is overcome that we will be able to encounter the true face of religion. Until
then, religion acts as an inspiration for all those who intend communion
with others and with the world.
If this basic problem of personal life could be resolved; if the negative
mode could finally and completely be subordinated to the positive in all
personal activity, the redemptive function of religion would be complete;
and only its central activity would remain. Religion would then be simply
93 John Macmunay, Persons in Relation, p.164.
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the celebration of communion - of the fellowship of all things in God.
Meanwhile, it sustains the intention to achieve this fellowship.94
Real and Unreal Religion
It is clear that Macmurray has made some strong claims here and that there
is a need for him to justify those claims in the light of our actual experience
of religion. This leads us to the point where Macmurray attempts to draw a
distinction between what he terms 'real' and 'unreal' religion. In order to do
this he returns again to the idea of action. It is action which determines the
future. Linked to this is the notion of freedom, which Macmurray describes
as the capacity to act and so the capacity to determine the future. Freedom
can be understood as having two significant dimensions: we are able to
move and we are able to know. Both of these dimensions refer to the
existence of others. To move is to modify the other; to know is to
apprehend the other. Given that this is the case, to act means to modify the
other by intention.
However, the freedom of any particular agent to act will be dependent on
the accuracy of her knowledge of the other. And, as Macmurray has
previously shown, knowledge of the other is always somehow problematic.
To the extent that knowledge of another is erroneous, one's capacity for
action will be limited and frustrated. One's intention will not properly be
realised. Action therefore, if it is to achieve its intention, must also involve
reflection too. Such reflection is concerned with achieving true knowledge,
and with overcoming error. The more we can come to true knowledge of
the other the more we are able to create the conditions of freedom.
94 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p.165.
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Without such freedom we will be unable to act in such a way that we can
determine the futw:e intentionally.
Since it is precisely the capacity to act rationally that makes us persons, the
forms of reflection we use will be different modes of rationality. Macmurray
suggests that there are three traditional modes of reflection, religion, art and
science. It is his view, however, that religion serves as the primary mode of
reflective rationality. It can be understood as being primary because it is the
first form of reflection to express itself in human development and because
both art and science are historically derived from religion.
As a particular mode of reflection, religion is concerned with true
knowledge of a personal Other. The data that we bring to this religious
reflection are our own experiences of personal relationship with others.
Since it is the case that many of our experiences· of relationships with others
are problematic, religious reflection will inevitably be concerned with
achieving true knowledge of the Other and so overcoming the problems of
personal relationships. It is Macmurray's understanding that the value of
religious reflection is that it universalises .the problem of personal relations
through the idea of a universal Person, to whom all human agents stand in
an identical relation. This universal Person can be described as God. And
since religious knowledge is the knowledge of God, such knowledge can be
applied to all personal relationships.
Macmurray now returns to the human experience of being in personal
relations with others. What does it mean to know another person? What
form does such knowledge take? In the first place, real knowledge of
another cannot be purely objective or scientific.
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A purely objective attitude to another person precludes a personal
knowledge, because it excludes direct personal relationship. We can
know a great deal about other people, both in particular and in general,
without knowing them. The reason for this is simply the mutuality of the
personal ...If you do not know me, then necessarily I do not know you.
To know another person we must be in communication with him, and
• • • 9S
commUllicahon is a two-way process.
It follows from the above that all knowledge of persons comes from the
revelation of the other. Our knowledge of others, if it is to be real
knowledge, can only emerge to the extent that another reveals herself to us.
As long as another person pretends to be what she is not then there is no
possibility of us being able to acquire true knowledge of her. Clearly too, we
ourselves can only be known insofar are we are prepared to reveal the truth
of ourselves. The corollary of this idea of knowledge of another stemming
from self-revelation is also significant. A person can know herself only as
she reveals herself to another. In this way, self-revelation also acts as self-
discovery.
Macmurray now suggests that in fact it is all too easy for us to have an
illusory knowledge of one another. While it is true that we can only know
another to the extent that the person reveals herself to us, our knowledge is
also largely dependent on the emotional disposition that we bring to that
person. A negative attitude to another makes knowledge of the other, and
indeed of oneself, impossible. Mutual hatred, suspicion or dislike inevitably
hinders any prospect of self-revelation. Without a desire to truly know
another, and the openness to love, whatever idea we may have of another
per~onwill be an illusion.
9S John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p.169.
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My knowledge of another person is a function of my love for him; and in
proportion as my knowledge is a function of my fear of him, it is illusory
or unreal. The problematic of our knowledge of persons is in terms of
the distinction between reality and illusion, between real and unreal.96
Just as our human relations can be illusory and unreal, so too with religion.
It is Macmurray's view that religion can be either real or unreal, and that the
distinction between the two rests on the motivation behind religious belief
and practice. If the motivation behind religion is negative then the religious
activity and the religious knowledge that informs it will be unreal. Insofar as
the motivation behind religion is positive then it will be real. One of the
signs of unreal or illusory religion is that it will tend to be egocentric and
defensive. It will be egocentric in that it is accepted for the sake only of
oneself. It will be defensive in that it is rooted in a fear of life. Real religion
on the other hand is what Macmurray calls 'heterocentric' in that it is lived
for the sake of others. While it may be true that all religion, both real and
unreal, are concerned at least in part with the overcoming of fear, one can
distinguish real religion from the unreal by their different ways of dealing
with the problem of fear.
The maxim of illusory religion runs: 'Fear not, trust in God and He will
see that none of the things you fear will happen to you'; that of real
religion, on the contrary, is 'Fear not, the things that you are afraid of are
quite likely to happen to you, but they are nothing to be afraid of.97
96 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p.170.
97 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p.171.
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It is clear from what Macmurray has been saying that it is all too easy for an
individual to have a religious faith which is fundamentally unreal. Now he
wants to go further and to suggest that the religion of whole faith
communities and of whole societies can also be unreal. In his view, religion
within a particular society is an expression of its consciousness of
community. But if the understanding of community within a society is an
inappropriate one then its religion will also be unreal. Macmurray argues
that the unreal character of some religions can be seen in their fundamental
outlook. Those religions which are either fundamentally pragmatic or
fundamentally contemplative are to be understood as being unreal.
A religion which is pragmatic will take the form of some kind of spiritual
technology. It will contain a whole set of devices to control the forces that
make life either a success or failure. It will have a number of rituals which
are intended to placate the hostility or beg the favour of God. A religion
which is basically contemplative in outlook, on the other hand, will tend to
be idealist in nature. It will also be otherworldly, and will focus on an ideal
community which is hoped for and imagined, but one which is not possible
in the world that we live in. Such contemplative religions encourage a
withdrawal from the world and an escape into fantasy. The symbols which
they use refer not to the world that we live in but to the desire for another
world, which somehow compensates for the unsatisfactory nature of life as
we experience it here on earth. Contemplative religions, like any other form
of idealism, tend to invert the distinction between appearance and reality.
They make the spiritual world real and present the material world in which
we live as being unreal and illusory.
It is Macmurray's view that the basic problem of religion lies in terms of the
distinction between reality and unreality in _personal relations. But how is
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one to be able to overcome this problem? He suggests that what is needed
is personal integrity.
The primary demand of religion is for a personal integrity. Integrity here
is not a general term for moral goodness: it means specifically a way of
life which is integral In particular, an integration of the inner life with
the outer, a unity of reflection and action, a coincidence of motive and
intention. If this were complied with, the result would be action which is
at once moral and spontaneous, and consequendy, free.98
Without a life of integrity we are likely to fall into the trap of dualism, which
for Macmurray involves the inability to distinguish between the real and the
unreal. Religion, if it is to be real, cannot acquiesce in any form of dualism.
It may be accepted that religion is a form of reflection and also a search for
knowledge. This allows us to ask whether a religion, or a religious belief, is
true. It also allows us to question the spiritual and moral value of a
particular religion or religious belief. But, since religion is also about the
distinction between what is real and unreal, it is always necessary to ask
questions about the reality of a religion too.
This is a question which includes the other two questions and demands
their unification. If it is true but unsatisfactory, or is satisfactory but
untrue, it is unreal. Now truth is judged; satisfaction is felt: consequendy
the reflection which is concerned with the problematic of truth is an
intellectual reflection, while the reflection that is concerned with
satisfactoriness is emotional. The first is concerned with matter of fact;
the second with matter of intention, that is to say, with value. Both, as
representational, refer to action and have their verification in action.99
98 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p.l72.
99 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p.173.
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In a somewhat complex argument, Macmurray moves on to suggest that the
knowledge which is involved in action has two major aspects which
correspond to the reflective distinction between means and ends. A
knowledge of means is always a matter of facts. What in fact is the best
means to a given end? A knowledge of ends, on the contrary, is always a
matter of value rather than a matter of facts. What do I want to do with my
life? Action is understood by Macmurray to involve an integration of these
two types of knowledge. To act is nothing other than to choose to realise a
particular objective or end by an effective means. However, in the process
of reflection the question of means and ends are necessarily separated,
because they require two different modes of reflection if they are to provide
an adequate solution. The problematic questions of religion, which requires
the integration of both means and ends, can only be properly solved in
action and not in reflection. This point of view has serious implications for
all religions in terms of both doctrine and practice.
The validity of a theological doctrine, for instance, cannot be determined
merely by asking whether it is true. For this is only one aspect of its
reality. Its validity depends also upon the valuation with which it is
integrated in action. It is characteristic of theological doctrines that they
are ambivalent in this respect.100
It appears to Macmurray therefore that religion has two aspects, ritual and
doctrine. Of these two aspects, the ritual is the primary and positive one
because it is concerned with value and with the intention of action.
Doctrine, on the other hand, is always secondary because it is a means to an
end, and the means presupposes the end. Ritual and doctrine, as different
100 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, pp. 173-174.
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aspects of religion, complement one another in that they both seek
integration in action. Both refer in different ways to the unity of action
which is what constitutes reality; the one referring to fact and the other to
value. Together, ritual and doctrine create the conditions for action which is
both true and good.
In their togetherness they symbolise the unity of Truth and Goodness.
But this unity is realised only in action; so that reality is symbolised as the
one action which intends the unity of Truth and Goodness, and which
achieves its end with absolute efficiency.101
There remains however the constant risk that religion may become unreal,
and this is likely to occur whenever the motive behind religion itself
becomes negative. At an earlier point of Persons in Relation, Macmurray had
suggested that a child who fails to find proper communion with the mother
figure in his life, whose relationship with his mother is therefore unreal, will
tend to conform but to behave in either an aggressive or a submissive
manner.102 He now suggests that those same qualities of aggression and
submission are to be found in any manifestation of unreal religion.
In that case, the religion may either become aggressive - seeking to
achieve community by force and achieving, at most a pragmatic society;
or it may become submissive, contemplative and idealistic, referring its
reflective symbolism to another world; to a community which is expected
but not intended.103
101 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p. 174.
102 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, pp.103-5
103 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p.175.
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A Personal God
In the concluding chapter of Persons in Relation, which relates to the
conclusions he drew in the Gifford Lectures of 1953-54, Macmurray is
clearly intent on bringing together his views on both the nature of the
human person and the nature of religion. He makes reference to the
questions which are set for all those who are invited to give the prestigious
Gifford Lectures: 'What contribution does this philo,sophical study make to
the problem of the validity of religious belie±? fue there, or are there not,
rational grounds for a belief in God?'l04
His first significant point is that the traditional philosophical arguments to
prove the existence of God are, at the very least, inadequate. The main
problem with the traditional proofs, as seen for example in Descartes'
attempt to prove the existence of God, is that they tend to lead to some
form ofdualism. This Macmurray perceives as being unacceptable.
Any dualistic mode of thinking is incompatible with religion. For the
root of dualism is the intentional dissociation of thought and action;
while religion, when it is full-grown, demands their integration. From the
point of view of any dualist thought, whether in its pragmatic or its
contemplative mode, whether from an idealist or a realist attitude,
religion cannot even be rightly conceived; and the traditional proofs, even
if they were logically unassailable, could only conclude to some inftnite or
absolute being which lacks any quality deserving of reverence or worship.
The God of the traditional proofs is not the God of religion.105
104 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p.206.
105 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, pp.206-7.
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Macmurray argues that all the traditional proofs for the existence of God,
such as the argument from design or the argument from causes, fall within
the context of a philosophy which starts from the point of view of the
thinker rather than the agent, and that this inevitably commits one to a
dualist position. The knower, or thinker, becomes a pure subject, an
observer, one who is isolated in his own thoughts. It may be possible as a
thinker to reach out to other ideas, but it is not possible to reach anything
that actually exists. It is Macmurray's view that existence can never be
proved.
For such reasons we found ourselves compelled to abandon the
theoretical attitude and to start not from the '1 think', but from the '1 do';
to adopt the standpoint not of the observer but of the participant; not of
the thinker but of the agent. When we did this, we found that we were
dealing not with the isolated self, excluded from existence, but with
persons in dynamic relation, each an existing part of an existing world.
From this standpoint existence - both of the knower and of the world he
knows - is given, and given as a togetherness of self and other.106
Macmurray is prepared to acknowledge that even though the fact of agency
is our primary certainty and the certainty of existence, the nature of oneself
and of others remains problematic. But he sees this problem as being more
of a practical problem than a philosophical one. We must act in terms of a
basic distinction between right and wrong. This means that we have to
choose what to do, and inherent in the choice is the possibility of doing the
wrong thing. When we act wrongly our freedom as agents, which is the
capacity to determine the future in accordance with our intentions, cannot
be fully realised. To act freely and appropriately is to choose an end which
106 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p.209.
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is good, and to use the means that are most effective to achieve that end.
However our freedom to act is never unlimited. We live and act in a world,
made up of other agents. This fact is of the greatest significance for
Macmurray. We most properly express our freedom to act in the mutuality
of persons.
We need one another to be ourselves. This complete and unlimited
dependence of each of us upon the others is the central and crucial fact
of personal existence. Individual independence is an illusion; and the
independent individual, the isolated self, is a nonentity ...It is only in
relation to others that we exist as persons; we are invested with
significance by others who have need of us; and borrow our reality from
those who care for us. We live and move and have our being not in
ourselves but in one another; and what rights or powers or freedom we
possess are ours by the grace and favour of our fellows. Here is the basic
fact of our human condition.107
It is Macmurray's understanding that the mutuality of personal relations
provides the primary context in which we can express our freedom through
action. Insofar as freedom may be a problem to us, that problem can be
overcome through knowledge of one another. This knowledge can only
come about through a mutual self-revelation, and this is only possible when
we act out of love rather than from fear of others. Knowledge of others
therefore will be at the heart of all knowledge and all action. For
Macmurray, this knowledge takes a religious form.
Since our knowledge of one another conditions all our activities, both
practical and reflective, we find here the ultimate condition of all our
knowing and all our action. 1bis is the field of religion; and in this field
107 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p.211.
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the conditions of interpersonal knowledge have to be created by the
overcoming of fear, and so by the transformation of motives. lOB
At this point Macmurray acknowledges that there is something missing from
his attempt to elucidate the nature of religion and of personal communion.
We can only be in relation with others in the world that we live in. How
then are we to understand our relation to the world?
According to Macmurray, the traditional way of dealing with this question
has been to represent the human person as consisting of an immortal soul in
a mortal body. The body is seen to be material, like the world in which it
moves and lives. The soul, however, is understood as being immaterial, a
spiritual entity which has no counterpart in the natural world. This
approach is deemed by Macmurray to be inadequate because, once more, it
leads us to a dualist position. He suggests that a more appropriate
understanding of our relation to the world can be found by following what
he considers to be the implications of human agency.
We know that we are agents; and any theory which explicitly or implicitly
denies this is necessarily in error. We have tried to follow, step by step,
the implications of this starting-point. It has led us to the community of
persons in relation, realising their unity as the condition of freedom for
every agent. But this community can act only through the Other, which
is both its support and its resistance; and this Other is the world of which
the community of agents is only a part, in dynamic relation with the other
parts. How are we to represent to ourselves this universe of existence,
and our relation to it as the common world ofwhich we form part?109
lOB John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p.212.
109 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p.214.
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Macmurray's answer to this question is that to conceive the world as a
personal universe is to understand our relation with the world in religious
terms. For Macmurray it is much better to ask if the world is a personal
world than to ask whether God exists. To ask whether God exists is to
imply once again the primacy of the theoretical, because the question of
God's existence presupposes an idea of God which arises independently of
any knowledge of the existence of God. A more adequate theological
question is therefore to ask whether or not our world is a personal world.
The question of the nature of the world, personal or impersonal, can be
properly answered only through the idea of action.
This is a real question only if it has a reference to action. If it made no
difference to action it would be meaningless - a merely speculative
metaphysical conundrum. It would be incapable of any verification. But
clearly we can live in the world in a fashion that is grounded either in a
belief that the world is personal or that it is impersonal; and that these
two ways of life will be different. Consequently, the verification of the
belief in God must lie in their difference; and in particular in the
difference between the realisation of freedom in the one and in the
other.HO
Macmurray suggests that the difference between a personal and an
impersonal conception of the world is a matter of what he calls
'apperception'. The two major ways of understanding the world are those
of science and religion. In examining these two outlooks more closely we
can see how they are likely to affect our understanding of our relation with
the world.
110 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p.21S.
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Religion apperceives the world personally; science impersonally. This
implies two different conceptions of the relation between man and the
world. For science this relation is an impersonal one; for religion it is
personal. The scientific apperception is pragmatic. The world is material
for our use, and science seeks to develop that knowledge of the world
through which we can use it as the instrument of our intentions. The
religious apperception is communal. The relation of man to the world is
his relation to God; and we relate ourselves righdy to the world by
entering into communion with God, and seeking to understand and to
fulfil his intention.11l
Macmurray is anxious to show that, while the distinction between seeing the
world from a religious or scientific point of view is of the greatest
importance, it is not true that religion and science are inherently
incompatible. Rather, he perceives that religion is the expression of an
adequate and complete apperception of our relation to the world while
science is the expression of a necessarily limited, partial and therefore
inadequate apperception.
In order to suggest the strength of his Vlew, Macmurray now offers a
number of reasons why an impersonal conception of the world is
inadequate. The first point he makes is that the world is precisely one in
which we live and to which we belong. As human beings we are elements
of the world and our actions are part of the activity of the world. That is
enough to suggest that the world is personal. Next, a strictly scientific or
impersonal view of the world cannot account for human activity. The
scientific understanding of the world accepts the physical nature of life, and
sees the world as consisting of events which occur in accordance with
111 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p.217.
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unchanging natllial laws. All changes in this world are seen as being
determinate. Such a view allows no room for human freedom and action.
Thirdly, Macmurray argues that it is through action that we know both our
own existence and the existence of others. But if we perceive the world
impersonally we commit ourselves to the notion that everything that
happens in the world is simply the effect of prior causes. There can be no
accounting for acting with intention in a stricdy scientific perspective.
Since the scientific understanding of the world, as Macmurray presents it,
can only offer a severely impoverished and unpalatable understanding of the
natllie of reality, he suggests that we ought therefore to understand our
relation to the world in personal and religious terms. Thus, we are not only
in personal· relation to the world but also in a personal relationship with
God.
To conceive the world thus is to conceive it as the act of God, the
Creator of the world, and ourselves as created agents, with a limited and
dependent freedom to determine the future, which can be realised only
on the condition that our intentions are in harmony with His intention,
and which must frustrate itself if they are not.1l2
As he draws his Gifford Lectures to a close, Macmurray is anxious that his
conclusions about human nature, the nature of the world and the nature of
God should not be misunderstood. He therefore stresses, in the first place,
that the conception of God which he has arrived at is not a pantheistic one.
He believes that pantheism results from the attempt to put a religious
perspective on an essentially organic conception of the world. Only a
personal conception of the world can be fully theistic and fully religious.
112 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p.222.
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We should therefore perceive God as 'the infinite Agent who is immanent in
the world which is his act, but transcendent of it'.113
Next, Macmurray makes the point that, although he has offered a sustained
argument to show that God is in personal relationship with human beings
and with the world, this does not mean that he is arguing for the truth of
any particular system of religious belief. It is his view that religious
doctrines are problematic in much the same way as scientific theories are
problematic, and that religious doctrines stand in need of constant revision
and a continual verification in action. He suggests that religious doctrines
can only be properly verified by those who are prepared to intentionally
commit themselves to the way of life which their faith demands of them.
Finally, Macmurray expresses the hope that his analysis of the nature of the
human person and the world as personal might assist in helping philosophy
to recover its true voice. While lamenting the situation where philosophy
has, in his view, reduced itself to the clarification of language through a
logical and formal analysis, he believes that philosophy can yet re-discover
its kinship with theology.
By shifting our standpoint from the 'I think' to the 'I do', we have
restored the reference of thought to action, and in the result have found
that we are driven to conceive a personal universe in which God is the
ultimate reality. This transformation restores its whole substance to
philosophy, which again becomes the intellectual aspect of the search for
the real. The problematic of philosophy lies then in the distinction
between 'real' and 'unreal'. Now this, we have seen, is the problematic of
religious reflection; and philosophy, if it is concerned with the intellectual
113 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p.223.
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aspect of this problematic, must be identical with theology, with an
undogmatic theology which, like science, has abandoned certainty, and
which has recognised that religious doctrines too are all hypothetical.
Philosophy, we must conclude, is theology which has abandoned
dogmatism, and has become in a new and wider sense a Natural
Theology.114
114John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p.224.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JESUS
Towards the end of his life Macmurray was to write to a friend that his
philosophical ideas found their fullest expression in the Gifford Lectures
that we have just examined. While such a view cannot be argued with, what
was not fully developed in his Gifford Lectures was his own understanding
of the person of Jesus, and the significance of Jesus in revealing the true
nature of human beings. Throughout his life Macmurray wrote and thought
and spoke about both the philosophical and religious importance of Jesus.
Without an attempt to articulate these personal beliefs of Macmurray we will
fail to properly situate his Gifford Lectures, and fail to understand why Jesus
and Christianity are absolutely central to Macmurray's whole enterprise. To
this task, therefore, we turn.
The Ambiguity of Christianity
In 1938, just as the world was about to be engulfed by the hon:ors of a
second world war that would call into question the values of the world and
the very meaning of human life, Macmurray published a book entitled The
Clue to History. In this work he expressed more clearly than anywhere else in
his writings how he understood the person ofJesus, and what difference he
felt an appropriate understanding ofJesus would make to our personal lives
and to the world in which we live. A close examination of the views that
Macmurray expresses in The Clue to History will reveal that his own
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understanding of the person of Jesus was not only religiously profound but
was also in harmony with his wider philosophical concerns.
In his opening chapter, entitled The Ambiguity of Chnstianity, Macmurray
argues that the meaning of the term Christianity is not as simple or clear as
we would imagine. This is largely due to the fact that the word refers not
simply to a set of particular beliefs and practices but also to a great number
of Churches and groups that describe themselves as Christian. There is too
the fact that Christianity cannot but be linked to the historical events of the
life and teaching of Jesus. The :first task then in coming to a proper
understanding of the meaning of Christianity is to define it in such a way
that the life and message of Jesus is treated within its proper historical
context. The reason why this is so crucial is that the Christian churches,
though obviously coming into existence because of the life and teachings of
Jesus, do not necessarily maintain the teachings of Jesus in their own
teaching and practices.
The historical development of Churches or: other: institutions in no way
guarantees that the original teaching of their founder:, or even the original
purpose of their foundation is retained. Historical continuity is no
guarantee of spiritual continuity.115
Macmurray argues that much of the confusion over the mearung of
Christianity arises from this lack of clarity as to what is meant by the use of
the word itself. What does it mean for one to describe oneself as a
Christian? Is a person a Christian because she accepts and believes in the
teachings of Jesus? Or is someone a Christian because she participates in
the religious activities which have some historical continuity with the
115 John Macmurray, The Clue to History, SCM Press, London, 1938, p. 3.
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foundational Christian community of Jesus and his disciples? While
acknowledging that there have long been theological differences as to which
view is right, differences that have indeed contributed to the ambiguity of
the term Christianity, Macmurray's own approach in The Clue to History is
unambiguous.
It seems to me that historical continuity must take precedence in this
debate. For religion is concerned with the reality of life, and not with
ideas, except insofar as they embody themselves in life. And the reality of
human life is history. It is what Jesus did to human history by his life and
death rather than what he said about it that matters when we come to
defme Christianity. His work consists not in what he told men they
ought to do but in what he did to men. Christianity is primarily the
movement which Jesus founded rather than the doctrines that he
taught.116
Having said that, Macmurray is anxious to show that the continuity of the
teaching of Jesus is also important. In his view, a claim to historical
continuity with the life and actions of Jesus would necessarily involve a
claim to historical continuity with the ideas and teachings of Jesus too.
Indeed, the real value of the teaching of Jesus lies not so much in the
particular message that he expounds but rather that in his teaching Jesus
reveals his own purposes and intention for the world.
If then we are properly to discover whether an individual or an institution
or a way of life can legitimately be described as Christian, we have to
decide whether they are part of the historic continuity of purpose and
intention first expressed in the life ofJesus and first defined by him in his
teaching. The teaching ofJesus is important because it defines a purpose,
116 John Macmurray, The Clue to History, p.4.
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not because it deftnes a set of ideas about the world, and not because it
deftnes a way of life that men might live or 'ought' to live.m
Just as Macmw:ray was to argue later that seeing the human person from the
perspective of agency would provide us with an adequate understanding of
the natw:e of human being, so here he suggests that by examining the
actions of Jesus we can come to a proper appreciation of the intentions of
Jesus. In so doing we are then enabled to captw:e the precise meaning of
Christianity. For Macmw:ray, one thing is absolutely clear. To be a
Christian, and for a Chw:ch to be properly Christian, is to have some real
share in the historical intention underlying the actions and the teachings of
Jesus.
To deftne Christianity, then, is to deftne the historic continuity of an
intention. The reason why our efforts to deftne it set us in conflict is that
we habitually separate the two elements which are united in an intention
- the element of thought, or the mental element; and the material
element, the element of physical activity. There arises in this way a
dualism of theory and practice. Neither of these two elements can
provide, by itself, a criterion of Christianity.u8
Having set himself the task of clarifying the historical intentions of Jesus,
both in his actions and in his teachings, Macmw:ray now attempts to
provide the context in which Jesus lived and came to the decisions he made
about his own intentions. His view is that the intention that Jesus brought
to his life and his actions finds its sow:ce in the experience of the life of the
Jewish people of the Old Testament times. Although most people have no
117 John Macmurray, The Clue to History, p.5.
118 John Macmurray, The Clue to History, pp.9-10.
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difficulty in acknowledging that Christianity therefore finds its historical
roots in Judaism, little is made of the religious significance of that fact.
The Importance ofJudaism for Christianity
The religious significance of the fact that Christianity finds its roots in the
Jewish tradition lies, for Macmurray, in his view that the Jewish culture and
tradition is the only one in history that can be described as maintaining
unsullied a religious form and outlook. By contrast, the other great
traditions which have influenced Western society, those of the Greek and
Roman world, while being originally religious in outlook as were all societies,
gradually moved away from a strictly religious outlook and consciousness.
Primitive society is religious in form precisely because the elements of
culture which represent the origins of art, science, morality, law and
politics, have no autonomy. They are contained in religion and remain
aspects of it. The break with the religious form of consciousness, which
is almost universal, occurs when these aspects of social life, or some of
them, assert their autonomy, so that religion itself becomes one aspect of
culture which is contrasted with others. What is characteristic of the
Hebrew people is that it achieved a development to a high level of
civilization without this breaking up of the aspects of social life into
autonomous, contrasted and competing fields of interest and effort.119
Thus, the real significance of the history ofJewish society and culture lies in
the fact that religion never became simply another sphere of human activity,
but rather that everything within the Jewish world was imbued with a
religious understanding. Within the Jewish tradition, as far as Macmurray
119 John Macmurray, The Clue to History, p.28.
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understands it, there could be no split between the secular and the religious
aspects of life. The great value in the religious outlook of Judaism is that it
manages to avoid the dualism that inevitably follows from the split between
religion and all the other activities of life. Judaism, in maintaining the
religious consciousness which was to be found in all primitive societies, was
thus able to avoid the dualistic notions which are to be found in all other
cultures, expressed in issues such as the contrast between this world and
another world, and between the spiritual and the material.
The history of the Jewish people, as described in the Old Testament, is for
Macmurray, the story of the ongoing struggle to overcome the tendency to
fall into a dualistic view of life and of the world. Because at heart it is a
religious community, Judaism was able to avoid dividing their society into
different social classes. The teaching of the Law and the practice of things
like the Jubilee Year ensured that no aristocracy of the rich and the powerful
was able to arise. So too, the fact that in Jewish tradition it was the prophet
rather than the priest who was the main source of religious inspiration and
revelation means that Judaism managed to avoid the dualism of having a
hierarchy of religious classes too.
Macmurray argues that there is always a close connection between the way
that we conceive God and the way that we conceive our human life. Our
understanding of the relationship between God and humanity will largely
determine our understanding of how human beings are to relate to one
another. Here too, we have much to learn from the way that Judaism has
understood the true nature of the relationship between God and human
beings and between human beings themselves.
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The Jewish Law is summed up, not by Jesus but by the Jewish lawyer
quoting from the Old Testament, in the two commandments, "Thou
shalt love the Lord thy God" and 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as
thyself' ...This dictates a society which is equalitarian and
democratic, ...which determines human relations in terms of the inner
democracy and equality of friendship, not as an ideal but as a practice of
social relation which is totally incompatible with class-distinction, either
on an economic or on a caste basis.120
The Jewish society, like all other societies, had of course to recognize that
the vision of the harmonious life of friendship, pictured in the two great
commandments, was easier to imagine than to see in actual practice. How is
one able to maintain a fully religious outlook on life if there is so much evil
in the world? How is one to explain the fact that the relations between God
and human beings, and between fellow human beings, are not as
harmonious and united as they ought to be?
It is at this point that dualism seems inevitable, as a distinction between
an ideal world of what ought to be and a real and evil world ofwhat is. If
the religious consciousness is to be maintained through the process of
development, the problem of evil must be solved in a practical fashion,
which will allow the idea and the actuality to remain as parts of one
world.121
Macmurray suggests that it was the doctrine of the Fall, and with it the
promise of salvation, that enabled the Jewish religion to avoid falling into
dualism here. The beauty of the doctrine of the fall from grace of Adam
and Eve, and of all human beings, is that it permits us to understand the
120 John Macmurray, The Clue to History, p.34.
121 John Macmurray, The Clue to History, p.35
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problem of evil without needing to create an ideal world where evil would
no longer be an issue. This world is the only world we have, and the task of
human beings in this world is to be reconciled to God and to our fellow
human beings through repentance and forgiveness. Such a view keeps intact
the primary understanding of the Jewish faith that this world, despite the
evils to be found in it, is essentially good because created by Yahweh. The
goodness of Yahweh is itself seen most clearly in the fact that redemption
and reconciliation is possible for human beings as soon as they recognize
that they themselves are responsible for the evil and sin of the world. Evil,
in other words, cannot ultimately defeat the acts of God.
Hence the Fall of man merely describes the conditions under which God
now works for the redemption of the world...The Fall of man becomes
itself part of the process of the creation of the world, and history the
process by which the intention of God for human life is being carried
out. Where God is conceived as Agent the world is conceived as his act,
and in that case the criterion of reality must be the continuity of
intention. And this intention becomes, with the Fall, the intention of
reconciliation, and therefore can only be achieved through an operation
on the will of man. By thus doing justice both to the existence of evil
and to the goodness of God and his creation, the Hebrew consciousness
escapes from dualism and retains an integral consciousness of the
world.122
The major value in the Jewish religious understanding, as far as Macmurray
is concerned, lies not simply in that it manages to avoid any form of
dualism, but also that it clearly perceives that religion is concerned with this
world, and that history is nothing other than the act of God. What we see
122 John Macmurray, The Clue to History, p.38.
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therefore in the Jewish tradition, as distinct from the Greek and Roman
cultures, is a clear view of the meaning of religion.
Negatively, we see that the religious mode reveals itself in the absence of
dualism. Positively, it reveals itself in the integration of action and
reflection. The conception of God is also the conception of the nature of
society, and the experience of society is itself the act of God. In this way,
religious reflection becomes a continuous interpretation of history, and
historic experience becomes a progressive revelation of the nature and
purpose of God.123
It is of the greatest importance for Macmurray that it was within the Jewish
religious understanding and context that Jesus came, lived and died. He
argues that it was in the person of Jesus that the religious and cultural
oudook of Judaism was completed, and that it was through Jesus that the
religious understanding of the Jewish people became a universal value in
history. It is the figure ofJesus who therefore stands as the culmination of
the prophets of the Old Testament and the source of Christianity, which
makes universal the religious understanding ofJudaism.
By completing the process of the prophetic development, Jesus released
it from the limitations of its national reference and made it a movement
for the salvation, not of the Jews, but of the world through the Jews. For
this reason it is essential to insist again that Christianity is Jewish and that
Jesus was a Jew.124
The importance of this fact lies not so much in that it reveals the cultural
and religious background to the life ofJesus, but in the fact that Jesus stands
123 John Macmurray, The Clue to History, pp.39-40.
124 John Macmurray, The Clue to History, p.42.
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as the mature and final expression of the Jewish conSCiousness. As
Macmurray has suggested earlier, the crucial aspect of what he calls the
Jewish consciousness is that it manages to overcome dualism, and therefore
sees no split between faith and life, between the religious and the social
elements of human life.
For the religious consciousness a statement about society is a religious
statement and a statement about God has an immediate and direct
reference to society. This is the clue to any understanding ofJesus. He is
not an idealist - for the same reason that he is not a materialist - because
the distinction between the ideal and the material does not arise for
him.125
According to Macmurray, the work of Jesus began as a prophet, in the
judgement that the Jewish people have turned away from the purpose of
God, and in a call for repentance. It is a religious criticism of the social life
of the Jews, one made in the light of a religious interpretation of their
history. The particular historical context in which Jesus lived was, of course,
one where the Jewish people had been conquered by the Romans and lived
under their control. Although the Roman Empire could scarcely be
considered by the Jews as anything like the Kingdom of God, Jesus never
spoke of the need to overthrow the yoke of political slavery in order to
bring in the reign of the Kingdom of God. Instead, he called the Jewish
people to repentance and to turn back to the ways of God. Macmurray
suggests that, within the historical context in which he lived, Jesus made a
fundamental decision that his task was to bring the Jewish people back to an
appropriate understanding of their call: to be a religious people.
125 John Macmurray, The Clue to History, p.44.
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The character of this decision is seen in the fact that it defines Jesus'
mission as a mission to his own people. His task is defined by this
decision. He must lead his people to a fulfillment of their destiny by a
return to the religious principles of national action which their historical
experience has revealed and clarified, and so establish the conditions
necessary for the fulfi.llment of the divine purpose through them.126
The Teaching ofJesus
Turning to the question of the teaching ofJesus, Macmurray argues that two
elements are normally distinguished. There is first the exposition of Jesus'
understanding of the nature of human life in the world, an understanding set
within the context of the whole Jewish tradition. A second element is
apocalyptic and more concerned with the future. Macmurray suggests that
most Christians are happy to reflect on the first of these elements, one
which focuses on the moral and spiritual values of Jesus, but are much less
comfortable with the apocalyptic element. The difficulties that we have in
marrying these two aspects of the teaching of Jesus are a sign that we too
have been tainted by dualist notions.
The fact that we find it difficult to relate the two aspects reveals the
dualistic and non-religious character of our own minds. These two
aspects are fundamentally one; and to understand Jesus, or indeed the
religious mode of consciousness of which he is the supreme expression,
is to realize their essential and necessary unity.127
What is clear for Macmurray is that the teaching of Jesus is directly related
to the notion that the purpose of God is at work in the history of the Jewish
126 John Macmurray, The Clue to History, pp. 48-49.
127 John Macmurray, The Clue to History, p.49.
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people who are God's chosen ones. It is only when we accept that God is
at work in the world and that God's intentions will be realized that we will
learn to find happiness in working too for God's intention. Only then will
we be able to avoid falling into the trap of a dualistic understanding of God,
the world and ourselves. The significance of the apocalyptic element in
Jesus' teaching is that it is based on the belief that God will succeed in
bringing about his intention, in history.
The apocalyptic element in the teaching of Jesus is, indeed, the major
premiss upon which the whole teaching of Jesus rests, and if this is not
grasped then the teaching itself cannot be understood. In other words,
the teaching ofJesus is his answer to the question, "How is the kingdom
of God to be established in the world?" That it will be established is the
primary postulate. To deny it would be to deny the existence of God. A
creator who cannot achieve the intention of his creation is a contradiction
in terms.128
Once the apocalyptic element in Jesus' teaching, that God's intentions for
the world and for human beings will be realized in time, has been properly
understood, then it becomes easier to understand the role of the Jewish
people in salvation history and to perceive that Jesus reveals to us our
essential nature.
Thus Jesus marks the point in history at which it becomes possible for
man to adopt consciously as his own purpose the purpose which is
already inherent in his own nature. The mission of Jesus to his own
people is to reveal to them what has been implicit in their cultural history
128 John Macmurray, The Clue to History, p.54.
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from the beginning, to declare to them what they are called to do and to
fth k d · di· 129demand their acceptance 0 etas an 1ts con hons.
The primary revelation that Jesus brings to the Jewish people of his time is
concerned with the nature of human being; that human life is by its very
nature, a personal life. This teaching, while it might appear more than
obvious, needs, in Macmurray's view, to be reinforced in the contemporary
world, which is marked by organic and scientific notions of being.
To say that human life is personal is primarily to deny that human life is
organic, or that it can be treated as differing from animal life only in
degree and not in kind. It is to assert that the essence of human life is
radically different from the essence of organic life, and that the relations
which constitute the totality of human life are radically different from
those which make a unity of the organic world. It is this essential
character of human life, the thing that constitutes its humanness, that
Jesus discovered. And what he discovered was already implicit in the Old
Testament and had been coming nearer and nearer the threshold of
consciousness throughout the process ofJewish development.13o
The teaching ofJesus about the nature of the human pe:rson serves not only
as a contribution to human knowledge but, more importantly for
Macmurray, it also brings about a transformation of history. The effect of
the teaching of Jesus is that it allows us to come to a fuller self-realisation,
and in so doing it invites us to be transformed too. The message that Jesus
teaches is one that allows us to discover the truth of our own nature, and to
be able to act according to who we truly are. Part of the realisation of who
129 John Macmurray, The Clue to History, p.55.
130 John Macmurray, The Clue to History, p.56.
111
we are will be that we recognize that there is a purpose in life, that to be
human is to participate in the purposes and intentions of God.
Now it is the fundamental postulate of religious rationality that the
purpose of God must inevitably be achieved. Thus, the discovery of the
essence of humanity is the discovery, not merely of what human life
ought to be, but of what human life will be when the work of God in
history is complete. It is the discovery of what God is working at and
will achieve in human history. It explains past history and it defines the
end to which present history is in fact moving. Thus, by discovering, at
the point where the development of Hebrew reflection completes itself,
his own essence as a human being, Jesus discovered the intention of God
for man, which is the end of the process of history, the kingdom of
heaven which is to be established on earth. l31
Macmru:ray next tru:ns to a closer examination of the way in which Jesus,
through both his teaching and his actions, defines and expresses his
fundamental insight into human natru:e. He suggests that Jesus defines the
natru:e of human life both positively and negatively. From the negative
perspective, Jesus reveals the true meaning of human natru:e by denying the
truth of any expression of human natru:e which is not personal. So, we find
that Jesus denies that human community can be based simply on organic
models, or even on ties of family and blood. More concretely, this involves
the denial that human relationships can properly be based on family,nation
or race. When Jesus stated that whoever does the will of the Father is his
mother and father, he was denying that family alone could afford us an
appropriate idea of human relations. The parable of the Good Samaritan,
which is a response to the question as to who counts as a neighboru:, reveals
that human communities can only be brought about when we actually
131 John Macmurray, Th~ Clue to History, p.58.
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intend communion with others. Community, therefore, is not a matter of
fact but a matter of intention.
The difference that is brought out in this way between the orgaruc
relations and the personal relations is that the first are matters of fact,
while the second are matters of intention. The reason why the animal ties
of blood-relation cannot form the basis of human community is that
human community is a community of persons, and the unity of human
persons depends on human purposes determining human behaviour.
Blood relations are mere matters of fact which have no relation to that
freedom of choice which is the defining characteristic of human life.132
In Macmurray's view, Jesus also offers positive Views about the proper
nature of human being through his attempts to define the kind of structures
of relationship that would be found in a real community of persons. These
structures are exemplified in the great teaching of the Sermon on the
Mount, where Jesus presents his listeners with a profound lesson on the real
demands of love. Turning away from the notion that it is enough to love
those who have some special place in our lives through family ties or
through other social structures, Jesus insists that we are capable of intending
love with all others, even those whom we might consider to be enemies.
The demand of such a task lies precisely in the fact that "it lifts human
behaviour from the level of natural impulse to the level of deliberate
intention".133 It is the intending of communion with others that permits us
to deepen the bonds of love and fellowship with others. Love, in Jesus'
understanding, is not an emotion but rather a decision and an intention.
132 John Macmurray, The Clue to History, p.64.
133 John Macmurray, The Clue to History, p.66.
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The basis of a free human community must be the intention to enter into
community with others. It is in this way that love, which is in fact always
the basis of whatever human community there is, is raised in Jesus to the
level of intention, so that it becomes the motive force behind the
intention to create the kingdom of heaven, the community of mankind.134
Macmun:ay is anxious to make clear that the teaching of Jesus on the need
for love if we are to create communion is not some idealistic notion but is
intensely practical. The call of Jesus to love our enemies presupposes that
true community does not yet exist and offers a practical suggestion as to
what is needed if indeed we desire community and fellowship. Since real
community is marked by the mutual love and affection of its members, any
attempt to create community must begin with the intention of overcoming
hostility, so that love is created where it previously did not exist.
The guiding principles that would constitute any real community based on
the intending of love and fellowship would be equality and freedom. But
Macmurray again wants to state that these two principles are not simply
political slogans but that they are given a particular focus through the
teaching of Jesus. Freedom is the absence of restraint, and freedom
therefore means that we ought to be able to achieve our intentions. In
order for human beings to be properly free, they have to be able to act with
the intention of being true to their essential nature. To look for any other
kind of freedom can only end in self-frustration. We are only free insofar as
we live according to our own reality.
Freedom, in its full sense, can only be achieved when our intention is in
harmony with the nature of the reality of which we form a part; that is to
134 John Macmurray, The Clue to History, p.67.
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say, when our will and God's will coincide...The pnmary condition
which must be fulfilled if we are not to be frustrated, is that the relations
which bind us together into community, and which form the basis of the
possibility of human cooperation, should be right. Thus the root of
frustration and unfreedom in human life is the existence of enmity and
estrangement between us. If the relations between individuals in any
community are not harmonious then its members must be frustrated.
They cannot realize their intentions. They cannot be free.135
Turning to the idea of equality, Macmurray again suggests that the vision of
Jesus offers us a particular understanding of equality which is markedly
different from that offered by others. This notion of equality is based on
the fundamental principle that human life is personal, and therefore we can
only achieve proper equality once we acknowledge that fact. Equality is not
some kind of mathematical notion but is again the truth of our nature as
human beings.
It is neither a material nor an ideal equality that is properly referred to,
but a personal equality which combines both. In particular, it is not the
negation of difference. It is precisely the recognition of difference and
variety among individuals that gives meaning to the assertion of equality.
The statement that all men are equal means that any claim that one man
or one class or type of man is superior or inferior to another is, as a
matter of fact, quite untrue. The reason why it is untrue is that it makes a
human relationship impossible.136
Having shown that what is often termed as the ethical teaching of Jesus is
nothing other than an examination of our real human nature and the setting
out of the principles that accord with that nature, Macmurray next turns his
135 John Macmurray, The Clue to History, p.72.
136 John Macmurray, The Clue to History, p.74.
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attention to the fact that we tend to create a dualism between Jesus' ethical
teaching and his apocalyptic teaching. As we have already seen, Macmurray
finds such a division between the ethical and the apocalyptic problematic
because in reality, there is no such division.
What then is the basis of this distinction between "ethic" and
"apocalyptic"? It is quite clearly the dualism between the spiritual and the
material, which is the basic form of any non-religious mode of
apprehension. The "ethic" is spiritual. It sets before us an ideal of
human conduct. It reveals how we ought to behave. It provides us with
a theory of the good life. The "apocalyptic" on the other hand, is about
this world and what will happen to it in the end. 137
What is needed, therefore, if we are to succeed in coming to a correct
understanding of the teaching ofJesus, is to move away from the distortions
that a dualist approach inevitably brings, and to see that the teaching of
Jesus cannot be divided according to dualist premisses. Macmurray believes
that what is normally described as the ethical teaching of Jesus is in fact an
expression of Jesus' anthropology, one that expresses the principles that
govern the personal life. Likewise, what is often termed as the apocalyptic
teaching ofJesus is nothing other than the prediction about the future of the
personal life in the world which follows from those same principles. Only
when we are able to bring the various aspects ofJesus' teaching together can
we be sure that we properly understand his teaching.
If then we are to understand the teaching ofJesus we must rid our minds
of the habit of dualism, and learn to think the world, as he thought it,
religiously; as an integral whole in which the contrast of spirit and matter,
and all the contrasts to which this gives rise, are overcome. The proof of
137 John Macmurray, The Clue to History, p.84.
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our success will be that both ethic and apocalyptic will disappear, and in
their place we shall find a single unity of religious understanding with a
prediction of the future course of history as an inherent and necessary
part of it. We shall discover, as in all real understanding, an insight which
. al £ . h 138is so ores1g t.
One of the t:esults of looking at the world from a properly t:eligious
perspective, for Macmurray, is that one is thus enabled to come to a
realisation that God's action did not end with the creation, but that "history
is the continued act of God, and it is in his working in history that God is
known.,,139 Since real action involves the realisation of an intention, one can·
then see that history as the action of God and the realisation of the intention
of God. Further, if God is the Absolute, it would be absurd to imagine that
God's intention in history will not be t:ealised. Such an idea, however, might
well appear to be problematic. While it may be true that history can be seen
as being the action of God in our world, history is also about the actions of
human beings in the world. What then, if any, is the connection between
the actions of God in history and our human actions? How can the
manifold intentions of human actions be linked to the intention which
directs God's action in the world? What are we to make of the fact that
often our human intentions may be in opposition to God's intention ot: will?
In Macmurray's view, Jesus was able to offer real answers to these kinds of
questions. According to the teaching ofJesus, a fundamental truth is that if
our human intentions are opposed to the intention of God then they will
not be finally achieved, and our intentions will be frustrated. To be in
opposition to the will of God is to be in opposition to our own reality as
138 John Macmurray, The Clue to History, p.92.
139 John Macmurray, The Clue to History, p.93.
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human beings. To be a person is to be God's act, and therefore God's
intentions are embodied in om: own human natille.
This then is the principle by which Jesus understands the nature of
human freedom and its relation to the intention of God in history, which
is the nature of reality. God acts in history as Creator of Man. The
intention of this creation is known - a universal community of persons,
with freedom and equality as its structural principles of relationship.
Clearly such a relation is not possible unless Man wills it, because the
structure of human relationship is the expression of human intentions. If
God is to create a free and equal humanity, then Man must intend a free
and equal humanity. God's action in history must then be the creation in
Man of the effective intention to realise universal freedom and equality;
and since God cannot fail to realise his own intention, this will to
community is necessitated. l40
The question immediately anses, however, as to the natille of human
freedom. If we are free to will freedom are we not also free to reject
freedom? In what way can it be necessary for us to accept freedom and
equality and yet remain free? Macmm:ray argues that the answer that is
found in the teaching ofJesus is very clear. To reject our human freedom is
necessarily self-frustrating. To reject freedom is to reject om: own natille
and to fall into dualism, which leads to a perpetual war within oneself and
within societies.
Since God continues to act ill history, and since God's will cannot be
ultimately frustrated, we are able to see in the events of history that God
continually calls human beings back to the realisation of their true nature. It
is within this context that we are able to perceive the history of salvation.
140 John Macmurray, The Clue to History, p.l00.
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The whole world is offered the gift of redemption through the history of
God's action for the Jewish people. The history of the Old Testament,
therefore, is nothing other than the revelation of God's intention for
humanity, and with it, the call for the Jewish people to accept God's will as
their will, so that they might be the light that lightens the nations. One of
the tasks given to the Jewish people as the Chosen People is to bring about
the restoration of the idea that we are called to share our common
humanity. Macmurray sees the story of the tower of Babe! as one which
reveals this task. The story takes for granted the notion that there was a
primordial unity among all peoples and so needs to explain the fact of
diversity and division, highlighted by the existence of many different
languages. The explanation for this diversity is viewed in terms of our
rebellion against God. The diversity and lack of unity among peoples is
therefore understood to be a punishment for sin, and the implication of
such a view is that the redemption from this sin will bring about a
restoration of communion between all peoples. A significant part ofJesus'
teaching, therefore, is to remind his fellow Jews of their task of restoring the
unity that has been lost through sin.
Jesus' proclamation of the community of mankind is primarily a call to
his own people to accept as their mission, for which in the purpose of
God their whole history has been a preparation, the task of breaking
down the exclusive nationalism and racialism of the world, and becoming
the means of the unification of mankind.141
According to Macmurray, Jesus stands as the complete expression of the
developing Jewish insight that human history is the act of God. With the
141 John Macmurray, The Clue to History, p.l08.
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conung of Jesus we are able to recogruse the real intention of God ID
history.
Jesus has discovered the structural law of the action of reality in human
experience. He has brought into human consciousness, in the form of
rational knowledge, the real nature of human life, and the law of its
relation to the nature of reality as a whole. The result of this is that it is
now possible for men to adopt as their own intention, universally, the
intention of God for man, and to seek to realise it. Further, since the
intention of God for man is necessarily man's real intention, its
acceptance unifies human action and integrates human nature. Its
rejection, on the other hand, sets man in opposition to himself and leads
to self-destruction.142
The Failure of Christianity
Having attempted to lUlderstand the life and teaching ofJesus from within
the context of the history of the Jewish people, Macmurray next turns his
attention more specifically to the history of the Christian Church, a Church
which claims to be continuing to proclaim the message of Jesus. The first
point he makes is that Christianity in practice bears little resemblance to
Macmurray's own picture of the nature of Christianity.
There is clearly a very great difference between Christianity as we have
now defined it, and Christianity as exemplified by the various Christian
Churches of Europe - at least since Christianity was adopted as the
official religion of the Roman Empire. If our interpretation of the mind
142 John Macmurray, The Clue to History, pp. 116-7.
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and intention ofJesus is correct, even in general principle, then European
religion has transformed Christianity into something very unlike itself.
143
It is by again looking at history that we can find an explanation for this
failure of the Christian Churches to remain faithful to the intention of God
which is expressed in the person of Jesus. The first disciples of Jesus were
themselves Jewish, and they proceeded to carry out the intention of God
through their efforts to make the message of Jesus known beyond the
confines of the Jewish nation. Within a relatively short period of time most
of those who belonged to the Christian community were not Jewish.
Macmurray believes that the failure of the Jewish people to accept the
insights of Jesus involved them in a rejection of their own true nature, so
that "the Christian community is the result of the acceptance by Gentiles of
the inner significance of the Hebrew culture, and the Jewish community is
the result of its rejection by the Hebrews themselves."l44
The early Christian communities emerged and grew, both in terms of
numbers and of influence, within the political setting of the Roman Empire.
For long periods the Roman authorities, previously noted for their general
tolerance for all religions, persecuted those who followed the teachings of
Jesus. This is a sign that the Romans were well aware of the revolutionary
nature of the Christian message, and of the threat that it posed for the
Empire.· However, the Christian community succumbed to the temptation
to form a strategic alliance with the Roman authorities and, in so doing, lost
sight of their own vocation in the world, to create a universal community.
143 John Macmurray, The Clue to History, p.121.
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This alliance involved the acceptance by the organized Chw:ch of the
practical dualism which Jesus had repudiated, and Christianity became the
official religion of the Roman Empire. This prematw:e political triumph
of Christianity did not mean the acceptance of the intention of
Christianity by the Roman Empire, but the maintenance of the Roman
power against the threat to its continued existence which Christianity
contained within it. Consequendy, from the side of the Chw:ch, it meant
the achievement of a continuity of institutional development at the
expense of negating its own significance. The Church denied the
Christian intention by yielding to the will to power.145
Macmurray suggests that the history of medieval Ew:ope :reveals the final
:result of the partne:rship between the Christian Chw:ch and the Roman
Empti:e. The unity of medieval Ew:ope, such as it was, had been built by the
Christian Chw:ch from the ruins of the ea:rlie:r Roman Empti:e. The levels of
freedom and equality that human beings experienced in medieval times was
much greate:r than that available to citizens of the Roman Empti:e. In
medieval Christendom we a:re able recognise a human society which was
la:rgely based on the :religious belief in the sha:red humanity of all peoples.
This is undoubtedly a great achievement. But, we ought not to close ow:
eyes to the failw:es of medieval Christianity.
We are seeking to ...maintain the religious attitude, which can see every
stage of historical progress as at once the triumph of the pw:pose of God
and the manifestation of human self-frustration. What we have to notice
is first that the measw:e of conscious human cooperation with the
purpose of God which the medieval world contains is the measw:e of its
progress beyond the stage of history represented by the Roman Empire;
145 John Macmw:ray, The Clue to History, pp.130-1.
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and secondly, that the measure of its failure is the extent to which the will
to power remains dominant within it.
l46
The failru:e of the medieval Chru:ch to be faithful to the message of Jesus is
to be seen most clearly in the dualist structures of Chw:ch and State.
Macmru:ray suggests that both Chw:ch and State in the medieval context
were involved in a battle for power. Whatever might be said about the
Chru:ch wielding the sword of spiritual power and the State wielding the
sword of temporal power, in fact the Chru:ch, precisely in its quest for
power, inevitably turned away from the vision of communion and love that
was the keynote ofJesus' life and teaching.
The pressure of the Hebrew tradition in Christianity is towards the
unification of theory and practice, of spiritual and material, in order to
create a community on a basis of freedom and equality. Theoretically, the
Church exists to further this purpose. Practically, it exists - as the
religion of Christendom - to sustain the dualistic structure of medieval
society. These two purposes negate one another, and pr:oduce a dualism
and a tension in the body of the Church itself.147
Tru:ning next to a reflection on the history of the modem world, Macmurray
argues that the dualism inherent in medieval Christianity remains
problematic in the modem era too. This is so despite the fact that the State
has now become the secular instrument of government. While most of the
Christian Chru:ches have been happy to accept the priority of the State in
economic and social matters, they have still acquiesced in supporting a
dualist understanding of life. The main difference between society in
medieval times and in modem times is a structural one. Both Chw:ch and
146 John Macmurray, The Clue to History, p.146.
147 John Macmucray, The Clue to History, p.156.
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State have broken up and been fragmented, as can be observed by noting
the great number of both Christian Churches and States that have arisen in
the modem period. Each of these Churches and States has tended to insist
on their own autonomy and this has increased the difficulty of moving
towards the life of unity that Jesus called for.
The other huge change that occurs in the transition from the medieval to
the modem period is the rise of the concept of the individual, with its
demands for personal freedom and personal rights. According to
Macmurray, the form of the modern consciousness is inherently
individualist. This change, one to be found both in modem notions of the
State and of the Church, is itself problematic because it prevents human
beings from recognising their own true nature.
Individual self-realisation is an impossibility. Selfhood is inherendy
mutual, and it is only in relationship with others that the self has any
reality or can express it. Individualism, in which the individual self
becomes its own end, is incompatible with the nature of action, in which
the end must lie outside the self. The impulse to self-realisation is an
impulse to spontaneous action. But the concentration upon the self
negates the basis of action. Thus the modem world is in contradiction
with itself, and the dualism which results between theory and practice has
a new and intimate character. l48
The contradiction of the modem world manifests itself most dearly in the
tension between the individual and the State, but this in turn signifies that
there is a similar tension between each individual person and all the others.
Once we focus wrongly on our own individual rights then we necessarily see
148 John Macmurray, The Clue to History, pp.172-3.
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other individuals as obstacles to our personal freedom. The relations
between human beings, rather than being properly marked by mutual love
and respect, tend to become competitive and hateful. The focus in the
modern world on the rights of the individual, no matter how much support
it carries, is bound to fail because, whether we accept it or not, to be a
human being is to be a social being. In Macmurray's view, the modem
understanding of the self, though different than that of the ancient and
medieval periods, will through its contradictions also lead to self-frustration.
"Individualism is self-contradictory and self-frustrating. Its intention is one
which cannot be realised... Freedom and equality cannot be achieved by
self-isolation. Real community is the condition of real freedom."149
Despite the very serious criticisms that Macmurray makes about the failure
of the Christian Churches to remain true to the fundamental insights of
Jesus in regard to the nature of reality and the nature of human being, his
conclusions remain optimistic. In drawing his book to a close he remains
convinced that the intention ofJesus, because it is the reality of our life, will
be achieved. So too, the intention of Jesus for the Church he established
will finally bear fruit in a world of love and unity.
The leavening of Europe by Christianity has gone so far that unless
progress can be stopped altogether the next step must be the adoption of
the Christian intention not merely in idea but in practice. And this would
be the disappearance of dualism and the end of class society, and the
beginning of a planned and practical progress towards the achievement of
a universal community of humanity on the only basis on which in fact it
can be realised - the Christian basis of freedom and equality.1SO
149 John Macmurray, The Clue to History, pp.217-8.
150 John Macmurray, The Clue to History, p.220.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF UNITY FOR THE CHURCHES AND
FOR THE WORLD
Although in The Clue to History we are offered a deeper insight into
Macmurray's understanding of the significance of Jesus and of the task of
Christians to continue the action of God in history, one might argue that it
does not reveal much about the nature of this personal relationship with
God which Macmurray so adamandy calls for. It may be that his desire to
remain always philosophically coherent somehow inhibited him from
expressing more personally his own religious faith and relationship with
Jesus. What is clear from Macmurray's life, however, is that his personal
relationship with Jesus marked all of his intellectual concerns, and that his
own relationship with God also gave a focus to his understanding of·
Christianity and his criticisms of the Churches. While Macmurray rarely
wrote at an autobiographical level, we are offered an insight into his own
faith journey in a book that he wrote in 1965, entided Search for Reality in
Religion, which was the published version of the Swarthmore Lecture he gave
to a largely Quaker audience. This text, along with the newly published
biography of Macmurray by John E. Costello, allows us to see more clearly
that the question of the nature of the human person and the religious
significance of life was more than an academic interest for him. It was his
own love for Jesus that gave depth and power to his call for the Churches to
be more faithful to the fundamental insights of Jesus. A brief examination
of Search for Reality in Religion, along with a look at some of the key moments
in his religious development, will therefore enable us to draw closer to the
heart of Macmurray's concerns.
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Macmurray's Faith Experience
There is a marked difference in style between Macmurray's earlier writings
and that to be found in Search for Reality in Religion, one that is noted by
Macmurray himself.
In this lectw:e I intend to speak not as a philosopher but as a person to
persons, as a Christian to Christians, and, so far as my ignorance permits,
as a Quaker to Quakers. I do not wish to start an argument but to find
my way to an expression of personal belief. I shall not stay to prove what
might be proved, since I am not concerned with philosophy now but
with religion; not with conclusions of reason but with a confession of
faith. I should like, for this purpose, to escape from the limits of mere
intellectual formulation, and to speak from the whole of my experience.15l
In the first section of the book Macmurray offers an autobiographical
account of his own religious journey. He was born, in 1891, into a deeply
religious family in Scotland and his earliest religious experiences took place
within the Calvinist tradition of the Scottish Presbyterian Church. His
parents, however, were much influenced by the missionary work of the
American evangelists Moody and Sankey. It had been his father's intention
to become a missionary to China but this plan had fallen away as a result of
the Boxer Rebellion there. Macmurray himself felt a similar desire to
become a missionary and went to university with that intention in mind,
though he never actually brought that particular dream to fulfilment.
During his years as a student at Glasgow University he was greatly
influenced by the Student Christian Movement. His membership of that
151 John Macmurray, Searchfor Realiry in Religion, Quaker Home Service, 1965, pp.3-4.
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Movement encouraged him in the desire to search for religious unity and in
his belief that Christianity needs to work for the salvation of the life of the
world. Another significant factor in his religious development during this
time was his interest in matters scientific, an interest that was to remain with
him throughout his academic career.
It was also during his student years that Macmurray had an experience
which was to have a profound effect on his own religious understanding and
which might be said to have initiated his lifelong search for the true meaning
of religion. He was asked to lead a Bible study group for young men at the
Glasgow Mission Hall, and he decided to take as his text the letter of St.
Paul to the Romans. The reason for his choice was because he had been
taught that the main aspects of Christian theology and doctrine were to be
found there. Macmurray's approach however was to concentrate on a
scientific analysis of the text as if it were entirely unknown to him. The
results of his analysis came as a shock to him. He discovered that the great
central Christian dogmas were not to be found in Paul's letter to the
Romans after all. Rather than an exposition of doctrine, what was to be
found was an invitation to experience the freedom from the law which
comes through the person of Christ. This experience had an immediate
effect on Macmurray's approach to theology and religion.
Two things were... decisive about it. The first was that the theology in
which I had been trained could not stand up to a scientific scrutiny of the
scriptural text from which it claimed to be derived. This did not result in
a rejection of theology, far less of religion itself. But it made theology
questionable and so destroyed its dogmatic claims. I did reject dogma, in
the belief that theology required critical analysis and reconstruction. The
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second decisive result came from the consciousness that I was using
scientific tools to test the validity of my religious beliefs.
152
Macmurray's expenence was to dramatically change his outlook on the
whole question of religion. He was to subsequently maintain a great interest
in the question of the relationship between science and religion, and was to
focus much on the need for theology to be tested scientifically if it is not
itself to fall prey to error. But there were changes of a more personal nature
too.
I had reached the notion of a theology developing by self-criticism. It
remained, however, little more than an idea. I had hardly begun to apply
it. But I should never again fall into the gross mistake of identifying
religion with theology or with any system of beliefs. To this I would add
that religion remained for me missionary in oudook and function, and
that it became more and more definitely non-sectarian and
interdenominational. Before my student days were over my personal
oudook in religion was fully and finally ecumenical.153
Just at this time there was another great event waiting to take place, one
that would be perhaps even more significant in the development of
Macmurray's thought: The First World War. At the outbreak of hostilities,
Macmurray seriously considered the possibility of being a pacifist but he
finally decided to serve in the Medical Corps. In 1916, believing that serving
on the medical corps was just as much taking part in the conflict as were the
soldiers fighting in the trenches, he joined the Cameron Highlanders and
served as a soldier until the end of the war.
152 John Macmurray, Search for Reality in Religion, p.14.
153 John Macmurray, Searchfor Reality in Religion, pp.15-16.
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In terms of his religious development, Macmurray suggests that the horrors
of the war had two main effects. The first was that the experience of so
much suffering and death left him without any fear of death and allowed
him to focus on reality.
The fear of death is the symbol in us of all fear; and fear is destructive of
reality...Life is precious because it is short; and because it may end at any
moment we must live so that every day would be a good day to die in, if
death should come. Without this knowledge of death, I came to believe,
there can be no real knowledge of life and so no discovery of the reality
f ligi' 154o re on.
The second significant effect on Macmurray's war experience was that he
grew increasingly disillusioned by the kind of society that was prepared to
accept the death of so many millions of people in war. He was also deeply
upset by the hatred that he felt among the civilians he encountered while on
home leave. This hatred he encountered most strongly when he was invited
to preach at a Church in North London.
I took the opportunity to advise the church and the Christians in it, to
guard against this war-mentality; and to keep themselves, so far as
possible, aloof from the quarrel, so that they would be in a position - and
of a temper - to undertake their proper task as Christians when the war
was over, of reconciliation. The congregation took it badly; I could feel a
cold hostility menacing me; and no one spoke to me when the service
was over. It was after this selVice that I decided, on Christian grounds,
that I should never, when the war was over, remain or become a member
of any Christian Church.155
154 John Macmurray, Search for Reality in Religion, p.18.
155 John Macmurray, Search for Reality in Religion, p.2l.
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This is as far as Macmurray goes in his description of his own personal faith.
However, the fact that Macmurray did indeed refuse to join any of the
Christian Churches until he became a Quaker, along with his wife, in 1959,
should not lead us to the idea that during those 40 years between the end of
the First World War and his joining the Quakers he was in some kind of
religious wilderness. He believed that this refusal to join any religious
organisation was an act of Christian protest against the spurious Christianity
that he saw all around him. On a personal level, he remained a convinced
Christian and he decided to devote his career to the issue that he considered
the most important of all, the question of the reality of religion. He brought
to this search a profound scepticism about all the traditional expressions of
religion, but his desire was to discover the validity of all religion and of
Christianity in particular.
Before looking more closely at the views expressed by Macmurray in Search
for Reality in Religion, we can be helped to situate those views properly by
looking at the way in which his own faith developed, particularly during the
years in which he refused to join any of the Christian Churches. What will
become clear is that it was through his own human experiences, and
through reflection on the troubled historical period in which he lived, that
he grew in his understanding of the nature ofJesus and the Church.
In his biography of Macmurray, John E. Costello makes much use of a
private journal that Macmurray kept from the years 1908 to 1913, a time
when he was a student at the University of Glasgow. The value of this
journal is that it helps to suggest something of the dramatic and
overwhelming nature of his turn away from a very traditional understanding
of God and the Church towards a wider and more personal faith in the
person of Jesus. It also shows that the development of his religious
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understanding had already begun before the pivotal war experiences that
Macmurray makes mention of in Search for Reality in Religion. During those
years Macmurray experienced the exhilaration of discovering that the more
personal his relationship with God became the more he grew in a sense of
his own value and freedom. But he also experienced the painful struggle of
having to let go of the doctrinal certainties he had previously believed and
the loneliness that comes with the refusal to simply accept what others hold
to be true. In a journal entry made in 1912 he wrote:
Everything has hitherto been believed on the authority of others and of
their experience. Now I refuse, and must refuse, to build my hopes for
all that is highest and best upon an untested authority - however high -
or to wrestle through the struggle we call life in contest for the truth of
another's experience.156
The decision to search f01: a religious faith that was authentically his own
brought Macmurray into conflict with his parents who felt that his time at
university had succeeded only in turning him away from the faith he had
been brought up to hold most dear.
Father and mother have spoken what I felt all along they had been
thinking. They see the change in me, and are alarmed. They believe that
it is all wrong, all sin, and the penalty for neglecting the Word of God and
prayer... that my difficulties and struggles are nothing else than a darkness
which I have brought upon myself.15?
But these years of personal struggle in the life of the young Macmurray were
also leading to insights that were to give direction to his whole life, insights
156 John E. Costello,]ohn Macmurrqy: A Biograpf?y, p.SO.
15? John E. Costello,]ohn Macmurrqy: A Biograpf?y, p.S2
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that he was never to disown throughout either his academic or personal
journey. We find a foretaste of Macmurray's mature thought in a journal
entry from 1912:
When we cease to believe, we cease to live - either to man or to God.
Unbelief is spiritual death and intellectual death. It abolishes Love and
enthrones suspicion - paralyses governments, religions, friendships, all
societies of men. We must believe or die ... thus faith is possible or life is
impossible. It is my duty to find the faith which satisfies the need. To
fail in this quest is to perish utterly: and can only arise from insincerity or
lack of earnestness in the searching.158
In these years Macmurray was growing in the realisation that it is love that is
the most significant aspect of our human identity, and that this love is what
enables us to perceive the true nature of a God who is nothing other than
Love. Falling in love with the woman who was to be his wife for almost 60
years was for Macmurray a deeply spiritual happening too, one that
deepened his religious and his philosophical convictions.
There seems to be no distinction left between winning her and winning
heaven. Nor is this a mere sick lover's exaggeration: it is a spiritual
insight which has come of knowing that for a man to have learned to love
fully and perfectly the woman of his choice is to have attained to the
fullness of the measure of the stature of Christ. My love has grown to
mean this by small degrees, and will spread out in greener, stronger life in
the years ahead... I have not attained. Rather, I have caught an amazing
view of the immensity of the height to be attained.159
158 John E. Costello, John Macmurrqy: A Biograp~, p.51.
159 John E. Costello, John Macmurrqy: A Biograp~, p.55.
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Macmurray's courageous refusal to take for granted the teachings of the
faith that he had grown up in, and his desire to come to know God at a
personal level, were already bearing significant fruit. He was learning that
there is an essential unity to life, one which would in later years provoke his
fury and dismay at any dualist understanding of life, faith or God. In one of
the last of his journal entries, as he reflects on his time as a university
student, he recognises that the essential unity of life is God's gift to the
world.
My knowledge has increased in large measure: especially my knowledge of
life. Gaps have been filled up, the whole more closely assimilated, the
borders widened. The unity of all knowledge and the higher unity of all
life have revealed themselves; so that goodness and truth and beauty have
each claimed and been granted an essential place in every scheme of
things. Poetry, philosophy, human affection, music, art and many other
things; all the range of human knowledge indeed has been admitted to
association with the spiritual ideal. I long for the spiritual to penetrate all
these and make them part of a single life, with its face towards God, and
the coming ofRis Kingdom in its view.160
By the year 1913, therefore, when Macmurray was only twenty-two years
old, we are already able to see in embryo, the future shape of his
philosophical and religious concerns. In his biography, Costello points out
the wonder of such an intellectual and religious vision:
One marvels at the degree to which this paragraph in the youthful journal
expresses in marvellous compactness the landscape of the entire
philosophical project of the mature thinker. It is as though everything
from this point on is a search mainly for the means of expression, for the
160 John E. Costello, John Macmu1Tc!y: A Biograp!?J, pp.56-7.
134
appropriate categories and language for that expression, not for the
essential goal, direction or substance of his conviction.161
Clearly, as can be seen in the autobiographical section of Search for Reality in
Religion, these early insights of Macmurray were greatly reinforced by the
horrors of the First World War, and added to his sense that if Christianity is
real then it must have something constructive to say to a world torn apart by
war and hatred. In the years after the war, as Macmurray set out on his
academic career, lecturing first at Manchester University from 1919 to 1921,
followed by two years lecturing in philosophy at the University of the
Witwatersrand, he continued to reflect on what he perceived as the failures
of philosophy and Christianity to provide a meaningful vision of the dignity
of the human person.
In 1922 he wrote a letter to a friend and expressed the general direction that
his philosophical and religious beliefs were taking him.
If there is to be knowledge of God, it must be positive knowledge of
character. Now we can only know persons by acquaintance or, if you
like, by friendship, sympathy, love. And my conclusion is therefore that
until we can be acquainted with a particular person, and say of him that
his personality is the revelation of God's personality: positing necessarily
a relation of identity between the two, then we can have no knowledge of
God, and therefore no knowledge at all which is well grounded.162
At the end of 1922 Macmurray returned to England to take up a post at
Bailiol College, Oxford, and was immediately caught up in the effort to
161 John E. Costello,John Macmurray: A Biograpf?y, p.57.
162 John E. Costello,John Macmurray: A Biograpf?y, p.139.
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make his views known, not simply through his lectures but also in the many
talks and seminars he gave to many different Christian student groups,
particularly the Christian Student Movement. All this time he was making
the personal nature of religion more and more explicit. In his writings we
see emerging a distinct voice, calling for a new understanding of philosophy,
religion and human nature based on his own personalist approach. In an
article written for university students entitled What I Live By, we catch a
glimpse of the unity of this vision:
Philosophically, a belief in God is necessary, since the character of the
world's unity can only be personal Only an absolute personality can be
the ground of the existence of finite persons ...A knowledge of God,
however simple, as distinct from the bare belief that God exists, can only
come to us from our experience of human persons and our estimation of
their worth ...I~am convinced that if we are to have any knowledge of
God which is real knowledge and not beautiful nonsense, it can only be
~rough knowing a human person who is himself the image of the divine
p:~s0nality and who reveals God by revealing himself. ..Either Christ is
the man whom the knowledge of God demands, or there is none.163
It is, of course, important to remember that Macmurray was not the only
person who was attempting to examine Christianity and to find new ways of
expressing the truth of God's love in a broken world. The rise of the
ecumenical movement in the early years of the twentieth century can also in
large part be attributed to the failures of Christianity to avoid the destruction
of human values in war. Despite the fact that Macmurray was not a
member of any Church, he was often invited to participate in discussions
and meetings connected with the ecumenical movement. He used these
163 John E. Costello,John Macmum!y: A Biograpl[y, p.l46.
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opportunities to develop his own thought and to offer practical steps
forward for the Churches. In 1929, for example, he was invited to give the
keynote address at the Student Christian Movement's conference in
Liverpool. The theme of the conference was " The Purpose of God in the
Life of the World". Macmurray's own address was entitled ''Ye are my
Friends", and in it we find him offering a new vision to his listeners. J2-t a
time when the ecumenical movement was much divided as to whether unity
~ .
between the Churches should best be brought about through doctrinal ,
, -
agreements or through common service to the world, Macmurray suggest~
-,-
that, for Jesus, £J:iendship is what unites.
The world revolution of the Christians came when Jesus discovered the
true centre of human life. ''Not servants but friends" is the proclamation
of the revolution. The keyword of the Christian Gospel is not service but
friendship. Of late, I believe, we have been thinking too much in terms
of service - service of God and the world. There is nothing distinctively
Christian about that. ''But surely", you will say, "we are called as
Christians to serve Christ and the world". No, we are called to be the
friends of Christ and the friends of men. That is not at all the same
thing.164
Macmurray was doubtless aware that the call to friendship might easily
appear to be interpreted as a simplistic response to the needs of the world,
but he went on to state clearly that the friendship to which Jesus calls us to
and to which our own nature calls us, is far from easy. Real friendship will
cost us not less than everything!
Do you think that this is too simple and easy? Simple it is, perhaps, but
not easy. There is nothing we fear more than friendship, nothing that
164 John E. Costello,]ohn MacmufTqy: A Biography, p.162.
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strikes more terror into us than freedom ...To be a friend is to be yourself
for another person. It means committing yourself completely and
revealing yourself completely without reserve ...What men need from us
is love, not moving acts: friendship, not friendly services ...Friendship
means losing ourselves, and that is apt to be a terrifying experience.165
As a result of hearing Macmurray's adckess at the Student Christian
Movement conference, Archbishop Temple of York166 invited him to
prepare a memorandum for another conference in the same year, one
concerned with preparation for Church ministry. Macmurray used this
opportunity to present a twenty-page article, in which he challenged the
Churches to overcome what he perceived to be an overtly sentimental
~
approach to faith.. ~ s~3t~that the~~s~uld~e~terinto dialo~_~
~ ho_with~ut being necessarily Christian, share the same
~derstan~E of the absoh~te ~alue of the human persOn. He concludes his
memorandum with an urgent call to the Churches to seek unity, so that they
might offer a truer vision of the message of Jesus and give hope to the
young. I2.:-hi!.. un<!~~st~~&._ ~ch",-~ ;mity _wo~d not require the.
abandonment of different traditions in the Churches, but would be based on
~ .
a united faith in the saving presence ofJesus in the world.
Throughout this period Macmurray was moving closer and closer to the
notion, which he was never to subsequendy let go of, that the love of God is
always personal, and that therefore if we are to love God we must :first
recognise that we are called to enter into relationships with others through
165 John E. Costello,]ohn MacmufrCry: A Biography, p.163.
166 William Temple (1881 - 1944) was a noted theologian who was also Archbishop of
York from 1929 to 1942. Two years before his death he was appointed Archbishop of
Canterbury.
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love and not fear. We can see the strength of his belief in this idea in a letter
written to a friend in November 1930:
What is God if I am to love him? If the answer is 'Jesus' then the
question means: 'What is Jesus?' And my question then becomes: 'What
did Jesus feel to be holy and sacred and inviolable?' Only when I answer
that question does my own position emerge clearly. I shall treat
personality and the relation of persons in love as sacred and to be
reverenced, and nothing else. Whatever is impersonal must not be
reverenced or treated as sacred - on penalty oflosing our soul. To do so
is to be idolatrous; to worship as God what is not God. And to treat
what is personal impersonally is to pollute a holy thing.167
Throughout the 1930's Macmurray continued to engage both
philosophically and religiously with what he considered to be the dangers of
Nationalism, Fascism and Communism. While openly sympathetic to much
of what Marx had to say about alienation and the need to come to a deeper
understanding of society, he felt that Marx himself failed to understand the
true meaning of human nature. In 1933 he wrote a book entitled The
PhilosopfD; of Communism and two years later followed it up with another
entitled Creative Socz"ety: A Stucfy of the Relation of Christianity to Communism, a
work which shares Marx's intolerance of idealism. In Macmurray's view, the
reason why Marx rejected religion was because he saw it as a form of
idealism. While accepting, with Marx, that idealism is an illusion which
needs to be rejected, Macmurray argues that idealism and religion are also
incompatible. A religion that is idealist is an unreal religion. Macmurray
goes on to criticise Marx not for his rejection of religion but "on his refusal
167 John E. Costello, John MaC1!Jurrqy: A Biograpf!y, pp.176-7.
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to place the self-transcending nature of personal relating in this world at the
h f hi thr 1 " 168eart 0 s an opo ogy .
The Second World War, begun in 1939, once again led the world to horrors
beyond imagining, and, if anything, made Macmillray more convinced than
ever that the philosophical and religious ideas which governed societies were
both morally bankrupt and incapable of revealing the truth about human
nature and of how human beings are called to communion. Throughout the
period of the war, while continuing to lecture in philosophy, he felt the need
to call the Chillches to rediscover the essence of Jesus' teaching and to put
it into practice. In 1940 he produced a booklet called Challenge to the
Churches, in which he argued that most societies were built on fear and
therefore could never become communities gathered in love. The task of
the Chillches in a time of such great social upheaval as the present was to
proclaim that only love can set human beings free. If the Churches could
only take the message of Jesus to heart then they would see that what is
needed is to believe in and to work towards a universal community.
At the end of 1944, as the war was drawing to its horrific close, Macmurray
accepted a post as Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of
Edinburgh, a post he held until his retit:ement in 1958. It was during this
period that his philosophical understanding of the nature of the human
person was most completely expressed in the Gifford Lectures. As the time
of his retirement drew near he grew increasingly disappointed at the
direction philosophy was taking within the British academic world, so that
he felt he no longer belonged among colleagues whose main interests, such
as linguistic and analytic philosophy, seemed far removed from his concerns.
168 John E. Costello, John Macmurrqy: A Biography, p.233.
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In 1959 Macmurray, along with his wife, joined the Society of Friends, or
Quakers, thereby bringing to an end his self-imposed exile from any
particular Christian community. He informed a friend that his reason for
joining the Quakers was because, although he felt the need to belong to a
faith community, " there was no need to sign on the bottom line to a
statement of which there is no meaning; that is, there was no need to declare
his stance on dogmas".169 This was the religious community to which
Macmurray remained faithful till his death in 1976, and it clearly provided
him with the warmth of belonging to a community which, to his mind at
least, offered a close approximation of the vision he himself had argued for
throughout his life.
In the late years of his life Macmurray continued to deepen his own search
for the personal God whom he loved so much, and continued his unstinting
call to the Churches to return to the vision of Jesus so that, with a proper
self-understanding, we can live out the communion to which we are called.
He bears witness to his own personal search for God in a moving letter that
he wrote to his mother in 1969, on the occasion of her 102nd birthday:
What I owe you most of all is that I have always been a Christian, and
always shall be. For this my gratitude to you is very deep and very
constant. I am not sure how religious I am, but I am sure that my first
loyalty is and always has been to the Lord Jesus. What I mean by a
Christian has changed as I have studied him, and now I mean simply that
I am one of his disciples. And because I am a philosopher by trade I
cannot take that discipleship for granted, nor can I accept any
interpretation of its meaning because it is ancient or familiar. I must
search and go on searching for the truth of it and, of course, with His
169 John E. Costello,]ohn Macmurrqy: A Biograp!?y, p. 342.
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help. So pray for me that I shall be guided aright and kept free of self-
assertion or self-will.170
In returning to the text of Search for Reality in Religion we are also enabled to
capture Macmurray's mature thought on the urgent task of the Churches to
live out their Gospel call to be good news for the world. Having offered in
the opening chapter· a brief description of his own spiritual journey,
Macmurray now wants to share with his listeners and readers the
conclusions he has come to as a result of his own search for the true
meaning of religion and of Christianity. In the remainder of his book,
therefore, he looks in turn at the meaning of religion, the meaning of
Christianity and the future of the Church. While we have already seen many
of these ideas expressed in The Clue to History and in Persons in Relation, there
is value in summarising the overall vision of Search for Reality in Religion
because it offers us an opportunity to understand the continuity in
Macmurray's thought and also to see the way that he synthesises his
philosophical and religious views.
The True Value of Christianity
In his chapter entitled The Meaning ofReligion Macmurray covers much of the
same ground as in Persons in Relation. He begins by asserting that the
capacity for reflection is what makes us human beings. While it might be
said that philosophy, science, art and religion are all different expressions of
our reflective capacity, it is religion which is the first and the primary form
of human reflection. T.tlls can be seen by the fact that all communities, even
the mos! primitive, have been bound together by religion which serves to
170 John E. Costello,John Macmurrqy: A Biography, p. 363.
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sanctify their community life and to offer it appropriate meaning and
pw:pose. The common rituals and religious ceremonies which are to be
found in all rimitive communities have served to unite the members in a
- - -- ------------ - -
common _activity which has also highlighted their kinship with those who,
'---~ - -... .........
have died and with those yet to be born. What emerges from even the most
r- -
cursory of glances at the place of religion in human life is that it has always
been about community. It is religion which has helped most profoundly to
develop the idea of communion, not only between human beings, but also
communion with the natural world. Religion, of course, has always been
about the experience of communion with God too.
I should like to add one thing more to the analysis, which might possibly
explain why this religious structure takes the form it does. My conjecture
is that it is governed by the sense of an unseen presence, of something
more in our experience which is somehow personal, which transcends
our familiar experience of life in common, and yet which faces us when
we reflect deeply upon our everyday activities. In our own terms it is the
experience of the presence of God. 171
Macmurray points out that as religion develops to maturity certain
difficulties emerge. The most significant of these is that, through social
progress, a divide opens up between the religious dimension of people's
lives and that of politics. This brings about an inevitable struggle between
religious and political authority, which can be seen in the enduring historical
struggle between Church and State. The result of this struggle has been to
provoke a form of dualism which limits religion to the spiritual field and
politics to the material. It is Macmurray's suggestion that the only society
that in its progression to maturity has been able to avoid the rupture
171 John Macmurray, Searchfor Reality in Religion, p.34.
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between religion and every other aspect of human life has been the Hebrew
society. It is this view that allows him to see the Jewish people as the
uniquely religious people of history.
A second distinction between primitive religions and those which are on the
way to maturity cQn.~~m~the ~estion of in~lusivene~s. One of the marks
of primitive religions is that is always ~ religi<;>p- of a ~ted groun. The
gods ~f primitiye~ religion are the gods of a particular tribe or community.
The mark of mature religion, on the other hand, is tha! it te~<is to be~
~versal in its oudo~k. Religion is for all peoples and its god is the one true
God. Mature re.ligion therefore is monotheistic an~duniversal.
This concept of the universality of religion, however appealing it may sound,
is not one that is easily brought about. A universal religion demands a
universal community. We shou!d_no longer find our fundamental identity in .--- ._-
a tribe or nation, but rather in our communion with all others. Yet in
practice it is difficult to find any way to experience a universal fellowship.
Our experience of the world is that it remains fundamentally divided
according to groups and nations. For Macmurray this is the fundamental
problem for all the major world religions.
The fact that generates the recognised universality of religion is a fact
about the character of human society. It is the fact that it is not a
biological unity, not based on a blood-relation, but a personal unity...But
this fact implies also that there is an inherent impulse in human nature to
break through its organic limitations and realise itself as a great society to
which all men belong. If the corollary of any religion is a community
then the corollary of a universal religion is a universal community. With. "
th~ appearance of the universal religions, the disunity of mankind
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be~omes a fail~ ay~gy, ~_ evil to be. deplored and .a sin to be
- h b - 1 . 172confessed. Mankind oug t to e a smg e community. ~- -- ..
One way of trying to overcome the problem of division among peoples and
nations is to attempt to unify the world by force. Indeed many of the
nations of the world have come about precisely through a forced union with
others. It is Macmun:ay's belief however that even though force may
produce political and economic unity it can never produce a truly religious
union. Communion with others can only come about through love and
people cannot be forced to love one another.
Another way of dealing with the problem of universality is what Macmurray
describes as the idealist way, which he suggests can be seen in its clearest
and most unadulterated form in Buddhism. An idealist approach would be
one in which all conflict and division disappear through a denial of the
reality of the world as we experience it. If only the ideal is real then all
struggle and disunity would be nothing more than another illusion. Idealism
involves a necessary withdrawal from the world, and this invites us to solve
the problem of disunity simply by denying it.
Since neither of these ways of dealing with the problem of finding a
meaningful universalism is acceptable we must confront the problem more
practically. On~~ay of doing so is to take a closer look at that religion
~hich claims to be most universal: Christianity. What is the Christian
response to the problem of the universality of religion? The answer to that
question will reveal much about the proper meaning of Christianity itself,
and it is to this question that Macmurray turns his attention in his chapter
172 John Macmun:ay, Searchfor Reality in Religion, p.38.
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entitled The Meaning of Chnstianiry. In his attempt to come to a real
understanding of Christianity, Macmurray starts with a closer look at the
religion of the Jewish people. In his view Judaism began as a tribal religion,
worshipping the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. In its earliest stages of
growth it had to face the struggle against the temptation to worship other
gods, a temptation that is acknowledged in the first commandment: ''You
shall have no other gods to rival me" (Exodus 20, 3). Through the
teachings of the prophets the Jewish people were led to a proper
monotheism, that their God was the one true God.
It is Macmurray's view that the Jewish faith also had to battle against the
perennial risk of slipping into dualism, and this in two particular ways. The
first risk was to fall into the trap of a dualism of class, where the poor would
become subservient to the rich. In such a situation the bonds of real
community would be broken and it would no longer be possible to maintain
any real religious unity. This risk was overcome through the Jewish
institution of the year of Jubilee, where all those in debt would be set free
from the burden of repayment. A second danger was the rise of a dominant
priestly caste, but Macmurray suggests that this risk was also overcome, this
time through the distinction between priest and prophet. The fact that the
prophet was called not according to caste but according to the will of God
meant that the priesthood remained limited in power and influence and did
not therefore cause division among the Jewish people.
A further problem also attached itself to the Jewish understanding of
religious faith. Given their absolute commitment to monotheism, did this
-,. - - .. - . -- -
not so commit th_em to ~e id~a t:1l~tGQd is_ th~ .cr~tor of~ that is-, and
the:efore the Father of all peoples? While acknowledging that his- -_.
presentation of the Jewish tradition is nothing more than a bare outline,
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Macmurray believes that the faith of the Jews was indeed such that God wa
se~~al_unlirpited and universal ager;t. Human beings, precisely
because they are made in the image and likeness of God, are also to be
understood as being free and creative agents. But this freedom, which
constitutes an essential element of our human being, can be used wisely or
foolishly. Sip.ce all people are the children of God they are therefore .
members of one family. Human freedom however means that we are able
to turn away from the creative plan of God and to turn away from the
communion that God wills for all peoples.
Man, made in the image of God, has the freedom to create and seek to
realise his own intentions. These intentions may be incompatible with
the divine intention in his creation. Evil then is sin and sin is a personal
conflict of wills. Since religion is about community, a clash of wills
between men and God must express itself in the breaking of community -
as a clash of wills between man and man.173
If sin and alienation from God and from one another were to be the last
word on our lives then one would have to suggest that God's creation had
been a failure. 'f?is J1owev~r is not the case. God's ~~~s that the Jewish
p~?ple w.ot!ld c.ontinue to deepen their commitment to the equality and
communion between all peoples that is necessary if religion is to be what it ~
is called to be. Their task, as the chosen people, was not to perpetuate the
,.,--- - - -
sin of division but to create the religious and social conditions where
~<?mmunion between all peoples would again be possible. The history of
-_.. - - ----
the Old Testament is a history of the Jewish response' to their call by God to
......... - ..
a<:..t as initiators of a universal fellowship. It is a history made up of both
successes and failures. And it is a history which led to the hope of the
173 John Macmurray, Search for Reality in Religion, pAS.
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comm of a Messiah who would break down all division and restore all----- -- .
peoples to proper communion and love. .
In acknowledging that Jesus was the long awaited Messiah, Macmurray
limits his reflections on the person of Jesus only to those aspects of his
ministry which manifust_ his de~ire to btjng about real communion ang
fellowship. Jesus understood his vocation to be one of bringing about the
r-- .
Kingdom of God through a call to repentance. His ministry took place
within a particular historical and religious context; one where the Jewish
people were a part of the Roman Empire. While it is possible to argue that
the Roman Empire brought about a certain peace and stability throughout
the known world, this peace should not be seen as being a sign of real
commuruon.
The Roman Empire, though it has established peace and united the
nations, cannot be the promised Kingdom...The reason is that it is not a
true community. It has been created by military conquest and it is
maintained by self-interest and, in the last analysis, by compulsion. Its
basis therefore is fear. But the Kingdom of Heaven cannot be created by
force. It must be freely chosen. It cannot be maintained by self-interest
but only by self-sacrifice and, in the end, by attraction. For its basis
cannot be fear; it can only be love.174
How were Jesus and the Jewish people, those called to bring about the
realisation of a universal human community, to respond to their subjugation
by the Romans? While many were drawn to the idea that the Messiah would
be the one to bring about political liberation through a violent struggle
against the Romans, this would be no nearer the vision of communion than
174 John Macmurray, Searchfor Reality in Religion, p.49.
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that offered by the Roman Emplie. The only possible alternative, in
Macmurray's view, was to transform the Roman Emplie from within. This
could only come about through calling the Jewish people to repentance and
through the intending of communion with all others. The Jewish people
largely rejected the call to repentance and communion and Jesus could see
that his own mission would end in seeming defeat and death. As a result, he
focussed his attention on the small group of his disciples, preparing them to
continue his task of announcing the kingdom of God. This group of
disciples, despite their own failures, would in due course be responsible for
the spreading of the message of Jesus and the beginning of the Christian
community. The teaching of Jesus, as preserved in the Gospels, should be
understood as a very practical call to action, to bring about that communion
that is the sign of God's kingdom.
His teaching looks always to the task to be accomplished and the means
for its accomplishing. He is concerned, that is to say, to make clear to his
disciples in particular the character of the Christian community which he
will leave behind him to carry on his work, and the conditions which it
must fulfil if it is to do so. When I:e says, for example, 'Love your
en_emies', this is the statement of a necessary condition for replacing
e1?-mity by affection and so achieving reconciliation. It is a pragmatic rule
for the work of the Church in extending the Kingdom of Heaven in the
world.175
Macmurray acknowledges that the history of the Christian community since
the day of Pentecost has been a mixed one. There have been successes, but
there have been more failures in remaining faithful to the call ofJesus. The
175 John Macmurray, Searchfor Reality in Religion, p.S4.
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need for the Church of today therefore is to find a way of responding
positiyely to the Gosp~l demand f~r c9pununion and reconciliati?n.
Our need is to rediscover, under contemporary conditions, what sort of
community we ought to be in the world, and to become that kind of
community. It is to rediscover and to fulfil the conditions which are
requisite for accomplishing the task committed to US.176
In order to come to a real appreciation of the vocation of the Christian,
however, it is first necessary to examine what have been and still are the
major failings of the Church. The first and most persistent error in the
Church, as far as Macmurray is concerned, is that of dualism. The roots of
dualism can be traced back to the influence of Greek philosophy in the early
Church, and it has had the effect in Christian thought of shifting the
emphasis from action to reflection or from practice to theory. This shift in
emphasis has had seriously negative repercussions for the whole Christian
tradition.
Faith, which originally meant trust and confidence, came to mean a set of
beliefs. Christians came to be people who professed certain beliefs.
Christianity, aiming at the philosophic ideal, sought to become an
organised system of doctrine. 1bis assimilation of Christianity to Greek
philosophy not only created theology. It created heresy.m
It is Macmurray's ~derstanding that t1:l~ di~.ion among the Christian
Churches can be traced, at least. in part, to the difficulties that inevitably
arise when the emphasis on the Christian life is on dogma and doctrine
176 John Macmurray, Search for Reali!J in Religion, p.55.
m John Macmurray, Search for Reali!J in Religion, p.57.
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rather tqan on practic~. Chri,stianity should be judged on the fruits it
produces in a person's life rather than on how faithful a perso_n is to a
particular set of beliefs.
A second effect of the dualism that marks Christianity as we experience it
today is that it tends to promote idealism. The idealist philosophy of Plato
and the N eoplatonists was absorbed by the early Christians and affected its
whole self-understanding.
The essential thing about dualism) as we have seen) is that it contrasts the
material with the spiritual in such a way as to bring them into opposition.
This opposition forces us to choose between them, and the idealist
choice is for the reality, and so the importance, of the spiritual. An
idealist religion, then) is concerned with the spiritual life and not with the
material, and the life of the spirit can be achieved only at the expense of
the material life.178
This idealist approach has had significant repercussions for Christian belief
and practice. It has led to a view that the human body is somehow always
sinful and in need of constant mortification. It has also led to the view that
the highest fonn of religious experience is contemplative or mystical. Any
religion which is based on idealism will tend to be otherworldly. It will
focus on a spirituality which seeks to escape from the world rather than on a
spirituality that embraces the world. It is Macmurray's belief that idealism is
fundamentally incompatible with religion. Any reli .on'ch claims to be
real_mu-.rt be concerned with action and with community. Idealism,
however, seeks to !!love frorp. action tQ_:(eflecti~n and from the struggle to .
create community to the solitary life of the thinker. A Christianity which is
178 John Macmurray, Search fOr Reali[y in Religion) p.58.
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idealist in outlook actually betrays the vision that is offered us by Jesus. He
came to proclaim the coming of God's kingdom among us and to bring
salvation to the world. The influence of idealism in Christianity has tended
however to create the situation where spirituality is focussed on the idea of
flight from the world rather than involvement in it, something which would
appear to be contrary to the life and the teaching ofJesus.
The Future of the Church
In the final chapter of Search for Reality in Religion Macmurray looks at the
future of the Christian Church and at what changes are needed if
Christianity is to offer a more faithful vision of the life that we are called to
in Christ. In this chapter he wishes to speak more directly as a member of
the Society of Friends179 and to situate the Friends within the context of the
Christian faith. Given all that he has previously said on the dangers of
idealism and dualism, he now wants to suggest that another danger for.
Christians is to see their faith in simply private terms. Many people believe
that religion is for the benefit of the believer. Faith is too often seen as- - -- ~
being something which provides comfort, encouragement and hope for the
individual in her struggle to make sense of life. But Macmurray now argues
that there is a much more appropriate way to understand the nature of
Christianity.
179 The Society of Friends, or Quakers, is a religious movement founded in England by
George Fox (1624 - 1691). Common to their beliefs is the notion that, since God's
spirit dwells within all human beings, each person is of inherent worth. The fact that the
Society of Friends does not demand of its members beliefin any credal statement, along
with its commitment to world peace and mutual tolerance, made it a natural religious
home for Macmurray.
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Christianity is not for the sake of the Christians but for the sake of the
world. The Christian Church exists not for the spiritual benefit of its
members but for the salvation of the world outside it. This is the task
assigned to it by Jesus, and it is the continuance of his work after his
death. In the light of this we may venture a functional definition of the
Church. "The Church", we may say, "is the community of the disciples
ofJesus working, in cooperation with God and under the guidance of His
Spirit, to establish the Kingdom of Heaven on earth.,,18O
The problem with a religion that is concerned only with things spiritual is
that it can offer no practical reference to the spiritual life. Macmurray
suggests that to understand Christianity in practical terms means that we are
able to overcome the problems of dualism and idealism. To define
Christianity in this way does not· mean that the spiritual is excluded, but
ra~pj~tual_is included along with the practical reference that
give_s_i~ true meaning: It is involvement in the world, rather than flight
from the dangers of the world, which is the true task of each individual
Christian and the whole Christian community.
For the Christian, the meaning and the purpose of his religion lies outside
himself and not within him. He is a person "for others", as Jesus was; a
person dedicated to the salvation of the world. This also means however
that he is a member of a Christian community in the world, which is itself
dedicated to the salvation of the world, and which can only achieve this
by exhibiting, in its own action in the world, the image of the Kingdom
of Heaven.181
180 John Macmurray, Search for Reality in Religion, p.64.
181 John Macmurray, Search for Reality in Religion, p.65.
153
If Christians are to come to a proper understanding of their vocation in and
for the world then there will need to be a vast transformation which will
affect every branch and area of Christian life. Indeed, Macmurray goes so
far as to declare that there is need for another reformation and a new
beginning for all the Christian Churches. Religion is always about
community, and Christianity must now commit itself wholeheartedly to the
creation of true community which alone can overcome the enmity and
division which is so much part of our lives.
Macmurray is able to discern signs of hope in the change that he sees
already taking place within the different Christian Churches. The desire for
unity, expressed through the ecumenical movement, is a clear manifestation
that the Spirit of God is still at work. The creation of the World Council of
Churches is another sign that Christians are prepared to acknowledge that
division among Christians is nothing other than scandalous. As long as the
various Christian communities remain divided it becomes almost impossible
for the Churches to actively contribute to the peace and reconciliation which
the world so desperately needs.
The question of how to achieve unity between the vanous Christian
communities is therefore of vital importance. Macmurray is uncomfortable
with the notion th~t unity can be best brought about by attempting to
overcome doctrinal differer:,ces. Indeed, one of the reasons why he chose to
become a member of the Society of Friends is precisely that it objects to any
attempt to define Christianity simply in doctrinal terms. Christiani should
r~th~~_.!'e seen as a pr~ctical way of life tha( is compatible with a wide
divergence of beliefs and doctrines. He argues that the approach of the
Society of Friends can in this way make an important contribution to the
success of the ecumenical movement. Since Christianity cannot be
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definitively expressed through particular doctrines and dogmas, then unity
between the Churches does not have to depend on a prior agreement about
dogmatic issues. All that is needed to E.rovide a basis for unity is the mutual
~ --
re~?gnition of the Churches as being Christian. In Macmurray's view, if this
approach, suggested by the Society of Friends, were to be taken up by the
other Christian Churches then it would make the unity of Christians
something that could be achieved immediately. Unity should therefore be- . - ...
understood not as_calling us tg uniformity in doctrine but rat;h~r as inviting
all C.,!u:istians to offer their lives for the good of the worldt The vision that
guides the Society of Friends is one that can help all the Christian Churches
to overcome the distortions that inevitably follow from idealism and
dualism. This vision is one that also enables us to recover the notion of the
primacy of action in the Christian life.
The effect is to shift the expreSSiOn of Christianity from theory to
practice. "By their fruits you shall know them" becomes the accepted
rule. Faith no longer means the acceptance of an established creed or the
assent to an authoritative system of doctrine. It recovers its original
meaning of trust and fearless confidence; and this spirit of faith is
expressed in a way of living which cares for one another and for the
needs of all men. Our Christianity is a practical discipleship ofJesus in all
the relationships of daily life.182
While acknowledging that the Quaker's tradition of not defining faith in
doctrinal terms is of the greatest importance, Macmurray feels that the
Society of Friends still needs to find an appropriate and adequate theoretical
articulation of their Christian discipleship. He suggests that it is possible to
create a theology that is not dogmatic but that is able to face the challenges
182 John Macmurray, Search for Reality in Religion, pp.70-1.
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of a changing world and social context. Through a radical critique of what
he terms traditional theology it is likely that a variety of theological
standpoints would emerge. The task of the Society of Friends would then
be to hold these differing viewpoints together in a unity of love.
Another aspect of Quaker tradition to be examined by Macmurray is that of
the place of ritual. While it is often suggested that the Society of Friends
reject all forms of ritual, he argues that all activities of communal prayer and
worship are an expression of ritual. Although it may be true that the
worship of the Society of Friends is marked by a particularly simple
expression of faith, gathering together for silent prayer, it remains
nonetheless a form of ritual. Since, therefore, it is not the case that
Quakerism rejects all forms of ritual, it is clear that the Society of Friends
could express their worship through a richer symbolic ritual, like the
celebration of Holy Communion, without changing the essentials of their
Christian witness.
Turning agam to the wider context of all the Christian Churches,
Macmurray o,ffers a sUf?IDary of his understanding of the role of the.
Churches in the m~dem world. Once again his desire is that the Churches
" -
become sY,..mbols of communion in a world scarred by_w~and violence.
The task of the church today, I believe, is what it has always been - to
cooperate with God under the guidance of the Spirit of Christ in
establishing on earth the Kingdom of Heaven. The means for
accomplishing this task is the means that Jesus taught to his first disciples.
The Church must be a real community on earth which exhibits to the
world, in its life and in the relations of its members, the image of the
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Kingdom of Heaven, and which acts, in relation to the world outside, in
the spirit of that Kingdom, by the way of the Cross.183
Macmurray concludes his work with a very brief examination of two issues
where he believes the Churches can show that they are serious in their
intention to put on the mind and heart of Christ. Th~.Jirsti§.sue concerns,
the question of power. The Christian approach to power ought to be--- --,
essentially different than that which can be seen in much of politics and
business. We are to find our response to matters of influence and power in
the example ofJesus. What can be seen in the life ofJesus is that he never
gives in to the temptation to power. In his actions and words he reveals
that the way to true freedom and love is through service of others and not
through the seeking of position or influence. Th.e Churches therefore must
also avoid the temptation to seek influence and power in the world, so that
they may be free to lead people to the real values of life.
~ -
The kingdoms of this world rest upon the appeal to fear, because they
must take people as they are. But the Church of Christ, if it is to save the
world, must not take men and women as they are; it must transform
them, by using the only motive that can overcome fear, the power of
love. And if it is to do this it must itself already have been transformed
by love. l84
Connected to the question of power is the matter of the proper relations
that should exist between Church and State. It is Macmurray's belief that,
generally speaking, States are able to maintain the common life of a society
only through the idea of fear and punishment. The Christian Churches,
183 John Macmurray, Search ftr Reali!J in Religion, p.76.
184 John Macmurray, Search ftr Reali!J in Religion, p.77.
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because they are proclaiming very different values, need to develop true
community not through fear but through love. And the task of the
Churches is to bring about the Kingdom of God not through political
means but through faithfulness to Gospel values. Since the values of the
world are so different than the values of those who are seeking God, it is
inappropriate for the Churches to be too closely linked to the powers of the
State.
If then we are to understand what it means for the Church to be a
community in the world and in the world to create the community of
mankind, then we must disabuse our minds of all notion of a partnership
between Church and State; of the age-old influence of the doctrine of the
two swords - the spiritual wielded by the Church and the material sword
wielded by the State. The Church has nothing to do with any sword,
spiritual or material, nor has it any authority save the authority of love.185
The second practical issue which the Churches need to address if they are to
take their calling seriously is the question of economics. The economic
vision that marks our contemporary world is one which is based on greed,
competition and selfishness. In an economic environment that is based on
the survival of the fittest, there is a real need for the Churches to offer an
alternative vision, one where each person is valued because she is a person.
We ought to have a practical commitment to _economic justice and to
helping those in need.
If the Church is to be a real community in the world; if its Christianity is
not to be defined in doctrines but expressed in action; and if its task is to
manifest to the world the image of the Kingdom of Heaven, then surely
the manner and spirit in which its members provide for one another's
185 John Macmurray, Search for Reality in Religion, p.78.
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material needs must stand in strong and visible contrast with the attitudes
and habits of the world around US. l86
As far as Macmw::ray is concerned, Christians who think that economic and
social issues have nothing to do with religious faith are in grave error. The
disparity of wealth and resow::ces between rich and poor makes community
and fellowship practically impossible. To assert that such disparity does not
affect or concern a religious community is to fall into the idealism that mars
so much of Christianity even today.
It is quite clear in Macmw::ray's mind that the Christian Chw::ches have not,
as yet, truly absorbed the fundamental vision ofJesusand the Kingdom he
came to proclaim. This, however, does not mean that we should despair.
The task is clear, and if Christians were to be more faithful to the example
of Jesus then the world in which we live might yet become a world of
communion and peace.
The Church must remam fully in the world at its most
contemporary...But our main task is to become a real community in the
world, and any effort to achieve this must aim from the beginning to be
inclusive, to be both international and interdenominational. Its intention
must be to unite all Christians throughout the world in a single
brotherhood in which each cares for all in all their needs. This is a
religious, not a political task, based not on self-interest or legal
compulsion, but on love working in freedom. 187
186 John Macmurray, Search for Reality in Religion, p.79.
187 John Macmurray, Searchfor Reality in Religion, pp.80-1.
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CHAPTER SIX
A SIGN OF HOPE: THE ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT
There can be no doubting the seriousness of Macmurray's call to the
Churches that they must seek unity, a call which is based both on his
philosophical understanding of human nature and on his religious
understanding of the person of Jesus and of the nature of Christian
discipleship. What also cannot be doubted is the controversial nature of his
views on how unity is to be achieved, and in particular his view that Church
unity ought not to be a question of doctrinal agreement. One of the ways
that we might test the validity of Macmurray's view that dogma and doctrine
are not essential for unity would be to take a necessarily brief look at some
of the most significant events in the history and documents of the
ecumenical movement and to examine whether Macmurray can claim
support from others who share his desire for the unification of all
Christians. However, before turning to the broader canvas of the history of
the ecumenical movement as such, it may be h~~_~g_..9l!tline th~ b~~ic_
suggestions regarding Church unity that Macmurray offers in Search for-_.- ---
Realz!J in Religion.
Unity Through Service
It is clear that Macmurray himself felt that the efforts of the World Council
of Churches to achieve Christian unity offered a sign of hope to the world.
The ecumenical movement is itself a deep change in the outlook of
Christians everywhere. We are reaching out to one another, recognising
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our brotherhood in Christ and seeking to find an expression for it that
will make us, and manifest that we are, one Church of Christ. The old
antagonisms .and enmities between sects are dying out. Friendship,
sympathy and cooperation are increasing. This is the ecumenical
movement. Can any Christian fail to realise in it the work of the divine
Spirit in his Church?188
Yet one major difficulty Macmurray had with the direction of the
ecumenical movement was that he felt the majority. of the Christian
churches were seeking unity through declarations of doctrinal belief. It was
for this reason, he argued, that the Quakers, who have no real sympathy
with such an approach, were a necessary and prophetic voice in the search
for Christian unity. Precisely through their abhorrence of doctrine, the
Quakers could help to ensure that the ecumenical movement would remain
focussed on practical unity. In so doing they can also ensure that the
ecumenical movement does not fall into the same dualist approach that has
hindered Christianity from being what it is called to be in the world.
The central conviction which distinguishes the Society of Friends is that
Christianity cannot be defined in terms of doctrinal beliefs; that what
makes us Christians is an attitude of mind and a way of life; and that
these are compatible with wide variations and with changes in beliefs and
opinions.189
Since it is the case, for Macmurray, that Christianity cannot be defined in
terms of doctrines, then it follows that doctrine is not the appropriate way
to come to the unity that so many desire. All that would be needed to bring
about unity would be the mutual recognition of the Churches as Christian.
188 John Macmurray, Searchfor Reality in Religion, p.67.
189 John Macmurray, Searchfor Reality in Religion, p.70.
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Indeed, such an approach as that taken by the Quakers would bring about
unity more quickly than we can imagine!
If this Quaker standpoint were accepted by the other Christian bodies,
reunion could take place tomorrow. I doubt whether it can be effectively
achieved on other terms. Indeed I doubt whether uniformity in Christian
belief or practice is itself desirable.190
Having argued that doctrinal agreement cannot lead to proper unity,
Macmurray wants to suggest that there is still a need for some reflection
regarding the Christian faith, though one that does not produce doctrine.
Rather, Christian reflection should lead to a form of undogmatic theology,
one which remains always hypothetical and temporary in nature.
It should be empirical in temper, checking theory against contemporary
experience, religious and scientific. It should be freely critical of the past,
recognising that in this field of knowledge as in others, antiquity is no
indication of validity. It should recognise that it is impossible to believe
what one does not understand, and undesirable to profess to believe what
one cannot believe effectively. It should be concerned to reject openly
and explicidy what it can no longer accept, and it should not expect nor
too eagerly desire unanimity...Divergent views and doctrines could be
held within a unity of love, and would avoid any tendency to produced
final and definitive doctrines which could become binding as an
orthodoxy.191
In place of doctrinal agreements, Macmurray suggests that the ecumenical
movement should be particularly marked by practical efforts to overcome
190 John Macmurray, Search for Reali!J in Religion, p.70.
191 John Macmurray, Search for Reali!J in Religion, p.73.
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the division of the world. He offers two immediate suggestions that will, if
acted upon, show that the ecumenical movement is intent on bringing
God's unity to the world. The first is that the Churches should avoid any
kind of partnership with political States. The reason for this is that States
are, at best, held together through law and justice whereas the Churches are
calling people to discover their true nature in seeking communion with one
another. The second suggestion made by Macmurray is that the Churches
need to deal with what he calls "the economics of the Kingdom of Heaven".
He states that the economic systems of the contemporary world 'are
incompatible with the kind of vision of love and communion given by Jesus.
An ecumenism that takes the life and the teaching ofJesus seriously will find
that its main task is not to come to doctrinal agreement but to find
appropriate ways of practically creating the communion that restores human
dignity to all.
A community which is merely spiritual is imaginary. The Church may
deceive itself about this, but the world will not Here then, rather than in
the field of doctrine or of ritual or of Church government, lies the major
problem of the ecumenical movement... Our main task is to become a
real community in the world, and any effort to achieve this must aim
from the beginning to be inclusive, to be both international and
interdenominational.192
In turning now to some of the key moments in the history of the
ecumenical movement, one can only presume that all of those who have
been part of the whole historical process of seeking unity among the
Christian Churches have shared Macmurray's view that -the lack of unity was
a serious obstacle to the task of offering witness to the vision of community
192 John Macmurray, Searchfor Reality in Religion, pp.80-1.
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that Jesus offers. But it will be seen that there has also been a wide
divergence of views as to how best bring about the Unity that is called for.
Ever since the Churches have been divided, of course, there have been
many Christians who argued that such division was sinful but for our
present purposes we will restrict our examination of the ecumenical
movement to the events of the 20th century and, more particularly, to the
various assemblies of the World Council of Churches that took place within
Macmurray's lifetime.
The Ecumenical Movement
It is generally agreed that the ecumenical movement as such was given new
impetus through the World Missionary Conference, which took place in
Edinburgh in 1910. It was here that the protestant Churches came together
and realised that their missionary endeavours were being adversely affected
by the fact that although they were all proclaiming the Lordship of Jesus,
their own division made such claims somehow questionable. While it had
not been the intention of the delegates at the Conference to set up an
ecumenical movement as such, one of the results of the Edinburgh
Conference was the creation of the International Missionary Council in
1921, and this ensured that the Chw:ches involved moved away from a
competitive missionary drive in order to work together for the sake of the
world. Perhaps even more significantly, the World Missionary Conference
of 1910 concluded with a proposal to hold a World Conference on Faith
and Order. It was envisaged that such a Conference should invite
participants not only from the protestant Churches but also from the
Roman Catholic and Orthodox communities too.
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The first World Conference on Faith and Order took place in Lausanne in
1927, with most of the mainline Christian Churches, excluding the Roman
Catholic Church, being represented. While it may be true that the
Conference was much weakened through a lack of clarity regarding the
precise aims of the meeting, its real significance lay in the fact that Christians
of different traditions were able to listen to one another and to recognise
not only their differences but also the fact that they had much in common
too. To that extent, therefore, the Conference increased the desire for
further and deeper cooperation among the Churches.
The second World Conference on Faith and Order took place in Edinburgh
in 1937, with Archbishop William Temple presiding. In his opening address
Temple made clear that it was not the task of the participants to simply
focus on understanding the traditions and practices of the different
Christian Churches. Rather, it was essential to recognise that the lack of
unity among Christians presented a serious obstacle to the proclamation of
the Gospel.
How can it call men to worship of the one God if it is calling to rival
shrines? How can it claim to bridge the divisions in human society.. .if
when men are drawn into it they find another division has been added to
the old ones - a division of Catholic from Evangelical, or Episcopalian
from Presbyterian and Independent? A Church divided in its
manifestation to the world cannot render its due service to God or to
man, and for the impotence which our sin has brought upon the Church
through divisions in its outward aspect we should be covered with shame
and driven to repentance.193
193The Ecumenical Movement: An Anthology of Kry Texts and Voices, edited by Michael
Kinnamon and Brian E. Cope, WCC Publications, Geneva, 1997, p.18.
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The key text to emerge from the Conference was the Affirmation, a
document that largely accepts Temple's analysis of the sinfulness of division
and calls for an ongoing search for what unity in Christ means in practical
terms. ''We are convinced that our unity of spirit and aim must be
embodied in a way that will make it manifest to the world, though we do not
yet clearly see what outward form it should take.,,194
Along with the Conference on Faith and Order, which allowed Christians of
many denominations to gather and to reflect on the theological issues that
both united and divided them, it is possible to see another strand of growing
ecumenical concern, one more focussed on social issues. Many Christians
shared Macmurray's desire to find some meaningful response to the horrors
of war and to the fact that the world, despite the influence of Christianity,
remained divided and unjust. In 1920, at a meeting in Geneva, the Universal
Christian Conference on Life and Work was established. In its early years
the Conference on Life and Work saw itself as being more concerned with
the Churches' response to the social problems of the day than with the
attempt to come to doctrinal agreement. Many of those who participated in
the efforts of the Life and Work movement supported the phrase that
"doctrine divides but service unites", and felt that unity could best be
achieved through a common witness in social action. A second Conference
on Life and Work was held in Stockholm in 1925. Under the leadership of
Bishop Nathan Soderblom of Uppsala, the Conference dealt with such
issues as economic, social and moral problems as well as with the question
of international relations. The Conference concluded with a message which,
while acknowledging the ecumenical progress being made through the Faith
and Order movement, saw the need for Christians to engage directly with
194 The EcumenicalMovement: An Anthology, p.85.
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the social concerns of the world and to find practical means to express the
unity of the Chru:ches.
The sins and sorrows, the struggles and losses of the Great War and
since, have compelled the Christian Churches to recognise, humbly and
with shame that 'the world is too strong for a divided Church'. Leaving
for the time our differences in Faith and Order, our aim has been to
secure united practical action in Christian Life and Work. The
Conference itself is a conspicuous fact. But it is only a beginning.195
It is probably safe to conjectru:e that, given his views on the appropriate
manner for the Chru:ches to seek unity, Macmru:ray would have been more
comfortable with the efforts of the Life and Work movement than with
those of Faith and Order. However, it is clear that even within the Life and
Work movement there was considerable tension as to the relationship
between Christian dogma and Christian practice. In his analysis of the
history of the Life and Work Movement between 1925 and 1948, Nils
Ehrenstrom argues that although the desire to work together on social
issues was seen as central, there also developed an appreciation of the fact
that there was need for theological reflection on social action too.
Under the impulse of its own initial convictions, and of keen criticism
from some of its own supporters, Life and Work increasingly recognised
the importance of theological factors, and thus steered a course which
gradually brought it into convergence with Faith and Order.196
195 The EcumenicalMovement An Antholo~,p.265.
196A History if the Ecumenical Movement, 1517-1948, edited by Ruth Rouse and Stephen
Charles Neill, SPCK, 1967, p.573.
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A further Conference on Life and Work took place in Oxford in 1937.
Faced with the reality of the rise of both Communism and Fascism in the
world and the threat to world peace, the Conference was determined to find
a prophetic voice with which to call for a unity that transcends race,
nationality or political oudook. The final document of the Conference
stated that " the first duty of the Church, and its greatest service to the
world, is that it be in very deed the Church.,,197 However, despite the good
will of those participating, no clear vision emerged as to what exacdy was
envisaged by the slogan "Let the Church be the Church!". Perhaps as a
result of this lack of clarity, and of the growing realisation that social issues
need also to be understood from a theological perspective, the Conference
also suggested that the Faith and Order movement should unite with the
Faith and Life movement in order to form a World Council of Churches.
Both movements accepted this suggestion but, due to the turmoil of the
Second World War, the first gathering of the World Council of Churches
took place in Amsterdam only in 1948.
Although the Roman Catholic Church was not officially represented at the
first assembly of the World Council of Churches, a total of 147 Christian
Churches were represented, and it was seen by all as a gift that many of the
'younger' Churches from Africa, Asia and the Americas sent participants.
The official message of the Assembly managed to show that the ecumenical
project, to which the World Council of Churches committed itself, involved
some fundamental doctrinal agreement as well as a call to offer united
Christian witness in the world. In so doing, it seems to infer that there is no
fundamental split between doctrine and service. In terms of doctrine, the
197 A History ofthe EcumenicalMovement, 1517-1948, p.591.
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fact that the World Council of Churches had gathered in the name of Jesus
presumes at the very least agreement on the Lordship of Christ.
We bless God our Father, and our Lord Jesus Christ who gathers
together in one the children of God that are scattered abroad. He has
brought us here together at Amsterdam. We are one in acknowledging
Him as our God and Saviour. We are divided from one another not only
in matters of faith, order and tradition, but also by pride of nation, class
and race. But Christ has made us His own and He is not divided. In
seeking Him we find one another...We intend to stay together.198
Along with this admittedly basic doctrinal statement we find too a call to a
mutual sharing of the task of procla.iining Gospel values to the world.
Our coming together to form a World Council will be in vain unless
Christians and Christian congregations everywhere commit themselves to
the Lord of the Church in a new effort to seek together, where they live,
to be His witnesses and servants among their neighbours ...We have to
learn afresh together to speak boldly in Christ's name both to those in
power and to the people, to oppose terror, cruelty and race
discrimination, to stand by the outcast, the prisoner and the refugee. We
have to make of the Church in every place a voice for those who have no
voice, and a home where every man will be at home.199
One of the ways in which we can clearly see that matters doctrinal and social
were both of concern to the World Council of Churches is simply to look at
the themes that have been covered during the World Council of Churches
assemblies. The first assembly, that of Amsterdam in 1948, took as its main
198 The EcumenicalMovement: An Anthology, p.21.
199 The EcumenicalMovement: An Anthology, p.22.
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theme" Man's Disorder and God's Design". The theme was discussed
from four different perspectives; that of the universal Church in God's
design, the Church's witness to God's design, the Church and the disorder
of society, and the Church and the international order. The Amsterdam
assembly showed that it was unafraid to face controversial issues by
committing itself to two important declarations, the first being that war is
contrary to the will of God, and the second, that Christianity ought not to
be equated with any particular political system. These clearly practical
declarations are a sign that the World Council of Churches from the
beginning took social concerns seriously, but did so within the context of
some overall theological understanding of God's design for the world and
for humanity.
The second assembly of the World Council of Churches took place in 1954,
in Evanston, D.S.A. The theme chosen for the assembly was" Christ - the
Hope of the World". Once again the main theme was addressed according
to various aspects. The sub-themes were as follows: Our oneness in Christ
and our disunity as Churches, the mission of the Church to those outside
her life, the responsible society in a world perspective, Christians in the
struggle for world community, the Churches amid racial and ethnic tensions,
and lastly, the laity: the Christian in his vocation. The fact that at this
assembly the World Council of Churches again faced the social problems
affecting the world in issues like racism and economic injustice reveals that
the ecumenical movement was anxious to make a practical difference in
terms of human relations in the world. But it is also significant that when
the delegates came to discuss the real meaning of Christian hope there was a
divide between those, mainly from the European Churches, who favoured
an eschatological understanding of hope, and those who argued that
Christian hope is for the world here and now. It would appear then that
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although the assembly was clear in its intention to offer a message of hope
to the world, the question of how to bring that message of hope across was
largely dependent on a theological and doctrinal understanding of what
exactly constitutes Christian hope.
The next assembly of the World Council of Churches took place at New
Delhi in 1961. The general theme of the assembly was '1esus Christ - the
Light of the World", and the main focus of the meeting was on the issues of
witness, service and unity. While the focus on service and unity was clearly
intended to bear practical fruit, the main focus of the Conference proved to
be that of unity. The final document of the assembly produced a famous
statement on the meaning of unity, one which again reveals that there are
both doctrinal and practical aspects of the call to Christian unity.
:~' We believe that the unity which is both God's will and his gift to his
I Church is being made visible as all in each place who are baptised into
Jesus Christ and confess him as Lord and Saviour are brought by the
Holy Spirit into one fully committed fellowship, holding the one
apostolic faith, preaching the one Gospel, breaking the one bread, joining
in common prayer, and having a corporate life reaching out in witness
and service to all and who at the same time are united with the whole
Christian fellowship in all places and all ages in such a wise that ministry
and members are accepted by all, and that all can act and speak. together
as occasion requires for the tasks to which God calls his people.2°O
What is most significant in this view of Christian unity is that, without losing
sight of the need for practical witness and service in the name of the
Gospel, it shows that for such witness and service to be Christian in nature
200 The EcumenicalMovement An Anthology, p.88.
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it necessarily demands a share in at least a minimal doctrinal and theological
agreement about the nature ofJesus and the nature of the Chw:ch. In other
words, the call to serve the world and to witness to the hope that Jesus
brings is based on a prior understanding of Jesus and the Chw:ch that is
inherently theological and doctrinal.
The fow:th assembly of the World Council of Chw:ches took place in 1968
at Uppsala, in Sweden. The theme of the assembly was ''Behold, I make all
things new". With more than 700 delegates present, representing 235
Chw:ches, it has been said that the Uppsala assembly was the most widely
representative gathering of Christian Chw:ches ever to be held. Also new at
this assembly was the presence of the Roman Catholic Chw:ch, newly open
to ecumenical dialogue as a result of the Second Vatican Council.
The sub-themes of the assembly were again concerned with both the quest
to offer proper witness to a rapidly changing world and with doctrinal
issues. They were as follows: The Holy Spirit and the catholicity of the
Chw:ch, renewal in mission, world economics and social development,
towards justice and peace in international affairs, worship, and the call to
move towards new styles of living.
The final document of the Uppsala assembly made no effort to hide the fact
that the question of Chw:ch unity involves a real tension as to how best
bring about the unity that is desired, nor did it avoid the difficulties in
deciding whether unity should be focussed more on service to the world or
on doctrinal agreements about the meaning of the Chw:ch and its place in
the world.
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We are confronted with the fact that the basis of our endeavour for unity
is being widely questioned. It seems to many, inside and outside the
Church, that the struggle for Christian unity in its present form is
irrelevant to the immediate crisis of our times. The Church, they say,
s ould seek its ~ty_!hrough solidarity with those forces in modern life,
s~ as tQ.e struggle for social equality, and should g!ve up its concern
with patc~g up its own internal disputes.201
Such a paragraph might have been written with Macmurray's ecumenical
concerns in mind, but the response of the final document is to acknowledge
that the whole ecumenical enterprise is being conducted within the context
of God who acts in history. In terms that, paradoxically, could have come
from Macmurray's The Clue to History it states that:
In the agonising arena of contemporary history...we see the work of
demonic forces that battle against the rights and liberties of man, but we
also see the activity of the life-giving Spirit of God. We have come to
view this world of men as the place where God is already at work to
make all things new, and where he summons us to work with him.202
Again, the final document seems to argue that although there may be
disagreement as to how best create the unity of the Churches for the good
of the world, such unity involves at least some level of doctrinal agreement.
" The purpose of Christ is to bring people of all times, of all races,of all
'-- - ..
places: of ~ conditions, into an organic and living unity in Christ by the
.,--
~oly Spirit under the universal fatherhood of God".203 Such a Trinitarian
201A History if the EcumenicalMovement 1948-1968: The EcumenicalAdvance, edited by Harold
E. Fey, SPCK, London, 1970, p.421.
202 A History ifthe EcumenicalMovement 1948-1968: The EcumenicalAdvance, p.421.
203 A History ifthe EcumenicalMovement 1948-1968: The EcumenicalAdvance, p.421.
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statement, with its declaration as to what the pru:pose ofJesus is, could only
be based on some shared doctrinal agreement among those who call
themselves Christian as to the nature and pru:pose of Jesus and to the
communion of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.
The last of the assemblies of the World Council of Churches to take place in
Macmurray's lifetime was that of 1975, which took place in Nairobi.
Without failing to examine the need for the Churches to seek practical
expressions of unity and for the ChurclJ.es to work with all those who.
uPE-0ld the dignity of human being, the focus at the assembly was again,
predictably, turned to the question of unity, and to what God's intention for
unity was demanding of the Churches. While all continued to share in a
desire for unity, there emerged a growing appreciation of the fact that the
kind of unity the World Council of Churches was seeking was not in any
"'-- - - _. - -- -- - --
s~ uniformity, but rather unity expres~ed.through diversity. The Nairobi
assembly built on the idea of the New Delhi assembly, that the Churches
were being called to an organic unity, by adding that, while this remains the
goal of the World Council of Churches, the organic unity of the Churches
can still be expressed through the diversity of styles of worship and lifestyle
to be found within the Churches. It further suggested that the Churches
ought to_work towards '.5=onciliar fellowship', whereby the Churches coul~
welcome their diversity within a context of deeper unity, best expressed in
r~
meetings like those of the assemblies of the World Council of Churches.
However, the richness of diversity was still to be seen within the framework
of a general doctrinal agreement about the fundamental aspects of Christian
beliefs.
Though different members in each local community, and different local
communities, do and should manifest a rich diversity, and develop their
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own proper personality, nevertheless no cultural, sociological,
psychological, political or historical difference can alter the integrity of
the one apostoli~Jaith. By the working of the Holy Spirit, the One
Living Word and Son of God is incarnate in the One Church, the One
Body of which Christ is the Head and the true worshippers of the Father
the members. TheycQ~~ipw!J.o said: '1 am the truth'. This
Living Truth is the goal towards which, all churches who seek for unity
tend together.204 .
Unity Through Doctrine and Service
The history of the ecumenical movement and of the World COlUlcil of
Churches subsequent to Macmurray's death in 1976 need not concern us
here, but it is clear that the desire for unity among the Churches continues
to be expressed through cOlUldess gatherings, large and small, of those who,
share his fundamental belief that the Church needs to be united if it is to be
true to God's word and to its own nature. The tension between seeking
doctrinal agreement and seeking united action for the sake of the world
continues to engage many of those involved in ecumenism, and perhaps
inevitably so.
In terms of our admittedly brief glance at some of the major developments
in the history of the ecumenical movement, we have seen that there has
been no single vision of unity at work. Rather, there has always been both a
doctrinal and a social element to the call to unity. Indeed, the call to
C~ristians to be a practical sign of unity in the world depends largely on .
som~ basic doctrinal agreement as to what constitutes a Christian, even if
such agreement is limited to the confession that Christ is Lord. We can find
204 The EcumenicalMovement: An Anthology, p.lll.
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evidence for this even in Macmurray's writing itself. In Search for Reality in
Religion, before making his appeal to the Churches to focus on a unity which
is practical rather than doctrinal, Macmurray himself has to provide his
readers with a functional definition of the Church. "The Church is the
community of the disciples of Jesus working, in cooperation with God and
under the guidance of His Spirit, to establish the Kingdom of Heaven on
earth".20S Any attempt to interpret such a definition of Christianity, or
indeed any other, must surely stem from a doctrinal perspective. In the light
of the history of the ecumenical movement, Macmurray's assertion, in Search
for Reality in Religion, that if the Churches avoided seeking doctrinal unity they
could achieve practical union tomorrow seems therefore, if not naive, then
at least overly optimistic!
What also emerges is the fact that it can be, if anything, more difficult for
Christians to come to agreement on very practical issues such as those of
how to create peace, justice and equality in the world than it is to find
doctrinal agreement about the nature of God and the vocation of the
Churches. This is a point well made by Jfu:gen Moltmann, a theologian who
has been much involved in the whole ecumenical project. Writing a
reflection paper on the first fifty years of the Faith and Order movement in
1977, he states that:
Fifty years ago in the early days of ecumenical rapprochement it was said
that ''Doctrine divides - service_Ut!:!tes" ...Today the situation is almost
completely reversed. Now, after many years of patient, painstaking work
it would be true to say ''Theology unites - praxis divide~'. Controversy in
the ecumenical movement no longer centres on the Filioque, but
concerns instead the Programme to Combat Racism. The problem now
205 John Macmurray, Search for Reality in Religion, p.64.
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is not the theological understanding of the Eucharist and of ministry, but
the practical recognition of ministries and common celebration. After
fifty years of concerted theological effort we now have to say quite
openly to Christians and church authorities that there are no longer any
doctrinal differences which justify the divisions of our Churches.206
One final point with regards to the history of the ecumenical movement
needs to be made. TIlls is the fact that, in gathering together with the
intention of seeking the unity that God demands and in trying to find
practical means to express that unity, the very experience of sharing dialogue
has been itself an act of communion. Konrad Raiser, a former deputy
general secretary of the WorId Council of Churches, quotes the theologian J.
Brosseder who states that:
The attempt of the churches to proceed via "dialogue" to "consensus" as
a result of dialogue, so as then to be able to restore communion between
the churches, is contrived and remote from life, in that communion does
not come into being and is not experienced at all in that way. In these
successive stages - first, dialogue; then consensus; and then finally,
communion - what is overlooked is that dialogue is living communion.
Communion, fellowship, without dialogue is dead. Dialogue is not a
means to an end: it is rather living communion itself.207
TIlls insight can be said to reveal another weakness in Macmurray's well-
intended call for unity through practical action. The weakness of his view is
that it fails to recognise that the simple experience of dialoguing with others
is more than just a time spent in preparation for action. To enter into
dialogue with others, even if the goal of such dialogue is to work towards
206 The EcumenicalMovement: An Anthology, p.210.
207 Konrad Raiser, Ecumenism in Transition, WCC Publications, Geneva, 1991, p.l06.
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practical action, is itself an expenence of commuruon and fellowship.
Indeed, it is precisely at ecumenical gatherings that many people have come
to experience the unity and love they are most ardently seeking.
We are now in a position, I believe, to state that while the history of the
ecumenical movement does not necessarily prove that Macmurray's'
approach to the question of Church unity is wrong, it does suggest that he
failed both to appreciate the complexity of the ecumenical task and to
recognise that it is not possible to be united in Christ without some
doctrinal agreement as to the meaning ofJesus. All of the evidence available
to us through the history of the ecumenical movement and through the
many documents of the Faith and Order movement, the Life and Work
movement and the World Council of Churches, suggests indeed that the
closer the Churches come to doctrinal agreement on such issues as the
nature of Jesus, baptism, Eucharist and ministry, the easier it is for the
Churches to act in the world and for the world with one voice.
There is however another, perhaps more serious, criticism to be made of
Macmurray's refusal to accept the need for doctrinal agreement amongst the
Churches. This criticism is based, not on the history of the ecumenical
movement, but on Macmurray's own philosophical analysis of the nature of
the human person and on his notion that thinking itself is a reflective
activity, and done for the sake of action. In order to make this criticism
more explicit it is necessary to return again to some of the philosophical
arguments that Macmurray presents in both The Self as Agent and Persons in
Relation.
We are already familiar with Macmurray's View, shared by many
contemporary philosophers, that Descartes' attempt to find epistemological
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certainty left us with a greatly impoverished understanding of human nature.
In reducing the person to the concept of a thinker, Descartes could give no
plausible account of human activity. Nor could he explain the existence of
other human beings. Macmurray believed that most philosophy since
Descartes' Cogito was inevitably headed in the wrong direction and
attempted in his own philosophical endeavours to find a more appropriate
way to understand human nature. His way of doing so was to take as a
starting point the human person as an agent rather than as a thinker. In this
manner, one would be able to account for thinking without losing the
concept that it is agency that marks human being. In The Self as Agent
Macmurray suggested that the human person is a being who both thinks and
acts. Indeed, thinking and action can be seen as being nothing other than
contrasted modes of activity. The distinction between the two is simply that
action may be seen as always primary, while thinking can be seen as
secondary and.derivative, always done for the sake of action.
Macmurray developed this view further by focussing on the centrality of
intention in human actions. He was anxious that we avoid a teleological
understanding of human action because, in his view, such an understanding
makes the whole concept of human freedom problematic. If human beings
are by nature aimed at some purpose or intention then no human action is
properly free, nor are their actions properly human actions. What makes
human action different in kind from any other animal behaviour or activity
is precisely that human beings generally act with some intention in mind.
Human action is only proper human action when there is an intention to act
in a particular fashion. But our actions can only be properly intentional
when we have taken the time to adequately think and reflect.
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In terms of Macmurray's philosophical concept of personhoo~ therefore,
reflection is normally constituted by a withdrawal from action but is done
for the sake of further action. This experience is marked by what
Macmurray calls the rhythm of withdrawal· and return. In taking time to
reflect on our past activities we withdraw from direct attention. Doing so
allows us to not only judge the relative success or failure of our past actions,
but to clarify our intentions so that our future actions might be in harmony
with the intention that directs our activity. Each human life is marked by
this continuous rhythm of withdrawal and return, but what is crucial, in
terms of Macmurray's philosophical argument, is that proper human action
depends on acting with the right intention, and one can only be sure of
acting with the right intention if one withdraws from action so as to reflect.
In other words, although reflection is always secondary and done for the
sake of action, reflection itself is a form of activity. It is what gives shape
and purpose to all our human activities.
Throughout his writings Macmurray frequendy makes mention of what he
considers to be the three basic modes of reflection in human life. These are
science, art and religion. Originally, in what are termed primitive societies,
religion was the only real mode of reflection, but as people gradually lost
sight of the religious nature of their life and world, art and science came to
be seen as alternative, if not opposing, modes of reflection. In Macmurray's
view, it is only through rediscovering the primacy of religious reflection that
we will be enabled to act with the intentions that are appropriate to our own
nature.
Given the fact that we think and reflect for the sake of action, what is the
precise purpose of religious reflection and thinking? Macmurray's answer to
this is related to his other major philosophical argument that human action,
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when conducted with the right intention, always aIDlS at creating
communion and friendship with other human agents. The real value of
religious reflection lies, therefore, in that "religion.. .is the reflective activity
which expresses the consciousness of community; or more tersely, religion
is the celebration of communion".208 It is through religious reflection that
we can come to a true knowledge of ourselves, of other agents, and the God
who is also personal. With the knowledge that to be human is to intend
communion with God and with others, a knowledge that comes to us
through religious reflection, we are thus enabled to act in such a way that all
that we do is done with the intention of creating communion and
overcoming division.
This, in brief, is Macmurray's philosophical view of human nature, one best
summed up in his own words: " The simplest expression that I can find for
the thesis I have tried to maintain is this: All meaningful knowledge is for
the sake of action, and all meaningful action for the sake of friendship".209
Turning again to Macmurray's claim that unity between the Churches
cannot be achieved through doctrinal reflection and agreement but only
through action, it is my argument that Macmurray's view is logically
inconsistent with his philosophical understanding of the importance of
reflection.
There can surely be little doubt that the intention of all those who have
participated in the ecumenical efforts of the 20 th century has been to create
the communion and fellowship that Macmurray spent his whole life trying
to achieve. Nor can it be seriously doubted that the intention of the
208 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation, p.162.
209 John Macmurray, The SelfasAgent, p.1S.
181
ecumenical movement has been practical, something which is clearly
revealed in the fact that the Churches have played a significant role in the
effort to overcome social evils such as racism and sexism.
The various gatherings of the ecumenical movement through the years have
been precisely what Macmurray suggests is appropriate; namely, they have
been moments of withdrawal but moments spent always with the intention
of returning to make a practical difference in the creation of a world built on
mutual respect and communion. Up to this point, therefore, we might say
that the assemblies of the World Council of Churches, for example, reveal
Macmurray's philosophical notion of action to be not only theoretically
plausible, but also practically possible.
Where then can we see evidence of the logical inconsistency in Macmurray's
refusal to accept that doctrinal matters can be a source of unity too? The
evidence, I believe, stems from his notion that thinking and reflection is not
only done for the sake of action, but is itself a form of activity. If that is the
case, then surely it cannot be denied that religious reflection, and with it
doctrinal reflection, is also a form of activity? Even if, as Macmurray states,
reflection is always a secondary form of activity, it remains an activity
nonetheless. Again, given the case that thinking or reflecting and action are
simply contrasted modes of activity, then one can see that the World
Council of Churches' dual approach to the question of unity, through
doctrinal agreement and through practical social action, are not as
irreconcilable as Macmurray believes. Rather, they both constitute modes of
action, conducted with the intention of creating that communion in which
we can move away from fear to a real love for one another.
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It may be that Macmurray's aversion to the attempt of the Churches to
come to doctrinal agreement on the nature of God and the Christian
vocation is no more than a desire that such reflection should be seen in its
proper context, that even doctrinal agreement is to be understood as
secondary, and for the sake of proper action in the world. But by stating
that, in our Christian task to help create the unity that is God's will for
humanity, there is no place for doctrinal reflection and agreement,
Macmurray fails to be consistent with his own view that reflection is in itself
an activity. This lack of consistency shows that Macmurray's failure lay in
the fact that he was unable to see that the activities of the ecumenical
movement could provide the world with a very clear living example of what
he had spent his whole life trying to proclaim.
The sad truth is that Macmurray, through his abhorrence of doctrine, was
blinded to the fact that the whole ecumenical enterprise can be seen as a
living image of the very thesis that he wanted to maintain. To paraphrase
Macmurray's own expression of his thesis, we can conclude with the view
that all meaningful knowledge, including doctrinal knowledge, is for the sake
of action. And all meaningful action, including both the reflective activity of
working towards doctrinal agreement and the practical action of creating
communion among the Churches and beyond, is for the sake of friendship.
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CONCLUSION
In the Introduction to this dissertation I made the suggesnon that
Macmurray never succeeded in feeling entirely at home within the
philosophical and religious environment of his time. This was largely
because his interest in coming to a fuller understanding of what it means to
be person took him along roads no longer traversed by many of his fellow
philosophers and Christians. Yet, even in his own lifetime, there were some
who believed that Macmurray had something significant to say to a world
searching for hope in the midst of so much turmoil and horror. Among
those who valued the contribution of Macmurray was Thomas F.
Torrance21o, a professor of Divinity at the University of Edinburgh. In a
letter written in 1975 Torrance stated that:
John Macmurray is the quiet giant of modem philosophy, the most
original and creative of savants and social thinkers in the English-
speaking world. If his thought is revolutionary, as it certainly is, the kind
of revolution he has in view is not revolt but the reconstruction of the
foundations of life and knowledge with a view to a genuinely open and
creative society of the future ... In what he has done through his teaching
and writing there is a longer period between germination and harvest, for
his thought penetrates deeply and pervasively into the foundations of
210 Thomas F. Torrance (b. 1913) wrote his doctorate at the University of Basel under the
supervision of Karl Barth. He was professor of Christian Dogmatics at the University of
Edinburgh from 1952 to 1979. From 1976 to 1977 he served as the Moderator of the
Church of Scotland. Among his many publications are God and Rationali!J (1971) and
Theology in Reconstruction (1965).
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human existence; if, then, he has not been yet appreciated as he ought to
be, it is because he is something like fifty years ahead of the rest of us.
21l
Torrance was not the only person to recognise that Macmurray, in his belief
that human beings are most fully themselves when they seek communion
with others, had something significant to say to the contemporary world.
Dame Cicely Saunders, for example, who founded the St. Christopher's
Hospice in 1967, claimed that the inspiration for her notion that the dying
should be treated with the utmost respect and dignity came from her reading
of Macmurray's view of the human person. Similarly, the famous
psychiatrist R.D.Laing was only one of many psychiatrists who studied the
works of Macmurray because of his view that personal reality is deeply
marked by relationships.212
Again, the contemporary American philosopher, Walter G. Jeftko who
wrote his doctoral thesis on Macmurray's ethical vision, has recently
published a book dealing with a variety of ethical issues from a personalist
standpoint. In his book, Contemporary Ethical Issues: A Personalistic Perspectivl13,
Jeftko clearly states that without agreeing with everything that Macmurray
says, and while dealing with moral issues not specifically dealt with by
Macmurray himself, his ideas are heavily influenced by Macmurray's view of
the nature of the human person.
Macmurray's Vlews about society and community have also had some
influence in the political world, most notably in the thought of the present
211 John E. Costello,John MacmufrC!j: A Biography, p.422.
212 cf. John E. Costello,John MacmurrC!J: A Biography, p 352.
213 Waiter G. Jeffko, Contemporary Ethical Issues: A Personalistic Perspective, Humanity Books,
New York, 1999.
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Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Tony Blair. In a Foreword that he
wrote for John Conford's selection of Macmurray's writings, Blair states
that:
John Macmurray is not one of the twentieth century's most famous
philosophers. This is surprising. Actually his work is more accessible,
better written and above all far more relevant than most of what I and
many others studied as hallowed texts at university ...Macmurray offers
two insights. First, he places the individual firmly within a social setting -
we are what we are, in part, because of the other, the 'You and 1'. We
cannot ignore our obligations to others as well as ourselves. This is
where modem political notions of community begin. Secondly, by
rooting his vision in the personal world and in intention, he rejects simple
determinism. The personal is not submerged in the social or organic. In
religious terms, also, it is easy to see his influence in a whole generation
of Christian philosophers. For him, spirituality was based in this world; it
was not an abstraction from it... For philosophy to be at all relevant, it
must either increase an understanding of the world or our ability to
change it. At best it can do both. This is a test John Macmurray passes
with flying colours. I hope more people discover him.214
Without wishing to express any op1n.1on on the nature of Blair's own
political values, I would endorse his desire that more people come to
discover the richness and challenge of Macmurray's thought. In particular I
would hope that those who share Macmurray's concern for unity among the
Christian Churches might find in his belief that to be human is to be
essentially communitarian a valuable philosophical basis for the whole
ecumenical project.
214 John Conford, The Personal World: John MacmurrCfY on Se!! and Society, Floris Books,
Edinburgh, 1996, pp.9-10.
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Although in my thesis I have tried to assert that Macmurray's failure to give
any place to the need for doctrinal agreement among the Churches marks a
logical inconsistency in terms of his own philosophical understanding of the
nature of action and of thought as a form of reflective activity, this ought
not to blind us to the positive contribution that Macmurray can make to the
ongoing search for real unity among Christians.
While it may be true that ecumenism is primarily a theological concern, it is
my opinion that the efforts of the ecumenical movement can be greatly
enhanced by being properly grounded in a philosophically sustainable
understanding of human nature. By cogently arguing that to be a person is
to live with the intention of creating communion with others, Macmurray is
able to show that ecumenism is not simply desirable for pastoral reasons or
even for the sake of the proclamation of the Kingdom of God. Rather, in
expressing our desire for unity among Christians, and indeed with all
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